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Initial commit - 611 cybersecurity skills across all subdomains
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---
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name: monitoring-darkweb-sources
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description: >
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Monitors dark web forums, marketplaces, paste sites, and ransomware leak sites for mentions
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of organizational assets, leaked credentials, threatened attacks, and threat actor communications
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to provide early warning intelligence. Use when establishing dark web monitoring coverage,
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investigating specific data breach claims, or enriching incident investigations with dark web
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context. Activates for requests involving dark web OSINT, leak site monitoring, credential
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exposure, Recorded Future dark web, or Tor hidden service intelligence.
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domain: cybersecurity
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subdomain: threat-intelligence
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tags: [dark-web, OSINT, credential-monitoring, ransomware-leaks, Recorded-Future, SpiderFoot, CTI]
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version: 1.0.0
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author: team-cybersecurity
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license: MIT
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---
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# Monitoring Dark Web Sources
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## When to Use
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Use this skill when:
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- Establishing continuous monitoring for organizational domain names, executive names, and product brands on dark web forums
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- Investigating a reported data breach claim found on a ransomware leak site or paste site
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- Enriching an incident investigation with context about stolen credentials or planned attacks
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**Do not use** this skill without proper operational security measures — dark web browsing without isolation exposes analyst infrastructure to adversary counter-intelligence.
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## Prerequisites
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- Commercial dark web monitoring service (Recorded Future, Flashpoint, Intel 471, or Cybersixgill)
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- Isolated operational environment: Whonix OS or Tails OS running in a VM with no persistent storage
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- Keyword watchlist: organization domain, key executive names, product names, IP ranges, known credentials
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- Legal guidance confirming passive monitoring is authorized in your jurisdiction
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## Workflow
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### Step 1: Establish Keyword Monitoring via Commercial Services
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Configure dark web monitoring keywords in your CTI platform (e.g., Recorded Future Exposure module):
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- Domain variations: `company.com`, `@company.com`, `company[dot]com`
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- Executive names: CEO, CISO, CFO full names
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- Product/brand names
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- Internal codenames or project names (if suspected breach scope is broad)
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- Known email domains for credential monitoring
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Most commercial services (Flashpoint, Intel 471, Cybersixgill) crawl forums like XSS, Exploit[.]in, BreachForums, and Russian-language cybercriminal communities without analyst exposure.
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### Step 2: Manual Investigation with Operational Security
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For investigations requiring direct dark web access:
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**Environment setup**:
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1. Use a dedicated physical machine or air-gapped VM (Whonix + VirtualBox)
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2. Connect via Tor Browser only — never via standard browser
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3. Use a cover identity with no links to organization
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4. Never log in with real credentials to any dark web site
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5. Document all sessions in investigation log with timestamps
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**Paste site monitoring** (clearnet-accessible, no Tor required):
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```bash
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# Hunt paste sites via API
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curl "https://psbdmp.ws/api/search/company.com" | jq '.data[].id'
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curl "https://pastebin.com/search?q=company.com" # Rate-limited public search
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```
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### Step 3: Investigate Ransomware Leak Sites
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Ransomware groups maintain .onion leak sites. Monitor these through commercial services rather than direct access. When a claim appears about your organization:
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1. Capture screenshot evidence via commercial service (do not access directly)
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2. Assess legitimacy: Does the threat actor's claimed data align with any known internal systems?
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3. Check timestamp: Is this claim recent or historical?
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4. Cross-reference with any known security incidents or phishing campaigns from that timeframe
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5. Engage IR team if claim appears credible before public disclosure
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Known active ransomware leak site operators (as of early 2025): LockBit (disrupted Feb 2024), ALPHV/BlackCat (disrupted Dec 2023), Cl0p, RansomHub, Play.
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### Step 4: Credential Exposure Monitoring
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For leaked credential monitoring:
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- **Have I Been Pwned Enterprise**: Domain-level notification for credential exposures in breach datasets
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- **SpyCloud**: Commercial credential monitoring with anti-cracking and plaintext password recovery from criminal markets
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- **Flare Systems**: Automated monitoring of paste sites and dark web markets for credential dumps
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When credential exposures are confirmed:
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1. Force password reset for affected accounts immediately
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2. Check if credentials provide access to any organizational systems (SSO, VPN)
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3. Review access logs for the period between credential exposure and detection for unauthorized access
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### Step 5: Document and Escalate Findings
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For each dark web finding:
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- Capture evidence (commercial service screenshot, paste site archive)
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- Classify severity: P1 (imminent attack threat or active data exposure), P2 (credential exposure), P3 (general mention)
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- Notify appropriate stakeholders within defined SLAs
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- Open investigation ticket and link to evidence artifacts
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- Apply TLP:RED for any findings referencing named executives or specific attack plans
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## Key Concepts
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| Term | Definition |
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|------|-----------|
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| **Dark Web** | Tor-accessible hidden services (.onion domains) not indexed by standard search engines; hosts both legitimate and criminal content |
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| **Paste Site** | Clearnet text-sharing sites (Pastebin, Ghostbin) frequently used to publish stolen data or malware configurations |
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| **Ransomware Leak Site** | .onion site operated by ransomware group to publish stolen victim data as extortion leverage |
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| **Operational Security (OPSEC)** | Protecting analyst identity and organizational affiliation during dark web investigation |
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| **Credential Stuffing** | Automated use of leaked username/password pairs against authentication systems |
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| **Stealer Logs** | Data packages exfiltrated by infostealer malware containing saved browser credentials, cookies, and session tokens |
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## Tools & Systems
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- **Recorded Future Dark Web Module**: Automated monitoring of dark web sources with alerting on organization-specific keywords
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- **Flashpoint**: Dark web forum monitoring with human intelligence augmentation for criminal community context
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- **Intel 471**: Closed-source access to cybercriminal communities with structured intelligence on threat actors
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- **SpyCloud**: Credential exposure monitoring with recaptured plaintext passwords from criminal markets
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- **Have I Been Pwned Enterprise**: Domain-level breach notification API for credential monitoring at scale
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## Common Pitfalls
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- **Direct access without OPSEC**: Accessing dark web forums without Tor and a cover identity can expose analyst IP, browser fingerprint, and organization affiliation to adversaries.
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- **Overreacting to unverified claims**: Ransomware groups and forum posters fabricate attack claims for extortion or reputation. Verify before escalating to incident response.
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- **Missing clearnet sources**: Most dark web intelligence programs miss Telegram channels, Discord servers, and paste sites which operate on the clearnet and host significant criminal activity.
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- **Inadequate legal review**: Dark web monitoring must be reviewed by legal counsel — passive monitoring is generally lawful but active participation in criminal markets is not.
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- **No evidence preservation**: Dark web content disappears rapidly. Capture timestamped evidence immediately upon discovery using commercial service exports.
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