Initial commit - 611 cybersecurity skills across all subdomains

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# Standards Reference - Kubernetes Penetration Testing
## MITRE ATT&CK for Containers
### Relevant Techniques
| ID | Technique | Phase |
|----|-----------|-------|
| T1609 | Container Administration Command | Execution |
| T1610 | Deploy Container | Execution |
| T1611 | Escape to Host | Privilege Escalation |
| T1613 | Container and Resource Discovery | Discovery |
| T1612 | Build Image on Host | Defense Evasion |
| T1552.007 | Container API | Credential Access |
## CIS Kubernetes Benchmark v1.8
### Master Node Checks
- 1.1: Control Plane Configuration Files
- 1.2: API Server (anonymous auth, RBAC, audit logging)
- 1.3: Controller Manager
- 1.4: Scheduler
### Worker Node Checks
- 4.1: Worker Node Configuration Files
- 4.2: Kubelet (anonymous auth, authorization mode)
### Policies
- 5.1: RBAC and Service Accounts
- 5.2: Pod Security Standards
- 5.3: Network Policies
- 5.4: Secrets Management
## NSA/CISA Kubernetes Hardening Guide
### Key Areas
- Scan containers and pods for vulnerabilities
- Run containers as non-root users
- Use network policies to restrict traffic
- Encrypt secrets at rest
- Audit logging for all API calls
- Scan for misconfigurations regularly
## OWASP Kubernetes Top 10
1. K01: Insecure Workload Configurations
2. K02: Supply Chain Vulnerabilities
3. K03: Overly Permissive RBAC
4. K04: Lack of Centralized Policy Enforcement
5. K05: Inadequate Logging and Monitoring
6. K06: Broken Authentication
7. K07: Missing Network Segmentation
8. K08: Secrets Management Failures
9. K09: Misconfigured Cluster Components
10. K10: Outdated and Vulnerable Kubernetes Components
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# Workflows - Kubernetes Penetration Testing
## Workflow 1: External Kubernetes Pentest
```
[Scope Definition] --> [Reconnaissance] --> [Service Discovery]
| | |
v v v
Define targets DNS, OSINT, nmap 6443,8443
Rules of engagement cloud metadata 10250,2379,30000+
| | |
+---------------------+--------------------+
|
v
[Automated Scanning]
kube-hunter --remote
kubescape scan
kube-bench (if access)
|
+---------+---------+
| |
v v
[API Server Tests] [Kubelet Tests]
Anonymous auth Unauthenticated access
RBAC enumeration Command execution
Token theft Pod listing
| |
+-------------------+
|
v
[Exploitation]
Deploy privileged pod
Extract secrets
Pivot to other namespaces
|
v
[Report and Remediate]
```
## Workflow 2: Internal/Assumed-Breach Testing
```
Step 1: Initial Pod Access
- Deploy test pod in target namespace
- Collect service account token
- Enumerate permissions: kubectl auth can-i --list
Step 2: Internal Reconnaissance
- List namespaces, pods, services
- Discover internal services via DNS
- Check metadata endpoints (cloud IMDS)
- Identify NetworkPolicy gaps
Step 3: Privilege Escalation
- Check for wildcard RBAC roles
- Test service account token from other pods
- Attempt to create privileged pods
- Check for vulnerable admission controllers
Step 4: Lateral Movement
- Access services in other namespaces
- Extract secrets and configmaps
- Attempt container escape
- Access cloud provider metadata
Step 5: Impact Assessment
- Demonstrate data access (secrets, PVCs)
- Show cluster-wide compromise path
- Document attack chain
```
## Workflow 3: Pentest Cleanup
```
[Testing Complete]
|
v
[Remove all pentest pods]
kubectl delete pods -l purpose=pentest -A
|
v
[Remove test RBAC resources]
kubectl delete rolebinding pentest-rb
kubectl delete serviceaccount pentest-sa
|
v
[Verify cleanup]
kubectl get all -l purpose=pentest -A
|
v
[Document findings and hand off report]
```