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skills/analyzing-ios-app-security-with-objection/references/standards.md
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# Standards Reference: iOS App Security with Objection
## OWASP Mobile Top 10 2024 Mapping
| OWASP ID | Risk | Objection Testing Coverage |
|----------|------|---------------------------|
| M1 | Improper Credential Usage | Keychain dumping, memory string search for hardcoded credentials |
| M3 | Insecure Authentication/Authorization | Hook authentication methods, bypass biometric checks |
| M5 | Insecure Communication | SSL pinning bypass, network class hooking |
| M7 | Insufficient Binary Protections | Jailbreak detection bypass, Frida detection assessment |
| M8 | Security Misconfiguration | Info.plist review, URL scheme analysis, ATS configuration |
| M9 | Insecure Data Storage | NSUserDefaults inspection, SQLite database access, file system review |
## OWASP MASVS v2.0 Control Mapping
| MASVS Category | Objection Commands | Assessment Area |
|----------------|-------------------|-----------------|
| MASVS-STORAGE | `ios keychain dump`, `ios nsuserdefaults get`, `sqlite connect` | Sensitive data in keychain, NSUserDefaults, databases |
| MASVS-CRYPTO | `memory search`, hook crypto framework calls | Key storage, algorithm selection |
| MASVS-AUTH | Hook LAContext, authentication classes | Biometric bypass, session management |
| MASVS-NETWORK | `ios sslpinning disable`, hook NSURLSession | Certificate pinning, cleartext traffic |
| MASVS-PLATFORM | Hook URL scheme handlers, pasteboard monitor | Deep link security, clipboard exposure |
| MASVS-CODE | `memory list modules`, binary inspection | Debugging symbols, framework analysis |
| MASVS-RESILIENCE | `ios jailbreak disable`, Frida detection hooks | Anti-tampering, anti-debugging |
## OWASP MASTG Test Cases
| Test ID | Description | Objection Approach |
|---------|-------------|-------------------|
| MASTG-TEST-0053 | Testing Local Storage for Sensitive Data | `ios keychain dump`, filesystem inspection |
| MASTG-TEST-0057 | Testing Backups for Sensitive Data | Check backup exclusion attributes |
| MASTG-TEST-0060 | Testing Custom URL Schemes | Hook `application:openURL:options:` |
| MASTG-TEST-0063 | Testing for Sensitive Data in Logs | Monitor NSLog calls via hooking |
| MASTG-TEST-0066 | Testing Enforced App Transport Security | Inspect Info.plist ATS configuration |
## Apple Platform Security Requirements
| Requirement | Assessment Method |
|-------------|-------------------|
| Keychain Access Control | Verify kSecAttrAccessible values via keychain dump |
| App Transport Security | Check Info.plist for NSAllowsArbitraryLoads exceptions |
| Data Protection API | Verify file protection attributes on sensitive files |
| Secure Enclave Usage | Hook SecKey operations for biometric-protected keys |
skills/analyzing-ios-app-security-with-objection/references/workflows.md
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# Workflows: iOS App Security with Objection
## Workflow 1: iOS Runtime Security Assessment
```
[Setup Environment] --> [Prepare Device] --> [Attach Objection] --> [Runtime Analysis]
| | | |
v v v v
[Install Frida] [Jailbroken: Start [Connect via USB] [Data Storage Check]
[Install Objection] frida-server] [Spawn target app] [Network Security]
[Non-JB: Patch IPA] [Auth Mechanism Review]
[Binary Protection Test]
|
v
[Document Findings]
[Generate Report]
```
## Workflow 2: SSL Pinning Bypass for Traffic Interception
```
[Configure Burp Proxy] --> [Set device proxy] --> [Attach Objection]
|
v
[ios sslpinning disable]
|
v
[Navigate app in browser/UI]
|
v
[Capture HTTPS traffic in Burp]
[Analyze API endpoints]
[Test authentication flows]
[Check for sensitive data in transit]
```
## Workflow 3: Keychain and Data Storage Assessment
```
[Attach Objection] --> [ios keychain dump] --> [Analyze keychain items]
| |
v v
[ios nsuserdefaults get] [Check protection classes]
| [Identify sensitive tokens]
v [Verify encryption at rest]
[List app sandbox files]
|
v
[sqlite connect *.db]
[Query sensitive tables]
|
v
[memory search "password"]
[memory search "token"]
[memory search "secret"]
```
## Workflow 4: Jailbreak Detection Assessment
```
[Attach Objection] --> [ios jailbreak disable] --> [Navigate app]
| |
v [App functions normally?]
[Hook detection methods] / \
[Monitor file checks] [Yes] [No]
[Monitor Cydia URL scheme] | |
| [Detection [Additional detection
v bypassed] methods exist]
[Document detection |
methods found] [Hook deeper: search
[Assess bypass for custom checks]
difficulty] [Frida script for
targeted bypass]
```
## Decision Matrix: Testing Approach
| Device State | IPA Access | Approach |
|-------------|-----------|----------|
| Jailbroken | Not needed | Direct Frida server + Objection attach |
| Non-jailbroken | Available | Patch IPA with `objection patchipa` |
| Non-jailbroken | Not available | Request IPA from client or use device management |
| Emulator | N/A | Limited: Frida on Corellium or similar platform |