Initial commit - 611 cybersecurity skills across all subdomains

2026-09-04 07:20:50 +03:00 · 2026-02-25 10:47:44 +01:00
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+---
+name: detecting-lateral-movement-in-network
+description: >
+  Identifies lateral movement techniques in enterprise networks by analyzing
+  authentication logs, network flows, SMB traffic, and RDP sessions using Zeek,
+  Velociraptor, and SIEM correlation rules to detect attackers moving between systems.
+domain: cybersecurity
+subdomain: network-security
+tags: [network-security, lateral-movement, threat-detection, siem, pass-the-hash]
+version: "1.0"
+author: mahipal
+license: MIT
+---
+# Detecting Lateral Movement in Network
+
+## When to Use
+
+- Monitoring enterprise networks for post-compromise lateral movement patterns (pass-the-hash, RDP hopping, PSExec)
+- Building SIEM detection rules and alerts for common MITRE ATT&CK lateral movement techniques (T1021, T1570)
+- Investigating suspected breaches by analyzing authentication patterns and network connections between internal hosts
+- Hunting for anomalous east-west traffic patterns that indicate an attacker pivoting through the network
+- Validating that network segmentation and access controls effectively limit lateral movement paths
+
+**Do not use** as a substitute for endpoint detection and response (EDR) tools, for monitoring only north-south traffic while ignoring internal traffic flows, or without baseline knowledge of normal internal communication patterns.
+
+## Prerequisites
+
+- Network security monitoring deployed at internal choke points (Zeek, Suricata, or network TAPs)
+- SIEM platform (Splunk, Elastic, Microsoft Sentinel) collecting Windows Security Event Logs, DNS, and flow data
+- Windows Event Log forwarding configured for Security events (4624, 4625, 4648, 4672, 4768, 4769)
+- Baseline of normal internal authentication and connection patterns
+- Understanding of MITRE ATT&CK Lateral Movement tactics (TA0008)
+
+## Workflow
+
+### Step 1: Configure Log Collection for Lateral Movement Detection
+
+```bash
+# Windows Event Logs to collect (via WEF or agent):
+# Security Log:
+#   4624 - Successful logon (Type 3=Network, Type 10=RemoteInteractive)
+#   4625 - Failed logon
+#   4648 - Logon using explicit credentials (RunAs, PsExec)
+#   4672 - Special privileges assigned (admin logon)
+#   4768 - Kerberos TGT request
+#   4769 - Kerberos service ticket request
+#   4776 - NTLM authentication (credential validation)
+# System Log:
+#   7045 - New service installed (PsExec indicator)
+#   7036 - Service started/stopped
+
+# Configure Windows Event Forwarding (WEF) subscription
+# On the collector server (PowerShell):
+# wecutil cs lateral-movement-subscription.xml
+
+# Filebeat configuration for Windows Event Log shipping
+cat > /etc/filebeat/modules.d/security.yml << 'EOF'
+- module: system
+  auth:
+    enabled: true
+    var.paths: ["/var/log/auth.log"]
+  syslog:
+    enabled: true
+
+- module: zeek
+  connection:
+    enabled: true
+    var.paths: ["/opt/zeek/logs/current/conn.log"]
+  dns:
+    enabled: true
+    var.paths: ["/opt/zeek/logs/current/dns.log"]
+  smb_mapping:
+    enabled: true
+    var.paths: ["/opt/zeek/logs/current/smb_mapping.log"]
+  dce_rpc:
+    enabled: true
+    var.paths: ["/opt/zeek/logs/current/dce_rpc.log"]
+EOF
+
+# Zeek configuration for lateral movement detection
+# Enable SMB, DCE-RPC, and Kerberos logging
+cat >> /opt/zeek/share/zeek/site/local.zeek << 'EOF'
+@load policy/protocols/smb
+@load policy/protocols/conn/known-hosts
+@load policy/protocols/conn/known-services
+@load frameworks/intel/seen
+EOF
+
+sudo zeekctl deploy
+```
+
+### Step 2: Build Detection Rules for Common Lateral Movement Techniques
+
+```yaml
+# Splunk SPL queries for lateral movement detection
+
+# 1. Detect PsExec usage (new service creation on remote hosts)
+# index=wineventlog EventCode=7045 ServiceName="PSEXESVC" OR ServiceName="*psexec*"
+# | stats count by ComputerName, ServiceName, ImagePath
+# | where count > 0
+
+# 2. Detect Pass-the-Hash (Type 3 logon with NTLM)
+# index=wineventlog EventCode=4624 LogonType=3 AuthenticationPackageName="NTLM"
+# | where TargetUserName!="ANONYMOUS LOGON" AND TargetUserName!="$"
+# | stats count dc(ComputerName) as unique_hosts by TargetUserName, IpAddress
+# | where unique_hosts > 3
+
+# 3. Detect RDP lateral movement (Type 10 logon from internal IPs)
+# index=wineventlog EventCode=4624 LogonType=10
+# | where cidrmatch("10.0.0.0/8", IpAddress) OR cidrmatch("192.168.0.0/16", IpAddress)
+# | stats count dc(ComputerName) as rdp_hosts by TargetUserName, IpAddress
+# | where rdp_hosts > 2
+
+# Elastic SIEM detection rules (KQL)
+# event.code: "4624" and winlog.event_data.LogonType: "3"
+#   and winlog.event_data.AuthenticationPackageName: "NTLM"
+#   and not winlog.event_data.TargetUserName: *$
+#   and source.ip: (10.0.0.0/8 or 172.16.0.0/12 or 192.168.0.0/16)
+```
+
+```bash
+# Sigma rules for lateral movement detection
+# Install sigma and convert to target SIEM format
+pip3 install sigma-cli
+
+cat > lateral_movement_pth.yml << 'EOF'
+title: Pass-the-Hash Lateral Movement Detection
+id: f8d98d6c-7a07-4d74-b064-dd4a3c244528
+status: experimental
+description: Detects network logon with NTLM authentication to multiple hosts
+logsource:
+    product: windows
+    service: security
+detection:
+    selection:
+        EventID: 4624
+        LogonType: 3
+        AuthenticationPackageName: NTLM
+    filter:
+        TargetUserName|endswith: '$'
+    condition: selection and not filter
+    timeframe: 15m
+    count:
+        field: ComputerName
+        min: 3
+        group-by: TargetUserName
+level: high
+tags:
+    - attack.lateral_movement
+    - attack.t1550.002
+EOF
+
+# Convert Sigma rule to Splunk SPL
+sigma convert -t splunk lateral_movement_pth.yml
+
+# Convert to Elastic query
+sigma convert -t elasticsearch lateral_movement_pth.yml
+```
+
+### Step 3: Network-Level Detection with Zeek
+
+```bash
+# Detect SMB lateral movement (admin$ and c$ share access)
+cat /opt/zeek/logs/current/smb_mapping.log | \
+  zeek-cut ts id.orig_h id.resp_h path | \
+  grep -iE "(admin\$|c\$|ipc\$)" | \
+  sort -t$'\t' -k2 | uniq -c | sort -rn
+
+# Detect hosts connecting to many internal hosts on port 445 (SMB spreading)
+cat /opt/zeek/logs/current/conn.log | \
+  zeek-cut ts id.orig_h id.resp_h id.resp_p | \
+  awk '$4 == 445' | \
+  awk '{print $2}' | sort | uniq -c | sort -rn | head -10
+
+# Detect WMI lateral movement (DCE-RPC to IWbemServices)
+cat /opt/zeek/logs/current/dce_rpc.log | \
+  zeek-cut ts id.orig_h id.resp_h operation | \
+  grep -i "wbem\|wmi" | sort | uniq -c | sort -rn
+
+# Detect RDP connections between internal hosts
+cat /opt/zeek/logs/current/conn.log | \
+  zeek-cut ts id.orig_h id.resp_h id.resp_p duration | \
+  awk '$4 == 3389 && $5 > 60' | \
+  sort -t$'\t' -k2 | head -20
+
+# Detect Kerberos ticket-granting anomalies
+cat /opt/zeek/logs/current/kerberos.log | \
+  zeek-cut ts id.orig_h id.resp_h client service success error_msg | \
+  grep -v "true" | head -20
+
+# Custom Zeek script for lateral movement detection
+sudo tee /opt/zeek/share/zeek/site/custom-detections/lateral-movement.zeek << 'ZEEKEOF'
+@load base/frameworks/notice
+@load base/frameworks/sumstats
+
+module LateralMovement;
+
+export {
+    redef enum Notice::Type += {
+        SMB_Lateral_Spread,
+        RDP_Lateral_Chain
+    };
+    const smb_host_threshold: count = 5 &redef;
+    const smb_time_window: interval = 15min &redef;
+}
+
+event zeek_init()
+{
+    local r1 = SumStats::Reducer(
+        $stream="lateral.smb",
+        $apply=set(SumStats::UNIQUE)
+    );
+
+    SumStats::create([
+        $name="detect-smb-lateral",
+        $epoch=smb_time_window,
+        $reducers=set(r1),
+        $threshold_val(key: SumStats::Key, result: SumStats::Result) = {
+            return result["lateral.smb"]$unique + 0.0;
+        },
+        $threshold=smb_host_threshold + 0.0,
+        $threshold_crossed(key: SumStats::Key, result: SumStats::Result) = {
+            NOTICE([
+                $note=SMB_Lateral_Spread,
+                $msg=fmt("Host %s connected to %d SMB hosts in %s",
+                         key$str, result["lateral.smb"]$unique, smb_time_window),
+                $identifier=key$str
+            ]);
+        }
+    ]);
+}
+
+event connection_state_remove(c: connection)
+{
+    if ( c$id$resp_p == 445/tcp && c$id$resp_h in Site::local_nets )
+    {
+        SumStats::observe("lateral.smb",
+            [$str=cat(c$id$orig_h)],
+            [$str=cat(c$id$resp_h)]
+        );
+    }
+}
+ZEEKEOF
+
+sudo zeekctl deploy
+```
+
+### Step 4: Threat Hunting for Lateral Movement Indicators
+
+```bash
+# Hunt for authentication anomalies in Windows logs
+# Splunk query: Users authenticating from unusual source hosts
+# index=wineventlog EventCode=4624 LogonType=3
+# | stats values(IpAddress) as source_ips dc(IpAddress) as source_count by TargetUserName
+# | where source_count > 5
+# | sort -source_count
+
+# Hunt for service accounts used interactively
+# index=wineventlog EventCode=4624 (LogonType=2 OR LogonType=10)
+# | where match(TargetUserName, "^svc-.*")
+# | table _time ComputerName TargetUserName IpAddress LogonType
+
+# Network flow analysis for lateral movement patterns
+# Look for hosts that suddenly start communicating with many internal hosts
+cat /opt/zeek/logs/current/conn.log | \
+  zeek-cut ts id.orig_h id.resp_h | \
+  awk '{
+    key = $2
+    targets[key][$3] = 1
+  }
+  END {
+    for (src in targets) {
+      count = 0
+      for (dst in targets[src]) count++
+      if (count > 20) print src, count
+    }
+  }' | sort -k2 -rn
+
+# Detect credential dumping artifacts (large LSASS reads)
+# Look for connections from hosts that suddenly pivot
+cat /opt/zeek/logs/current/conn.log | \
+  zeek-cut ts id.orig_h id.resp_h id.resp_p orig_bytes | \
+  awk '$4 == 445 && $5 > 10000000' | sort -t$'\t' -k5 -rn
+
+# Timeline analysis: map the attack path
+# index=wineventlog (EventCode=4624 OR EventCode=7045)
+# | eval stage=case(
+#     EventCode=4624 AND LogonType=3, "Network Logon",
+#     EventCode=4624 AND LogonType=10, "RDP Logon",
+#     EventCode=7045, "Service Creation"
+#   )
+# | timechart span=5m count by stage
+```
+
+### Step 5: Automated Response and Containment
+
+```bash
+# SOAR playbook for lateral movement response (pseudocode)
+# When lateral movement alert triggers:
+
+# 1. Enrich the alert with context
+# - Query AD for user group membership and role
+# - Check if source IP is a known admin workstation
+# - Look up recent vulnerability scan results for affected hosts
+
+# 2. Automated containment actions
+# Option A: Isolate the host via switch port shutdown
+# ssh admin@switch "conf t; interface Gi1/0/5; shutdown"
+
+# Option B: Quarantine via VLAN change (less disruptive)
+# ssh admin@switch "conf t; interface Gi1/0/5; switchport access vlan 999"
+
+# Option C: Block at firewall
+sudo iptables -I FORWARD -s 10.10.5.23 -j DROP
+
+# 3. Disable the compromised account
+# PowerShell: Disable-ADAccount -Identity compromised_user
+
+# 4. Force password reset
+# PowerShell: Set-ADAccountPassword -Identity compromised_user -Reset
+
+# 5. Collect forensic evidence before full containment
+# velociraptor artifact collect Windows.KapeFiles.Targets --target BasicCollection
+```
+
+### Step 6: Build Detection Dashboard
+
+```bash
+# Elastic Kibana dashboard queries for lateral movement monitoring
+
+# Panel 1: Authentication heatmap (source vs destination)
+# Aggregation: Terms on source.ip (rows) and destination.ip (columns)
+# Metric: Count of event.code:4624
+
+# Panel 2: SMB connections between internal hosts
+# Filter: destination.port:445 and source.ip:10.0.0.0/8
+# Aggregation: Top 20 source IPs by unique destination count
+
+# Panel 3: RDP sessions timeline
+# Filter: destination.port:3389 and event.code:4624 and winlog.event_data.LogonType:10
+# Visualization: Timeline by source.ip
+
+# Panel 4: New service installations
+# Filter: event.code:7045
+# Aggregation: Terms on winlog.event_data.ServiceName
+
+# Panel 5: Failed authentication spike detection
+# Filter: event.code:4625
+# Aggregation: Date histogram with anomaly detection
+
+# Export Kibana dashboard
+# curl -X GET "elastic-siem:5601/api/saved_objects/_export" \
+#   -H "kbn-xsrf: true" \
+#   -d '{"type":"dashboard","objects":[{"id":"lateral-movement-dashboard","type":"dashboard"}]}' \
+#   > lateral_movement_dashboard.ndjson
+```
+
+## Key Concepts
+
+| Term | Definition |
+|------|------------|
+| **Lateral Movement** | MITRE ATT&CK tactic (TA0008) describing techniques attackers use to move through a network from one compromised system to another |
+| **Pass-the-Hash (T1550.002)** | Using captured NTLM password hashes to authenticate to remote systems without knowing the plaintext password |
+| **PsExec (T1569.002)** | Remote service execution tool that creates a temporary service on the target system, detectable by Event ID 7045 |
+| **East-West Traffic** | Network communication between internal systems (as opposed to north-south traffic between internal and external networks) |
+| **Authentication Anomaly** | Deviation from baseline authentication patterns such as a user logging into systems they never accessed before |
+| **Kerberoasting (T1558.003)** | Requesting Kerberos service tickets for service accounts and cracking them offline, detectable via Event ID 4769 anomalies |
+
+## Tools & Systems
+
+- **Zeek**: Network security monitor generating SMB, Kerberos, DCE-RPC, and connection logs for lateral movement analysis
+- **Splunk/Elastic SIEM**: Log aggregation platforms for correlating authentication events, network flows, and service creation across the enterprise
+- **Sigma**: Vendor-agnostic detection rule format for writing portable lateral movement detection rules across SIEM platforms
+- **Velociraptor**: Endpoint forensics tool for collecting evidence from hosts involved in lateral movement chains
+- **BloodHound**: Active Directory attack path analysis tool for identifying potential lateral movement routes before attackers exploit them
+
+## Common Scenarios
+
+### Scenario: Detecting a Ransomware Operator's Lateral Movement
+
+**Context**: The SOC receives an alert for PsExec service creation on a file server (10.10.20.15) at 2:00 AM. The alert triggers a lateral movement investigation. The organization has Zeek network monitoring and Windows Event Log forwarding to Splunk.
+
+**Approach**:
+1. Query Splunk for Event ID 7045 (service creation) on 10.10.20.15 to confirm PsExec execution and identify the source IP (10.10.5.23)
+2. Trace authentication history for 10.10.5.23: find Event ID 4624 Type 3 logons, discovering the host authenticated to 8 servers in the past hour using NTLM (pass-the-hash pattern)
+3. Check Zeek conn.log for 10.10.5.23: identify SMB connections (port 445) to 12 internal hosts and large file transfers to an external IP
+4. Build the attack timeline: initial compromise via phishing at 1:15 AM, credential dumping at 1:25 AM, lateral movement to 8 servers between 1:30-2:00 AM
+5. Identify all compromised hosts by tracing authentication chains: 10.10.5.23 -> 10.10.20.15 -> 10.10.20.16 -> 10.10.20.17
+6. Contain by quarantining all identified hosts to VLAN 999, disabling the compromised account, and blocking the external C2 IP
+7. Report the complete attack chain with timeline, affected hosts, and detection gaps
+
+**Pitfalls**:
+- Only investigating the single alert instead of tracing the full lateral movement chain across all hosts
+- Not checking for persistence mechanisms on each compromised host before declaring containment
+- Relying solely on Windows Event Logs without correlating network flow data, missing lateral movement via tools that do not generate Windows events
+- Not establishing a baseline of normal internal authentication patterns, making anomaly detection impossible
+
+## Output Format
+
+```
+## Lateral Movement Investigation Report
+
+**Case ID**: IR-2024-0312
+**Initial Alert**: PsExec on 10.10.20.15 at 02:00 UTC
+**Investigation Period**: 2024-03-15 01:00 to 03:00 UTC
+
+### Attack Timeline
+
+| Time (UTC) | Source | Destination | Technique | Evidence |
+|------------|--------|-------------|-----------|----------|
+| 01:15 | External | 10.10.5.23 | Initial Access (Phishing) | Email log + HTTP download |
+| 01:25 | 10.10.5.23 | Local | Credential Dumping | LSASS access (Sysmon EID 10) |
+| 01:32 | 10.10.5.23 | 10.10.20.15 | Pass-the-Hash (SMB) | EID 4624 Type 3 NTLM |
+| 01:38 | 10.10.5.23 | 10.10.20.16 | PsExec | EID 7045 + Zeek SMB |
+| 01:45 | 10.10.20.16 | 10.10.20.17 | RDP | EID 4624 Type 10 |
+| 02:00 | 10.10.20.17 | 10.10.20.15 | PsExec (triggered alert) | EID 7045 |
+| 02:10 | 10.10.5.23 | 203.0.113.50 | Data Exfiltration | Zeek conn.log 2.3 GB |
+
+### Affected Systems
+- 10.10.5.23 (workstation-045) - Initial compromise
+- 10.10.20.15 (file-server-01) - Data accessed
+- 10.10.20.16 (app-server-02) - Pivoted through
+- 10.10.20.17 (db-server-01) - Final target
+
+### Detection Gaps
+1. Initial phishing email not blocked by email gateway
+2. Credential dumping not detected (no LSASS monitoring)
+3. 30-minute gap between first lateral movement and alert
+```