mirror of
https://github.com/mukul975/Anthropic-Cybersecurity-Skills.git
synced 2026-06-12 22:24:56 +03:00
Initial commit - 611 cybersecurity skills across all subdomains
This commit is contained in:
@@ -0,0 +1,30 @@
|
||||
# Standards Reference: Securing GitHub Actions
|
||||
|
||||
## NIST SSDF (SP 800-218)
|
||||
|
||||
### PS.1: Protect All Forms of Code
|
||||
- Workflows are code and must be reviewed and protected
|
||||
- Pin action dependencies to SHA digests
|
||||
- Minimize GITHUB_TOKEN permissions
|
||||
|
||||
## CIS Software Supply Chain Security
|
||||
|
||||
- BD-1: Define security requirements for build processes
|
||||
- BD-2: Automate security validation of build configurations
|
||||
- BD-3: Pin all external dependencies to immutable references
|
||||
|
||||
## OWASP CI/CD Top 10 Risks
|
||||
|
||||
| Risk | GitHub Actions Mitigation |
|
||||
|------|--------------------------|
|
||||
| CICD-SEC-1: Insufficient Flow Control | Environment protection rules, CODEOWNERS |
|
||||
| CICD-SEC-3: Dependency Chain Abuse | SHA pinning of actions |
|
||||
| CICD-SEC-4: Poisoned Pipeline Execution | Restrict pull_request_target, input sanitization |
|
||||
| CICD-SEC-6: Credential Hygiene | OIDC federation, minimal GITHUB_TOKEN scope |
|
||||
| CICD-SEC-9: Artifact Integrity | Sign artifacts in workflows |
|
||||
|
||||
## SLSA Framework
|
||||
|
||||
- Level 2: Hosted build service (GitHub Actions qualifies)
|
||||
- Level 3: Hardened build platform with isolation guarantees
|
||||
- Workflow hardening prevents provenance falsification
|
||||
@@ -0,0 +1,40 @@
|
||||
# Workflow Reference: Securing GitHub Actions
|
||||
|
||||
## Hardening Checklist
|
||||
|
||||
1. Pin all actions to SHA digests
|
||||
2. Set restrictive default permissions
|
||||
3. Sanitize all user-controlled inputs
|
||||
4. Never use pull_request_target with PR checkout
|
||||
5. Enable environment protection for production
|
||||
6. Configure CODEOWNERS for workflow files
|
||||
7. Enable Dependabot for github-actions
|
||||
8. Audit third-party actions quarterly
|
||||
9. Use OIDC instead of long-lived cloud credentials
|
||||
10. Add harden-runner for network monitoring
|
||||
|
||||
## Permission Scoping Reference
|
||||
|
||||
| Permission | Use Case |
|
||||
|-----------|----------|
|
||||
| contents: read | Checkout code |
|
||||
| contents: write | Create releases, push tags |
|
||||
| security-events: write | Upload SARIF results |
|
||||
| packages: write | Push container images |
|
||||
| deployments: write | Create deployment status |
|
||||
| id-token: write | OIDC cloud authentication |
|
||||
| pull-requests: write | Comment on PRs |
|
||||
|
||||
## Script Injection Prevention
|
||||
|
||||
```yaml
|
||||
# DANGEROUS patterns to avoid:
|
||||
run: echo "${{ github.event.issue.title }}"
|
||||
run: echo "${{ github.event.comment.body }}"
|
||||
run: echo "${{ github.head_ref }}"
|
||||
|
||||
# SAFE alternatives:
|
||||
env:
|
||||
TITLE: ${{ github.event.issue.title }}
|
||||
run: echo "${TITLE}"
|
||||
```
|
||||
Reference in New Issue
Block a user