Initial commit - 611 cybersecurity skills across all subdomains

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---
name: None
description: Deploy FIDO2/WebAuthn passwordless authentication using security keys and platform authenticators. Covers WebAuthn API integration, FIDO2 server configuration, passkey enrollment, biometric authentica
domain: cybersecurity
subdomain: identity-access-management
tags: [iam, identity, access-control, authentication, fido2, webauthn, passwordless]
version: "1.0"
author: mahipal
license: MIT
---
# Implementing Passwordless Authentication with FIDO2
## Overview
Deploy FIDO2/WebAuthn passwordless authentication using security keys and platform authenticators. Covers WebAuthn API integration, FIDO2 server configuration, passkey enrollment, biometric authentication, and migration from password-based systems aligned with NIST SP 800-63B AAL3.
## Objectives
- Implement comprehensive implementing passwordless authentication with fido2 capability
- Establish automated discovery and monitoring processes
- Integrate with enterprise IAM and security tools
- Generate compliance-ready documentation and reports
- Align with NIST 800-53 access control requirements
## Security Controls
| Control | NIST 800-53 | Description |
|---------|-------------|-------------|
| Account Management | AC-2 | Lifecycle management |
| Access Enforcement | AC-3 | Policy-based access control |
| Least Privilege | AC-6 | Minimum necessary permissions |
| Audit Logging | AU-3 | Authentication and access events |
| Identification | IA-2 | User and service identification |
## Verification
- [ ] Implementation tested in non-production environment
- [ ] Security policies configured and enforced
- [ ] Audit logging enabled and forwarding to SIEM
- [ ] Documentation and runbooks complete
- [ ] Compliance evidence generated
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# Standards - FIDO2 Passwordless Authentication
## FIDO Standards
- **FIDO2 Specification**: https://fidoalliance.org/specifications/
- **WebAuthn Level 2**: W3C Web Authentication API
- **CTAP2**: Client to Authenticator Protocol 2.0
## NIST Standards
- **NIST SP 800-63B**: AAL3 - Hardware-based phishing-resistant authenticator
- **NIST SP 800-53 Rev 5**: IA-2(6), IA-2(8) Replay-resistant authentication
- **NIST SP 800-157**: PIV Derived Credentials
## CISA Guidance
- **Phishing-Resistant MFA**: Required for federal agencies under EO 14028
- **OMB M-22-09**: Federal zero trust strategy requiring phishing-resistant MFA
## Vendor Resources
- **Yubico FIDO2**: https://www.yubico.com/authentication-standards/fido2/
- **Microsoft Passkeys**: https://www.microsoft.com/en-us/security/business/security-101/what-is-fido2
- **Google Passkeys**: Android and Chrome WebAuthn support
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# FIDO2 Passwordless Authentication Workflows
## Workflow 1: Security Key Enrollment
1. User receives FIDO2 security key (YubiKey, Titan Key)
2. User navigates to enrollment portal
3. System generates WebAuthn registration challenge
4. Browser prompts user to insert/tap security key
5. User verifies with PIN or biometric on key
6. Key generates unique public/private key pair
7. Public key registered with relying party
8. User tests authentication with enrolled key
## Workflow 2: Passkey Authentication Flow
1. User visits login page, enters username
2. Server sends WebAuthn authentication challenge
3. Browser prompts for authenticator (key, biometric, passkey)
4. User verifies identity (touch key, scan fingerprint, enter PIN)
5. Authenticator signs challenge with private key
6. Server validates signature with stored public key
7. User authenticated, session created
## Workflow 3: Migration from Passwords to Passwordless
1. Phase 1: Deploy FIDO2 to pilot group (IT, security teams)
2. Phase 2: Enable coexistence (password + FIDO2)
3. Phase 3: Expand FIDO2 enrollment to all users
4. Phase 4: Set FIDO2-only policy per group
5. Phase 5: Disable password authentication for migrated groups
6. Phase 6: Monitor for fallback authentication attempts
## Workflow 4: Lost/Stolen Key Recovery
1. User reports lost security key
2. Admin disables lost key in identity provider
3. User authenticates via backup method (recovery codes, backup key)
4. User enrolls replacement security key
5. Old key permanently revoked
6. Security team reviews for unauthorized usage of lost key