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Initial commit - 611 cybersecurity skills across all subdomains
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# Standards and References - Runtime Security with Tetragon
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## Industry Standards
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### NIST SP 800-190: Application Container Security Guide
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- Section 4.2: Runtime monitoring and anomaly detection for containers
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- Section 4.4: Container-level network monitoring requirements
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- Recommends kernel-level security monitoring for container environments
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### CIS Kubernetes Benchmark v1.9
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- Control 5.7.1: Create administrative boundaries between resources using namespaces
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- Control 5.7.3: Apply Security Context to pods and containers
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- Control 5.7.4: The default namespace should not be used
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### MITRE ATT&CK for Containers
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- T1611: Escape to Host -- Tetragon detects namespace manipulation attempts
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- T1059.004: Command and Scripting Interpreter: Unix Shell -- process execution monitoring
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- T1053.007: Container Orchestration Job -- detects unauthorized job creation
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- T1496: Resource Hijacking -- crypto-miner detection and blocking
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## CNCF Landscape Positioning
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Tetragon is positioned in the CNCF Runtime Security category alongside:
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- Falco (audit-log and syscall-based detection)
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- KubeArmor (LSM-based enforcement)
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- Tracee (eBPF-based tracing)
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### Key Differentiators
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- Kernel-level filtering reduces event volume before reaching user space
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- Native enforcement (Sigkill/Override) without requiring separate enforcement engine
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- Deep integration with Cilium for combined network + runtime security
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- TracingPolicy CRD for Kubernetes-native policy management
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## Compliance Mapping
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| Requirement | Framework | Tetragon Capability |
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|-------------|-----------|-------------------|
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| Runtime threat detection | PCI DSS 11.5 | TracingPolicy with file integrity monitoring |
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| Unauthorized process detection | SOC 2 CC6.8 | Process execution monitoring with namespace context |
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| Container isolation enforcement | NIST 800-190 4.2 | Namespace escape detection and blocking |
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| Audit trail generation | ISO 27001 A.12.4 | JSON event export to SIEM systems |
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| Incident response automation | NIST CSF DE.AE | Real-time Sigkill enforcement on policy violations |
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# Workflows - Runtime Security with Tetragon
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## Deployment Workflow
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### Phase 1: Observation Mode
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1. Install Tetragon with default TracingPolicies (no enforcement)
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2. Collect baseline process execution data for 7-14 days
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3. Analyze event patterns to identify normal vs anomalous behavior
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4. Document expected processes per namespace and workload type
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### Phase 2: Detection Policies
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1. Create TracingPolicies for known attack patterns (container escape, privilege escalation)
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2. Configure event export to SIEM (Elasticsearch, Splunk, or Datadog)
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3. Build alerting rules based on TracingPolicy matches
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4. Validate detection accuracy with red team exercises
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### Phase 3: Enforcement
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1. Enable Sigkill actions for high-confidence threats (known malware binaries)
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2. Enable Override actions for dangerous syscalls in non-privileged containers
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3. Implement graduated response -- alert first, block after confirmation
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4. Monitor enforcement actions for false positives
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## TracingPolicy Development Workflow
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```
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1. Identify Threat -> Map to MITRE ATT&CK technique
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2. Determine Kernel Hook -> kprobe, tracepoint, or LSM hook
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3. Define Selectors -> Binary, namespace, capability filters
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4. Set Action -> Post (observe), Sigkill (block), Override (deny)
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5. Test in Staging -> Deploy to non-production namespace first
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6. Validate with Attack Simulation -> Confirm detection
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7. Deploy to Production -> Apply via GitOps
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8. Monitor False Positives -> Tune selectors as needed
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```
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## Incident Response Integration
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### When Tetragon Detects a Threat
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1. Event is generated with full context (pod, namespace, binary, args, capabilities)
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2. Event exported to SIEM via JSON log export or Prometheus metric
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3. SOAR platform receives alert and triggers playbook
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4. Automated actions: isolate pod network (via Cilium NetworkPolicy), capture forensic data
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5. Security team receives enriched alert with Kubernetes context
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### Forensic Data Collection
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```bash
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# Export recent events for a specific pod
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tetra getevents --namespace <ns> --pod <pod-name> \
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--since 1h -o json > /forensics/tetragon-events.json
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# Get process tree for suspicious activity
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tetra getevents --process-pid <pid> --ancestors 5 -o compact
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```
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## Operational Runbook
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### Daily Checks
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- Review `tetragon_missed_events_total` metric for event buffer overflows
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- Check Tetragon DaemonSet health across all nodes
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- Review new TracingPolicy match counts
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### Weekly Checks
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- Analyze top 10 most frequent event types
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- Review enforcement action logs for false positives
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- Update TracingPolicies based on new threat intelligence
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### Monthly Checks
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- Performance impact assessment (CPU/memory overhead per node)
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- TracingPolicy effectiveness review with red team
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- Update Tetragon to latest stable release
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