Initial commit - 611 cybersecurity skills across all subdomains

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mukul975
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# Standards and References - Image Provenance with Cosign
## SLSA Framework (Supply-chain Levels for Software Artifacts)
- Level 1: Documentation of build process
- Level 2: Source version controlled + signed provenance
- Level 3: Hardened build platform, non-falsifiable provenance
- Level 4: Two-party review, hermetic reproducible builds
## NIST SP 800-190
- Section 4.1: Image vulnerabilities - Verify image integrity before deployment
- Section 5.1: Image security - Cryptographic signing and verification
## Executive Order 14028 (Improving the Nation's Cybersecurity)
- Section 4(e): SBOM requirements for software supply chain
- Section 4(g): Software supply chain security guidelines
## Sigstore Components
| Component | Purpose | URL |
|-----------|---------|-----|
| Cosign | Container signing/verification | https://github.com/sigstore/cosign |
| Fulcio | Free code signing CA | https://fulcio.sigstore.dev |
| Rekor | Transparency log | https://rekor.sigstore.dev |
| policy-controller | K8s admission enforcement | https://github.com/sigstore/policy-controller |
## Compliance Mappings
### PCI DSS v4.0
- Req 6.3.2: Develop software securely with integrity verification
### SOC 2
- CC8.1: Change management with cryptographic verification
### FedRAMP
- SA-12: Supply chain protection
- SI-7: Software, firmware, and information integrity
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# Workflow - Image Provenance with Cosign
## Phase 1: Setup
1. Install cosign CLI
2. Choose signing method: keyless (recommended) or key-based
3. If key-based: generate keys, store private key in KMS
4. Configure CI/CD OIDC token for keyless signing
## Phase 2: Build Pipeline Integration
1. Build container image
2. Push to registry (by digest)
3. Sign image with cosign (keyless or key-based)
4. Generate SBOM with syft
5. Attach SBOM as attestation
6. Attach vulnerability scan as attestation
## Phase 3: Admission Enforcement
1. Deploy policy-controller or Kyverno
2. Create ClusterImagePolicy requiring signatures
3. Test with signed image (should pass)
4. Test with unsigned image (should be denied)
5. Enable enforcement in production namespaces
## Phase 4: Verification
```bash
# Manual verification
cosign verify --certificate-identity=CI_IDENTITY \
--certificate-oidc-issuer=ISSUER \
IMAGE@DIGEST
# Verify SBOM attestation
cosign verify-attestation --type cyclonedx \
--certificate-identity=CI_IDENTITY \
--certificate-oidc-issuer=ISSUER \
IMAGE@DIGEST
```
## Phase 5: Monitoring
1. Check Rekor transparency log for audit trail
2. Monitor admission controller deny events
3. Alert on unsigned image deployment attempts