Initial commit - 611 cybersecurity skills across all subdomains

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# Standards and References - Detecting Mimikatz Execution Patterns
## MITRE ATT&CK Mappings
| Technique | Name | Description |
|-----------|------|-------------|
| T1003.001 | LSASS Memory | See attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1003/001 |
| T1003.006 | DCSync | See attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1003/006 |
| T1558.003 | Kerberoasting | See attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1558/003 |
| T1558.001 | Golden Ticket | See attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1558/001 |
## Detection Data Sources
| Source | Event ID | Purpose |
|--------|----------|---------|
| Sysmon | 1 | Process creation with command line |
| Sysmon | 3 | Network connection initiated |
| Sysmon | 7 | Image loaded (DLL) |
| Sysmon | 10 | Process access (LSASS) |
| Sysmon | 11 | File creation |
| Sysmon | 12/13 | Registry create/set |
| Sysmon | 22 | DNS query |
| Sysmon | 25 | Process tampering |
| Windows Security | 4624 | Successful logon |
| Windows Security | 4625 | Failed logon |
| Windows Security | 4648 | Explicit credential logon |
| Windows Security | 4672 | Special privileges assigned |
| Windows Security | 4688 | Process creation |
| Windows Security | 4697 | Service installed |
| Windows Security | 4698 | Scheduled task created |
| Windows Security | 4769 | Kerberos TGS requested |
| Windows Security | 5140 | Network share accessed |
## References
- MITRE ATT&CK Framework: https://attack.mitre.org/
- Sigma Detection Rules: https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma
- LOLBAS Project: https://lolbas-project.github.io/
- Atomic Red Team Tests: https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team
- Red Canary Threat Detection Report
- SANS Threat Hunting Summit Resources
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# Detailed Hunting Workflow - Detecting Mimikatz Execution Patterns
## Phase 1: Data Collection and Querying
### Splunk SPL Query
```spl
index=sysmon EventCode=1
| where match(CommandLine, "(?i)(sekurlsa|lsadump|kerberos::list|privilege::debug|token::elevate|dpapi::)")
| table _time Computer User Image CommandLine ParentImage
```
### KQL Query (Microsoft Defender for Endpoint)
```kql
DeviceProcessEvents
| where ProcessCommandLine has_any ("sekurlsa","lsadump","kerberos::","privilege::debug")
| project Timestamp, DeviceName, AccountName, FileName, ProcessCommandLine
```
## Phase 2: Baseline and Anomaly Detection
### Step 2.1 - Establish Normal Behavior Baseline
- Collect 30 days of historical data for the targeted technique
- Document expected patterns, frequencies, and legitimate use cases
- Identify known false positive sources and document exceptions
- Build statistical baseline (mean, standard deviation) for key metrics
### Step 2.2 - Identify Anomalies
- Compare current activity against the 30-day baseline
- Flag events exceeding 3 standard deviations from normal
- Prioritize anomalies by risk score and potential business impact
- Cross-reference with threat intelligence for known IOCs
## Phase 3: Investigation and Correlation
### Step 3.1 - Deep Dive Analysis
- For each anomaly, collect full process tree context
- Correlate with network activity, file operations, and authentication events
- Check binary signatures, file hashes, and certificate validity
- Review user account context and access patterns
### Step 3.2 - Attack Chain Reconstruction
- Map findings to MITRE ATT&CK kill chain stages
- Identify initial access vector if applicable
- Trace lateral movement and privilege escalation paths
- Determine data access and potential exfiltration
## Phase 4: Validation and Response
### Step 4.1 - True/False Positive Determination
- Verify findings with system owners and IT operations
- Check change management records for authorized activities
- Validate user context (authorized actions vs. compromised account)
- Document determination rationale for each finding
### Step 4.2 - Response Actions
- For confirmed threats: initiate incident response procedures
- For detection gaps: create or update detection rules
- For false positives: tune existing rules and update exclusions
- Update threat hunting playbook with lessons learned
## Phase 5: Documentation and Reporting
### Step 5.1 - Hunt Report
- Summarize hypothesis, methodology, and findings
- Include all queries executed and their results
- Document IOCs discovered and detection rules created
- Provide recommendations for security improvements
### Step 5.2 - Knowledge Base Update
- Add findings to threat intelligence platform
- Update MITRE ATT&CK coverage heatmap
- Share detection rules via Sigma format
- Schedule follow-up hunts for related techniques