Initial commit - 611 cybersecurity skills across all subdomains

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# Standards & References - Ransomware Tabletop Exercise
## Exercise Standards
### FEMA HSEEP (Homeland Security Exercise and Evaluation Program)
- Standardized methodology for exercise design, conduct, and evaluation
- Defines exercise types: seminars, workshops, tabletops, drills, functional, full-scale
- Provides templates for exercise plans, evaluation guides, and AARs
- https://www.fema.gov/emergency-managers/national-preparedness/exercises/hseep
### NIST SP 800-84: Guide to Test, Training, and Exercise Programs
- Framework for developing IT plan test and exercise programs
- Section 4.3: Tabletop exercises for incident response testing
- Covers exercise scoping, objectives, scenario development, and evaluation
### CISA Tabletop Exercise Packages (CTEPs)
- Free downloadable exercise scenarios for critical infrastructure sectors
- Ransomware-specific scenarios updated to reflect current threat landscape
- https://www.cisa.gov/resources-tools/services/cisa-tabletop-exercise-packages
## Ransomware-Specific Guidance
### CISA #StopRansomware Guide
- Ransomware response checklist that exercises should validate
- Decision tree for ransom payment considerations
- Recovery priority guidance
### NIST IR 8374: Ransomware Risk Management
- Identifies exercise testing as a key control in the Recover function
- Recommends annual tabletop exercises with escalating complexity
### FBI/CISA Joint Advisories
- AA24-131A: Black Basta Ransomware
- AA23-136A: BianLian Ransomware Group
- AA23-158A: CL0P Ransomware Gang Exploiting MOVEit
- Use these as source material for realistic exercise scenarios
## Regulatory Notification Requirements (for Scenario Design)
| Regulation | Notification Timeline | Authority |
|-----------|----------------------|-----------|
| GDPR (EU) | 72 hours | Supervisory Authority |
| HIPAA (US Healthcare) | 60 days (individuals), ASAP (HHS if >500) | HHS OCR |
| SEC (US Public Companies) | 4 business days (Form 8-K) | SEC |
| PCI DSS | 72 hours | Card brands/acquiring bank |
| NY DFS (23 NYCRR 500) | 72 hours | NY DFS |
| CCPA (California) | "Expedient time" | California AG |
| NIS2 (EU) | 24 hours (early warning), 72 hours (full) | National CSIRT |
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# Workflows - Ransomware Tabletop Exercise
## Workflow 1: Exercise Planning (4-6 weeks before)
```
Start
|
v
[Define exercise objectives] --> What gaps are we testing?
|
v
[Select scenario type]
|-- Double extortion (data theft + encryption)
|-- Supply chain ransomware (vendor compromise)
|-- Cloud ransomware (SaaS/IaaS targeted)
|-- Critical infrastructure disruption
|
v
[Choose threat actor model] --> LockBit / ALPHV / Cl0p / Rhysida
|
v
[Identify participants]
|-- Executive leadership (CEO, CFO, COO)
|-- IT/Security (CISO, SOC, IR team)
|-- Legal (General Counsel, external counsel)
|-- Communications (PR, media relations)
|-- Operations (business unit leaders)
|-- HR (employee communications)
|-- External partners (IR firm, insurance)
|
v
[Develop scenario with 4 phases and injects]
|
v
[Prepare materials: SITREPs, inject cards, evaluation scorecard]
|
v
[Schedule 3-4 hour block, distribute pre-reading]
|
v
End
```
## Workflow 2: Exercise Execution
```
Exercise Start
|
v
[Facilitator opening brief] (10 min)
|-- Ground rules, objectives, scope
|-- "This is discussion-based, no wrong answers"
|
v
[Phase 1: Initial Detection] (30 min)
|-- Distribute SITREP 1
|-- Discussion: Who, what, when, initial actions
|-- Inject: Additional information changes situation
|-- Document decisions on worksheet
|
v
[Phase 2: Escalation] (30 min)
|-- Distribute SITREP 2
|-- Discussion: Scope of impact, containment actions
|-- Inject: Double extortion element introduced
|-- Document decisions
|
v
[Break] (10 min)
|
v
[Phase 3: Critical Decision Points] (45 min)
|-- Distribute SITREP 3
|-- Discussion: Ransom payment, law enforcement, notification
|-- Inject: Public pressure from media/customers
|-- Document decisions with rationale
|
v
[Phase 4: Recovery and Communication] (45 min)
|-- Distribute SITREP 4
|-- Discussion: Recovery priority, timeline, customer comms
|-- Inject: Recovery complication (infected backup, key system fails)
|-- Document decisions
|
v
[Hot wash / Debrief] (20 min)
|-- Each functional area shares top insight
|-- Facilitator highlights key observations
|-- Immediate gap identification
|
v
Exercise End
```
## Workflow 3: After-Action Report Development
```
Exercise Complete
|
v
[Collect all documentation within 24 hours]
|-- Decision worksheets
|-- Facilitator notes
|-- Evaluation scorecards
|-- Observer notes (if separate observers present)
|
v
[Score each evaluation area (1-5)]
|
v
[Identify strengths (what worked well)]
|
v
[Identify gaps with severity rating]
|-- Critical: Would prevent effective response
|-- High: Would significantly delay/complicate response
|-- Medium: Would reduce response quality
|-- Low: Minor improvement opportunity
|
v
[Develop remediation actions]
|-- Each gap gets: action, owner, deadline, priority
|-- Must be specific and measurable
|
v
[Draft AAR within 5 business days]
|
v
[Review AAR with exercise sponsor]
|
v
[Distribute AAR to participants]
|
v
[Track remediation actions quarterly]
|
v
End
```