---
name: implementing-ransomware-kill-switch-detection
description: 'Analyzes ransomware kill switch mechanisms, including mutex-based execution
  guards, domain-based kill switches (e.g. WannaCry-style), and registry termination
  checks, then implements mutex vaccination and kill switch domain monitoring to stop
  ransomware before it runs. Use when analyzing a sample''s execution guards or deploying
  vaccination/monitoring as a defensive control.

  '
domain: cybersecurity
subdomain: ransomware-defense
tags:
- ransomware
- kill-switch
- mutex
- detection
- WannaCry
- malware-analysis
version: 1.0.0
author: mahipal
license: Apache-2.0
nist_csf:
- PR.DS-11
- RS.MA-01
- RC.RP-01
- PR.IR-01
mitre_attack:
- T1078
- T1190
- T1059
- T1486
- T1490
mitre_f3:
  version: '1.1'
  tactics:
  - positioning
  - monetization
  techniques:
  - id: T1219
    name: Remote Access Tools
    tactic: positioning
    source: attack
  - id: F1018
    name: Convert to Cryptocurrency
    tactic: monetization
    source: f3
  - id: F1017
    name: Conversion to Physical Monetary Instruments
    tactic: monetization
    source: f3
  - id: F1047
    name: Transfer of funds
    tactic: monetization
    source: f3
---

# Implementing Ransomware Kill Switch Detection

## When to Use

- Analyzing a ransomware sample to determine if it contains a kill switch mechanism (mutex, domain, registry)
- Deploying proactive mutex vaccination across endpoints to prevent known ransomware families from executing
- Monitoring DNS for kill switch domain lookups that indicate ransomware attempting to check before encrypting
- During incident response to quickly determine if a ransomware variant can be stopped by activating its kill switch
- Building detection signatures for ransomware mutex creation events using Sysmon or EDR telemetry

**Do not use** kill switch vaccination as a primary defense. Not all ransomware families implement kill switches, and those that do may remove them in newer versions. This is a supplementary detection and prevention layer.

## Prerequisites

- Python 3.8+ with `ctypes` (Windows) for mutex creation and enumeration
- Sysmon installed with Event ID 1 (process creation) and Event ID 17/18 (pipe/mutex events) configured
- Access to malware analysis sandbox for identifying kill switch mechanisms in samples
- DNS monitoring capability for detecting kill switch domain resolution attempts
- Familiarity with Windows internals: mutexes (mutants), kernel objects, named pipes
- Reference database of known ransomware mutexes (github.com/albertzsigovits/malware-mutex)

## Workflow

### Step 1: Identify Kill Switch Mechanisms in Ransomware

Analyze samples for common kill switch patterns:

```
Kill Switch Types Found in Ransomware:
━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━
1. MUTEX-BASED (most common):
   - Ransomware creates a named mutex at startup
   - If mutex already exists → another instance is running → exit
   - Defense: Pre-create the mutex to prevent execution
   - Examples:
     WannaCry:     Global\MsWinZonesCacheCounterMutexA
     Conti:        kasKDJSAFJauisiudUASIIQWUA82
     REvil:        Global\{GUID-based-on-machine}
     Ryuk:         Global\YOURPRODUCT_MUTEX

2. DOMAIN-BASED:
   - Ransomware resolves a hardcoded domain before executing
   - If domain resolves → security sandbox detected → exit
   - Defense: Register/sinkhole the domain to activate kill switch
   - Examples:
     WannaCry v1:  iuqerfsodp9ifjaposdfjhgosurijfaewrwergwea.com
     WannaCry v1:  fferfsodp9ifjaposdfjhgosurijfaewrwergwea.com

3. REGISTRY-BASED:
   - Check for specific registry key/value before executing
   - If key exists → exit (anti-analysis or kill switch)
   - Defense: Create the registry key proactively

4. FILE-BASED:
   - Check for existence of specific file or directory
   - If marker file exists → exit
   - Defense: Create the marker file on all endpoints

5. LANGUAGE-BASED:
   - Check system language/keyboard layout
   - Exit if Russian/CIS country keyboard detected
   - Common in Eastern European ransomware groups
```

### Step 2: Deploy Mutex Vaccination

Pre-create known ransomware mutexes on endpoints to prevent execution:

```python
# Windows mutex vaccination using ctypes
import ctypes
from ctypes import wintypes

kernel32 = ctypes.WinDLL('kernel32', use_last_error=True)

def create_mutex(name):
    """Create a named mutex to vaccinate against ransomware."""
    handle = kernel32.CreateMutexW(None, False, name)
    error = ctypes.get_last_error()
    if handle == 0:
        return False, f"Failed to create mutex: error {error}"
    if error == 183:  # ERROR_ALREADY_EXISTS
        return True, f"Mutex already exists (already vaccinated): {name}"
    return True, f"Mutex created successfully: {name}"

KNOWN_RANSOMWARE_MUTEXES = [
    "Global\\MsWinZonesCacheCounterMutexA",        # WannaCry
    "Global\\kasKDJSAFJauisiudUASIIQWUA82",        # Conti
    "Global\\YOURPRODUCT_MUTEX",                     # Ryuk variant
    "Global\\JhbGjhBsSQjz",                         # Maze
    "Global\\sdjfhksjdhfsd",                         # Generic ransomware
]
```

### Step 3: Monitor for Mutex Creation Events

Use Sysmon to detect when ransomware creates its characteristic mutexes:

```xml
<!-- Sysmon configuration for mutex monitoring -->
<Sysmon schemaversion="4.90">
  <EventFiltering>
    <!-- Event ID 1: Process creation with mutex indicators -->
    <ProcessCreate onmatch="include">
      <CommandLine condition="contains">mutex</CommandLine>
      <CommandLine condition="contains">CreateMutex</CommandLine>
    </ProcessCreate>
  </EventFiltering>
</Sysmon>
```

```
Detection via Event Logs:
━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━
Windows Security Log:
  Event ID 4688: Process creation (enable command line logging)

Sysmon:
  Event ID 1:  Process create (includes command line and hashes)
  Event ID 17: Pipe created (named pipes, similar to mutexes)

PowerShell detection:
  Event ID 4104: Script block logging (detect mutex creation in scripts)

Velociraptor artifact:
  Windows.Detection.Mutants - Enumerates all named mutant objects
```

### Step 4: Monitor DNS for Kill Switch Domains

Detect ransomware domain-based kill switch resolution attempts:

```
DNS Monitoring for Kill Switch Domains:
━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━
1. Monitor DNS queries for known kill switch domains
2. High-entropy domain names (>4.0 entropy in domain label) may indicate
   ransomware kill switch domains or DGA-generated C2 domains
3. Queries to newly registered domains from endpoints that typically
   only access well-established domains

Indicators:
  - Domain with no prior resolution history
  - Domain registered in last 24-72 hours
  - High character entropy in domain name
  - Resolution attempt followed by either mass encryption (kill switch failed)
    or process termination (kill switch activated)
```

### Step 5: Enumerate Active Mutexes for Incident Response

During an active incident, scan endpoints for ransomware-associated mutexes:

```powershell
# PowerShell: List all named mutant objects using Sysinternals Handle
# handle.exe -a -p <PID> | findstr "Mutant"

# Velociraptor query for mutex hunting:
# SELECT * FROM glob(globs="\\BaseNamedObjects\\*") WHERE Name =~ "mutex_pattern"

# Python-based enumeration (requires pywin32):
# import win32event
# handle = win32event.OpenMutex(0x00100000, False, "Global\\MutexName")
```

## Verification

- Verify mutex vaccination by attempting to create the same mutex (should get ERROR_ALREADY_EXISTS)
- Test that vaccinated mutexes survive system reboot (they do not; re-apply at startup via scheduled task)
- Confirm DNS monitoring detects test queries for known kill switch domains
- Validate Sysmon event generation for mutex creation by running a test script
- Check that vaccination does not interfere with legitimate applications using similar mutex names
- Test against actual ransomware samples in an isolated sandbox to confirm kill switch activation

## Key Concepts

| Term | Definition |
|------|------------|
| **Mutex (Mutant)** | A Windows kernel synchronization object used to ensure only one instance of a program runs; ransomware uses named mutexes to prevent re-infection |
| **Kill Switch** | A mechanism in ransomware that causes it to terminate without encrypting if a specific condition is met (mutex exists, domain resolves, file present) |
| **Mutex Vaccination** | Proactively creating named mutexes on endpoints that match known ransomware mutex names, preventing the ransomware from executing |
| **Domain Sinkhole** | Registering or redirecting a malicious domain to a controlled server; used to activate domain-based kill switches |
| **DGA (Domain Generation Algorithm)** | Algorithm used by malware to generate pseudo-random domain names for C2 communication, sometimes incorporating kill switch checks |

## Tools & Systems

- **Sysmon**: Microsoft system monitor providing Event ID 17/18 for named pipe and mutex creation monitoring
- **Velociraptor**: Endpoint visibility tool with built-in artifacts for enumerating mutant (mutex) objects on Windows
- **Sysinternals Handle**: Command-line tool for listing open handles including named mutexes per process
- **malware-mutex (GitHub)**: Community-maintained database of mutexes used by known malware families
- **ANY.RUN**: Interactive malware sandbox that reports mutex creation during dynamic analysis
- **PassiveDNS**: DNS monitoring infrastructure for detecting kill switch domain resolution attempts
