Initial commit - 611 cybersecurity skills across all subdomains

skills/detecting-dll-sideloading-attacks/references/standards.md

@@ -0,0 +1,49 @@
+# Standards and References - DLL Sideloading Detection
+
+## MITRE ATT&CK Mappings
+
+### T1574.002 - Hijack Execution Flow: DLL Side-Loading
+- **Tactic**: Persistence (TA0003), Privilege Escalation (TA0004), Defense Evasion (TA0005)
+- **Platforms**: Windows
+- **Data Sources**: File monitoring, DLL monitoring, Process monitoring
+
+### Related Techniques
+| Technique | Name |
+|-----------|------|
+| T1574.001 | DLL Search Order Hijacking |
+| T1574.006 | Dynamic Linker Hijacking |
+| T1574.008 | Path Interception by Search Order |
+| T1574.009 | Path Interception by Unquoted Service Path |
+| T1574.011 | Services Registry Permissions Weakness |
+| T1574.012 | COR_PROFILER |
+
+## Windows DLL Search Order
+
+1. Directory of the executable (or directory specified by SetDllDirectory)
+2. System32 directory
+3. 16-bit system directory
+4. Windows directory
+5. Current working directory
+6. PATH environment variable directories
+
+## Known Vulnerable Applications
+
+| Application | Vulnerable DLL | Vendor | Notes |
+|-------------|---------------|--------|-------|
+| OneDriveUpdater.exe | version.dll | Microsoft | Frequently abused by APTs |
+| Teams.exe | CRYPTSP.dll | Microsoft | Side-loading target |
+| DismHost.exe | dismcore.dll | Microsoft | Signed binary side-loading |
+| MpCmdRun.exe | mpclient.dll | Microsoft | AV binary abuse |
+| WerFault.exe | dbgcore.dll | Microsoft | Error handler abuse |
+| Grammarly | Various | Grammarly | User-space application |
+| Zoom | Various | Zoom | Meeting application |
+
+## Detection Data Sources
+
+| Source | Event | Purpose |
+|--------|-------|---------|
+| Sysmon Event 7 | Image Loaded | DLL load with hash and signature |
+| Sysmon Event 1 | Process Create | Application launch location |
+| Windows Security 4688 | Process Create | Command line monitoring |
+| ETW | DLL Load Events | Kernel-level DLL tracking |
+| MDE | DeviceImageLoadEvents | DLL load telemetry |

skills/detecting-dll-sideloading-attacks/references/workflows.md

@@ -0,0 +1,67 @@
+# Detailed Hunting Workflow - DLL Sideloading
+
+## Phase 1: Sysmon DLL Load Analysis
+
+### Step 1.1 - Unsigned DLLs Loaded by Signed Applications
+```spl
+index=sysmon EventCode=7 Signed=false
+| where match(Image, "(?i)\\\\(Program Files|Windows)\\\\")
+| where NOT match(ImageLoaded, "(?i)\\\\(Windows|Program Files)\\\\")
+| stats count by Image ImageLoaded Signature Computer
+| sort -count
+```
+
+### Step 1.2 - DLL Loads from Unusual Directories
+```spl
+index=sysmon EventCode=7
+| where match(ImageLoaded, "(?i)(\\\\temp\\\\|\\\\appdata\\\\|\\\\public\\\\|\\\\downloads\\\\)")
+| where Signed=false OR Signature="?"
+| stats count by Image ImageLoaded Computer User
+| sort -count
+```
+
+### Step 1.3 - KQL for MDE DLL Sideloading
+```kql
+DeviceImageLoadEvents
+| where Timestamp > ago(7d)
+| where InitiatingProcessFileName in~ ("OneDriveUpdater.exe","DismHost.exe","WerFault.exe")
+| where not(FolderPath startswith "C:\\Windows" or FolderPath startswith "C:\\Program Files")
+| project Timestamp, DeviceName, InitiatingProcessFileName, FolderPath, FileName, SHA256
+```
+
+## Phase 2: Legitimate App in Wrong Location
+
+### Step 2.1 - Signed Binaries Running Outside Standard Paths
+```spl
+index=sysmon EventCode=1
+| where NOT match(Image, "(?i)^(C:\\\\Windows|C:\\\\Program Files)")
+| where match(Image, "(?i)(svchost|explorer|rundll32|dllhost|OneDrive|Teams)\.exe$")
+| table _time Computer User Image CommandLine ParentImage Hashes
+```
+
+## Phase 3: Hash-Based Detection
+
+### Step 3.1 - Known-Bad DLL Hashes
+Compare loaded DLL hashes against threat intelligence:
+```spl
+index=sysmon EventCode=7
+| rex field=Hashes "SHA256=(?<sha256>[A-Fa-f0-9]{64})"
+| lookup threat_intel_hashes sha256 OUTPUT malware_family confidence
+| where isnotnull(malware_family)
+| table _time Computer Image ImageLoaded sha256 malware_family
+```
+
+## Phase 4: Behavioral Correlation
+
+### Step 4.1 - Network Activity After DLL Load
+Correlate DLL loads with subsequent network connections:
+```spl
+index=sysmon EventCode=7 Signed=false
+| rename Image as proc_image
+| join proc_image Computer [
+    search index=sysmon EventCode=3
+    | rename Image as proc_image
+    | where NOT match(DestinationIp, "^(10\.|172\.|192\.168\.)")
+]
+| table _time Computer proc_image ImageLoaded DestinationIp DestinationPort
+```