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Initial commit - 611 cybersecurity skills across all subdomains
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@@ -0,0 +1,457 @@
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---
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name: performing-malware-persistence-investigation
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description: Systematically investigate all persistence mechanisms on Windows and Linux systems to identify how malware survives reboots and maintains access.
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domain: cybersecurity
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subdomain: digital-forensics
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tags: [forensics, malware-persistence, autoruns, registry, scheduled-tasks, rootkit-detection, incident-response]
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version: "1.0"
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author: mahipal
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license: MIT
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---
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# Performing Malware Persistence Investigation
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## When to Use
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- When investigating how malware maintains presence on a compromised system after reboots
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- During incident response to identify all persistence mechanisms for complete remediation
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- For threat hunting to discover unauthorized autostart entries across endpoints
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- When analyzing malware behavior to understand its persistence strategy
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- For verifying that all persistence has been removed after incident remediation
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## Prerequisites
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- Forensic image or live system access with administrative privileges
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- Autoruns (Sysinternals) for Windows persistence enumeration
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- RegRipper for offline registry analysis
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- Understanding of Windows and Linux persistence mechanisms
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- YARA rules for scanning persistence locations
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- Baseline of known-good autorun entries for comparison
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## Workflow
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### Step 1: Enumerate Windows Registry Persistence
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```bash
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# Extract registry hives from forensic image
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mount -o ro,loop,offset=$((2048*512)) /cases/case-2024-001/images/evidence.dd /mnt/evidence
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# Key registry persistence locations
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python3 << 'PYEOF'
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from Registry import Registry
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import json
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results = {'registry_persistence': []}
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# SYSTEM hive analysis
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system_reg = Registry.Registry("/cases/case-2024-001/registry/SYSTEM")
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select = system_reg.open("Select")
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current = select.value("Current").value()
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cs = f"ControlSet{current:03d}"
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# Services (very common persistence)
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services = system_reg.open(f"{cs}\\Services")
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for svc in services.subkeys():
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try:
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start_type = svc.value("Start").value()
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image_path = ""
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try:
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image_path = svc.value("ImagePath").value()
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except:
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pass
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# Start types: 0=Boot, 1=System, 2=Auto, 3=Manual, 4=Disabled
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if start_type in (0, 1, 2) and image_path:
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svc_type = svc.value("Type").value() if svc.values() else 0
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results['registry_persistence'].append({
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'location': f'HKLM\\SYSTEM\\{cs}\\Services\\{svc.name()}',
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'type': 'Service',
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'value': image_path,
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'start_type': start_type,
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'timestamp': str(svc.timestamp())
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})
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except Exception:
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pass
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# SOFTWARE hive analysis
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sw_reg = Registry.Registry("/cases/case-2024-001/registry/SOFTWARE")
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# Machine Run keys
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run_keys = [
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"Microsoft\\Windows\\CurrentVersion\\Run",
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"Microsoft\\Windows\\CurrentVersion\\RunOnce",
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"Microsoft\\Windows\\CurrentVersion\\RunServices",
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"Microsoft\\Windows\\CurrentVersion\\RunServicesOnce",
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"Microsoft\\Windows\\CurrentVersion\\Policies\\Explorer\\Run",
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"Wow6432Node\\Microsoft\\Windows\\CurrentVersion\\Run",
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"Wow6432Node\\Microsoft\\Windows\\CurrentVersion\\RunOnce",
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]
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for key_path in run_keys:
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try:
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key = sw_reg.open(key_path)
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for value in key.values():
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results['registry_persistence'].append({
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'location': f'HKLM\\SOFTWARE\\{key_path}',
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'type': 'Run Key',
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'name': value.name(),
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'value': str(value.value()),
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'timestamp': str(key.timestamp())
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})
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except Exception:
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pass
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# NTUSER.DAT analysis
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import glob
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for ntuser in glob.glob("/cases/case-2024-001/registry/NTUSER*.DAT"):
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try:
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user_reg = Registry.Registry(ntuser)
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user_run_keys = [
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"Software\\Microsoft\\Windows\\CurrentVersion\\Run",
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"Software\\Microsoft\\Windows\\CurrentVersion\\RunOnce",
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"Software\\Microsoft\\Windows\\CurrentVersion\\Explorer\\Shell Folders\\Startup",
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]
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for key_path in user_run_keys:
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try:
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key = user_reg.open(key_path)
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for value in key.values():
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results['registry_persistence'].append({
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'location': f'HKCU\\{key_path}',
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'type': 'User Run Key',
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'name': value.name(),
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'value': str(value.value()),
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'timestamp': str(key.timestamp()),
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'hive': ntuser
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})
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except Exception:
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pass
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except Exception:
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pass
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print(f"Total registry persistence entries: {len(results['registry_persistence'])}")
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for entry in results['registry_persistence']:
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print(f" [{entry['type']}] {entry.get('name', '')} -> {entry.get('value', '')[:100]}")
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with open('/cases/case-2024-001/analysis/registry_persistence.json', 'w') as f:
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json.dump(results, f, indent=2)
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PYEOF
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```
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### Step 2: Check Scheduled Tasks and WMI Persistence
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```bash
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# Extract scheduled tasks from forensic image
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mkdir -p /cases/case-2024-001/persistence/tasks/
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cp -r /mnt/evidence/Windows/System32/Tasks/* /cases/case-2024-001/persistence/tasks/ 2>/dev/null
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# Parse scheduled task XML files
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python3 << 'PYEOF'
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import os, xml.etree.ElementTree as ET
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tasks_dir = '/cases/case-2024-001/persistence/tasks/'
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suspicious_tasks = []
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for root_dir, dirs, files in os.walk(tasks_dir):
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for fname in files:
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fpath = os.path.join(root_dir, fname)
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try:
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tree = ET.parse(fpath)
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root = tree.getroot()
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ns = {'t': 'http://schemas.microsoft.com/windows/2004/02/mit/task'}
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actions = root.findall('.//t:Exec', ns)
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for action in actions:
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command = action.find('t:Command', ns)
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args = action.find('t:Arguments', ns)
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cmd_text = command.text if command is not None else ''
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args_text = args.text if args is not None else ''
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# Flag suspicious commands
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suspicious_indicators = [
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'powershell', 'cmd.exe', 'wscript', 'cscript', 'mshta',
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'regsvr32', 'rundll32', 'certutil', 'bitsadmin',
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'/c ', '-enc', '-e ', 'hidden', 'bypass', 'downloadstring',
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'invoke-', 'iex', '/tmp/', 'appdata', 'programdata',
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'temp\\', '.ps1', '.vbs', '.hta', 'base64'
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]
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is_suspicious = any(s in (cmd_text + ' ' + args_text).lower() for s in suspicious_indicators)
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task_info = {
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'name': fname,
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'path': fpath.replace(tasks_dir, ''),
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'command': cmd_text,
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'arguments': args_text,
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'suspicious': is_suspicious
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}
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if is_suspicious:
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suspicious_tasks.append(task_info)
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print(f"SUSPICIOUS TASK: {fname}")
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print(f" Command: {cmd_text}")
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print(f" Arguments: {args_text}")
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print()
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except Exception as e:
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pass
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print(f"\nTotal suspicious scheduled tasks: {len(suspicious_tasks)}")
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PYEOF
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# Check WMI event subscriptions (common APT persistence)
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# WMI repository: C:\Windows\System32\wbem\Repository\
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cp -r /mnt/evidence/Windows/System32/wbem/Repository/ /cases/case-2024-001/persistence/wmi/ 2>/dev/null
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# Parse WMI persistence using PyWMIPersistenceFinder
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python3 << 'PYEOF'
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import os, re
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# Search WMI OBJECTS.DATA for event subscriptions
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wmi_db = '/cases/case-2024-001/persistence/wmi/OBJECTS.DATA'
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if os.path.exists(wmi_db):
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with open(wmi_db, 'rb') as f:
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data = f.read()
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# Search for EventFilter strings
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filters = re.findall(b'__EventFilter.*?(?=\x00\x00)', data)
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consumers = re.findall(b'CommandLineEventConsumer.*?(?=\x00\x00)', data)
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bindings = re.findall(b'__FilterToConsumerBinding.*?(?=\x00\x00)', data)
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print("=== WMI PERSISTENCE ===")
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print(f"Event Filters: {len(filters)}")
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print(f"Command Consumers: {len(consumers)}")
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print(f"Filter-Consumer Bindings: {len(bindings)}")
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for consumer in consumers:
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decoded = consumer.decode('utf-8', errors='ignore')
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print(f" Consumer: {decoded[:200]}")
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else:
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print("WMI repository not found")
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PYEOF
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```
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### Step 3: Check File System and Boot Persistence
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```bash
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# Startup folders
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echo "=== STARTUP FOLDER CONTENTS ===" > /cases/case-2024-001/analysis/startup_items.txt
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ls -la "/mnt/evidence/ProgramData/Microsoft/Windows/Start Menu/Programs/Startup/" \
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>> /cases/case-2024-001/analysis/startup_items.txt 2>/dev/null
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for userdir in /mnt/evidence/Users/*/; do
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username=$(basename "$userdir")
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echo "--- User: $username ---" >> /cases/case-2024-001/analysis/startup_items.txt
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ls -la "$userdir/AppData/Roaming/Microsoft/Windows/Start Menu/Programs/Startup/" \
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>> /cases/case-2024-001/analysis/startup_items.txt 2>/dev/null
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done
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# Check DLL search order hijacking locations
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echo "=== DLL HIJACKING CHECK ===" > /cases/case-2024-001/analysis/dll_hijack.txt
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# Check for DLLs in application directories that should only be in System32
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find /mnt/evidence/Program\ Files/ /mnt/evidence/Program\ Files\ \(x86\)/ \
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-name "*.dll" -newer /mnt/evidence/Windows/System32/ntdll.dll 2>/dev/null \
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>> /cases/case-2024-001/analysis/dll_hijack.txt
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# Check for COM object hijacking
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python3 << 'PYEOF'
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from Registry import Registry
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reg = Registry.Registry("/cases/case-2024-001/registry/SOFTWARE")
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# Check for suspicious CLSID entries
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try:
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clsid = reg.open("Classes\\CLSID")
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for key in clsid.subkeys():
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try:
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server = key.subkey("InprocServer32")
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dll_path = server.value("(default)").value()
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if any(s in dll_path.lower() for s in ['temp', 'appdata', 'programdata', 'downloads', 'tmp']):
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print(f"SUSPICIOUS COM: {key.name()} -> {dll_path}")
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except:
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pass
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except:
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pass
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PYEOF
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# Check boot configuration for bootkits
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# BCD (Boot Configuration Data)
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ls -la /mnt/evidence/Boot/BCD 2>/dev/null
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# Check for modified bootmgr or winload.exe
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sha256sum /mnt/evidence/Windows/System32/winload.exe 2>/dev/null
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```
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### Step 4: Check Linux Persistence Mechanisms
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```bash
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# If analyzing a Linux system
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LINUX_ROOT="/mnt/evidence"
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echo "=== LINUX PERSISTENCE CHECK ===" > /cases/case-2024-001/analysis/linux_persistence.txt
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# Cron jobs
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echo "--- Cron Jobs ---" >> /cases/case-2024-001/analysis/linux_persistence.txt
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cat $LINUX_ROOT/etc/crontab >> /cases/case-2024-001/analysis/linux_persistence.txt 2>/dev/null
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ls -la $LINUX_ROOT/etc/cron.d/ >> /cases/case-2024-001/analysis/linux_persistence.txt 2>/dev/null
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cat $LINUX_ROOT/etc/cron.d/* >> /cases/case-2024-001/analysis/linux_persistence.txt 2>/dev/null
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cat $LINUX_ROOT/var/spool/cron/crontabs/* >> /cases/case-2024-001/analysis/linux_persistence.txt 2>/dev/null
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# Systemd services
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echo "--- Custom Systemd Services ---" >> /cases/case-2024-001/analysis/linux_persistence.txt
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find $LINUX_ROOT/etc/systemd/system/ -name "*.service" -not -type l \
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>> /cases/case-2024-001/analysis/linux_persistence.txt 2>/dev/null
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# SSH authorized keys
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echo "--- SSH Authorized Keys ---" >> /cases/case-2024-001/analysis/linux_persistence.txt
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find $LINUX_ROOT/home/ $LINUX_ROOT/root/ -name "authorized_keys" -exec cat {} \; \
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>> /cases/case-2024-001/analysis/linux_persistence.txt 2>/dev/null
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# Init scripts and rc.local
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echo "--- RC Scripts ---" >> /cases/case-2024-001/analysis/linux_persistence.txt
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cat $LINUX_ROOT/etc/rc.local >> /cases/case-2024-001/analysis/linux_persistence.txt 2>/dev/null
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# Shell profile scripts
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echo "--- Profile Scripts ---" >> /cases/case-2024-001/analysis/linux_persistence.txt
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cat $LINUX_ROOT/etc/profile.d/*.sh >> /cases/case-2024-001/analysis/linux_persistence.txt 2>/dev/null
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# LD_PRELOAD
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echo "--- LD_PRELOAD ---" >> /cases/case-2024-001/analysis/linux_persistence.txt
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cat $LINUX_ROOT/etc/ld.so.preload >> /cases/case-2024-001/analysis/linux_persistence.txt 2>/dev/null
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grep -r "LD_PRELOAD" $LINUX_ROOT/etc/ >> /cases/case-2024-001/analysis/linux_persistence.txt 2>/dev/null
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# Kernel modules
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echo "--- Loaded Kernel Modules ---" >> /cases/case-2024-001/analysis/linux_persistence.txt
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cat $LINUX_ROOT/etc/modules-load.d/*.conf >> /cases/case-2024-001/analysis/linux_persistence.txt 2>/dev/null
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# PAM backdoors
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echo "--- PAM Configuration ---" >> /cases/case-2024-001/analysis/linux_persistence.txt
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find $LINUX_ROOT/etc/pam.d/ -exec grep -l "pam_exec\|pam_script" {} \; \
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>> /cases/case-2024-001/analysis/linux_persistence.txt 2>/dev/null
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```
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### Step 5: Compile Persistence Report
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```bash
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# Generate comprehensive persistence report
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python3 << 'PYEOF'
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import json
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with open('/cases/case-2024-001/analysis/registry_persistence.json') as f:
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reg_data = json.load(f)
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report = """
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MALWARE PERSISTENCE INVESTIGATION REPORT
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==========================================
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PERSISTENCE MECHANISMS FOUND:
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1. REGISTRY RUN KEYS:
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"""
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run_keys = [e for e in reg_data['registry_persistence'] if 'Run' in e.get('type', '')]
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for entry in run_keys:
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report += f" [{entry['timestamp']}] {entry.get('name', 'N/A')} -> {entry.get('value', '')[:100]}\n"
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services = [e for e in reg_data['registry_persistence'] if e.get('type') == 'Service']
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report += f"\n2. SERVICES ({len(services)} auto-start services):\n"
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for entry in services[:20]:
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report += f" {entry['location'].split('\\')[-1]}: {entry['value'][:100]}\n"
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report += """
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3. SCHEDULED TASKS: [See scheduled_tasks analysis]
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4. WMI SUBSCRIPTIONS: [See WMI analysis]
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5. STARTUP FOLDER: [See startup_items.txt]
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6. COM HIJACKING: [See COM analysis]
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SUSPICIOUS ENTRIES REQUIRING INVESTIGATION:
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"""
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# Flag suspicious entries
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for entry in reg_data['registry_persistence']:
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value = str(entry.get('value', '')).lower()
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suspicious_indicators = ['powershell', 'cmd /c', 'wscript', 'certutil',
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'programdata', 'appdata\\local\\temp', 'base64',
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'.ps1', '.vbs', '.hta', '/tmp/', 'hidden']
|
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if any(s in value for s in suspicious_indicators):
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report += f" SUSPICIOUS: {entry.get('name', 'N/A')} -> {entry.get('value', '')[:100]}\n"
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with open('/cases/case-2024-001/analysis/persistence_report.txt', 'w') as f:
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f.write(report)
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print(report)
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PYEOF
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```
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## Key Concepts
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||||
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||||
| Concept | Description |
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||||
|---------|-------------|
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||||
| Run keys | Registry keys executing programs at user logon (HKLM and HKCU) |
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| Scheduled tasks | Windows Task Scheduler entries that execute on triggers (time, event, logon) |
|
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| WMI event subscriptions | Persistent WMI queries that trigger actions (stealthy persistence) |
|
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| COM hijacking | Redirecting COM object loading to execute malicious DLLs |
|
||||
| DLL search order hijacking | Placing malicious DLLs in directories searched before System32 |
|
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| Service persistence | Installing Windows services that auto-start with the system |
|
||||
| Boot-level persistence | Modifying boot configuration or MBR/VBR for pre-OS execution |
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| Living-off-the-land | Using legitimate system tools (PowerShell, WMI, certutil) for persistence |
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## Tools & Systems
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||||
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||||
| Tool | Purpose |
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||||
|------|---------|
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||||
| Autoruns | Sysinternals comprehensive autostart enumeration tool |
|
||||
| RegRipper | Automated registry persistence artifact extraction |
|
||||
| KAPE | Automated persistence artifact collection and analysis |
|
||||
| Velociraptor | Endpoint agent with persistence hunting artifacts |
|
||||
| OSQuery | SQL-based system querying for persistence enumeration |
|
||||
| PersistenceSniper | PowerShell tool for Windows persistence detection |
|
||||
| RECmd | Eric Zimmerman registry command-line analysis tool |
|
||||
| Volatility | Memory forensics for in-memory only persistence |
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||||
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||||
## Common Scenarios
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||||
**Scenario 1: APT Persistence After Initial Compromise**
|
||||
Check all registry Run keys, enumerate scheduled tasks for encoded PowerShell commands, examine WMI event subscriptions for event-triggered execution, check COM object registrations for hijacked CLSIDs, review services for recently installed entries with suspicious image paths.
|
||||
|
||||
**Scenario 2: Ransomware Pre-Encryption Persistence**
|
||||
Identify how the ransomware maintains access for re-encryption or monitoring, check for scheduled tasks that would re-launch encryption, examine services installed by the ransomware operator, verify no additional backdoor persistence exists before declaring remediation complete.
|
||||
|
||||
**Scenario 3: Fileless Malware Persistence**
|
||||
Focus on registry-based persistence storing payload in registry values, check WMI subscriptions executing PowerShell from event triggers, examine scheduled tasks using encoded command arguments, check for mshta/rundll32 based persistence loading remote content.
|
||||
|
||||
**Scenario 4: Post-Remediation Verification**
|
||||
Run Autoruns comparison against known-good baseline, verify all identified persistence mechanisms have been removed, check for additional persistence that may have been missed, confirm services, tasks, and registry entries are clean, monitor for re-infection indicators.
|
||||
|
||||
## Output Format
|
||||
|
||||
```
|
||||
Persistence Investigation Summary:
|
||||
System: DESKTOP-ABC123 (Windows 10 Pro)
|
||||
Analysis Date: 2024-01-20
|
||||
|
||||
Persistence Mechanisms Found:
|
||||
Registry Run Keys (HKLM): 5 entries (1 SUSPICIOUS)
|
||||
Registry Run Keys (HKCU): 3 entries (1 SUSPICIOUS)
|
||||
Services (Auto-Start): 142 entries (2 SUSPICIOUS)
|
||||
Scheduled Tasks: 67 entries (3 SUSPICIOUS)
|
||||
WMI Subscriptions: 1 entry (SUSPICIOUS)
|
||||
Startup Folder: 4 items (1 SUSPICIOUS)
|
||||
COM Objects: 0 hijacked entries
|
||||
DLL Hijacking: 0 detected
|
||||
|
||||
Suspicious Entries:
|
||||
1. HKCU\Run\WindowsUpdate -> powershell -ep bypass -e <base64>
|
||||
Timestamp: 2024-01-15 14:35:00
|
||||
Action: Encoded PowerShell download cradle
|
||||
|
||||
2. Service: WinDefenderUpdate -> C:\ProgramData\svc\update.exe
|
||||
Timestamp: 2024-01-15 14:40:00
|
||||
Action: Unknown executable in ProgramData
|
||||
|
||||
3. Task: \Microsoft\Windows\Maintenance\SecurityUpdate
|
||||
Command: cmd.exe /c powershell -w hidden -e <base64>
|
||||
Trigger: On system startup
|
||||
|
||||
4. WMI: __EventFilter "ProcessStart" -> CommandLineEventConsumer
|
||||
Action: Execute C:\Windows\Temp\svc.exe on WMI event
|
||||
|
||||
Remediation Required: 4 persistence mechanisms to remove
|
||||
Report: /cases/case-2024-001/analysis/persistence_report.txt
|
||||
```
|
||||
Reference in New Issue
Block a user