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https://github.com/mukul975/Anthropic-Cybersecurity-Skills.git
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Add folder anatomy (scripts/agent.py + references/api-reference.md) for 648 cybersecurity skills
Complete skill folder anatomy across all cybersecurity skills: - scripts/agent.py: 80-150 line Python agents using real libraries (impacket, boto3, azure-mgmt-*, kubernetes, pefile, yara, scapy, shodan, stix2, etc.) - references/api-reference.md: real API documentation with method signatures - LICENSE: MIT license for all skill folders
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mukul975
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MIT License
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Copyright (c) 2025 Anthropic Agent Skills Contributors
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Permission is hereby granted, free of charge, to any person obtaining a copy
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of this software and associated documentation files (the "Software"), to deal
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in the Software without restriction, including without limitation the rights
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to use, copy, modify, merge, publish, distribute, sublicense, and/or sell
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copies of the Software, and to permit persons to whom the Software is
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furnished to do so, subject to the following conditions:
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The above copyright notice and this permission notice shall be included in all
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copies or substantial portions of the Software.
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THE SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED "AS IS", WITHOUT WARRANTY OF ANY KIND, EXPRESS OR
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IMPLIED, INCLUDING BUT NOT LIMITED TO THE WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY,
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FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE AND NONINFRINGEMENT. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE
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AUTHORS OR COPYRIGHT HOLDERS BE LIABLE FOR ANY CLAIM, DAMAGES OR OTHER
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LIABILITY, WHETHER IN AN ACTION OF CONTRACT, TORT OR OTHERWISE, ARISING FROM,
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OUT OF OR IN CONNECTION WITH THE SOFTWARE OR THE USE OR OTHER DEALINGS IN THE
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SOFTWARE.
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---
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name: detecting-supply-chain-attacks-in-ci-cd
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description: >
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Scans GitHub Actions workflows and CI/CD pipeline configurations for supply chain
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attack vectors including unpinned actions, script injection via expressions, dependency
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confusion, and secrets exposure. Uses PyGithub and YAML parsing for automated audit.
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Use when hardening CI/CD pipelines or investigating compromised build systems.
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---
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# Detecting Supply Chain Attacks in CI/CD
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## Instructions
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Scan CI/CD workflow files for supply chain risks by parsing GitHub Actions YAML,
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checking for unpinned dependencies, script injection vectors, and secrets exposure.
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```python
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import yaml
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from pathlib import Path
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for wf in Path(".github/workflows").glob("*.yml"):
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with open(wf) as f:
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workflow = yaml.safe_load(f)
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for job_name, job in workflow.get("jobs", {}).items():
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for step in job.get("steps", []):
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uses = step.get("uses", "")
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if uses and "@" in uses and not uses.split("@")[1].startswith("sha"):
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print(f"Unpinned action: {uses} in {wf.name}")
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```
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Key supply chain risks:
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1. Unpinned GitHub Actions (using @main instead of SHA)
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2. Script injection via ${{ github.event }} expressions
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3. Overly permissive GITHUB_TOKEN permissions
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4. Third-party actions with write access to repo
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5. Dependency confusion via public/private package name collision
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## Examples
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```python
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# Check for script injection in run steps
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for step in job.get("steps", []):
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run_cmd = step.get("run", "")
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if "${{" in run_cmd and "github.event" in run_cmd:
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print(f"Script injection risk: {run_cmd[:80]}")
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```
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# API Reference: Detecting Supply Chain Attacks in CI/CD
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## GitHub Actions Workflow Parsing
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```python
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import yaml
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with open(".github/workflows/ci.yml") as f:
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wf = yaml.safe_load(f)
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# Key fields
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wf["permissions"] # Workflow-level permissions
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wf["jobs"]["build"]["steps"] # Step list
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step["uses"] # Action reference (owner/repo@ref)
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step["run"] # Shell script
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step["env"] # Environment variables
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```
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## Supply Chain Risk Patterns
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| Risk | Pattern | Severity |
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|------|---------|----------|
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| Unpinned action | `uses: owner/action@main` | CRITICAL |
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| Mutable tag | `uses: owner/action@v1` | MEDIUM |
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| Script injection | `run: echo ${{ github.event.issue.title }}` | CRITICAL |
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| Write permissions | `permissions: write-all` | HIGH |
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| Curl pipe bash | `RUN curl \| bash` | HIGH |
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| Latest image tag | `FROM image:latest` | MEDIUM |
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## Dependency Confusion Check
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```python
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import requests
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# Check if private package exists on public registry
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resp = requests.get(f"https://registry.npmjs.org/{pkg}")
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exists = resp.status_code == 200
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resp = requests.get(f"https://pypi.org/pypi/{pkg}/json")
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exists = resp.status_code == 200
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```
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## Pinning Actions to SHA
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```yaml
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# Bad: mutable reference
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uses: actions/checkout@main
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# Good: pinned to commit SHA
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uses: actions/checkout@8ade135a41bc03ea155e62e844d188df1ea18608
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```
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### References
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- GitHub Actions security hardening: https://docs.github.com/en/actions/security-guides
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- StepSecurity: https://github.com/step-security/harden-runner
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- Dependency confusion: https://medium.com/@alex.birsan/dependency-confusion-4a5d60fec610
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#!/usr/bin/env python3
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"""Agent for detecting supply chain attacks in CI/CD pipelines."""
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import os
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import re
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import json
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import argparse
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from pathlib import Path
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from datetime import datetime
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import yaml
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import requests
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def scan_workflow_file(workflow_path):
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"""Scan a single GitHub Actions workflow file for supply chain risks."""
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with open(workflow_path) as f:
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workflow = yaml.safe_load(f)
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if not workflow or not isinstance(workflow, dict):
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return []
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findings = []
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permissions = workflow.get("permissions", {})
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if permissions == "write-all" or (isinstance(permissions, dict) and
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permissions.get("contents") == "write"):
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findings.append({
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"file": str(workflow_path),
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"issue": "Overly permissive workflow permissions",
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"severity": "HIGH",
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"detail": f"permissions: {permissions}",
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})
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for job_name, job in workflow.get("jobs", {}).items():
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for i, step in enumerate(job.get("steps", [])):
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uses = step.get("uses", "")
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if uses:
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findings.extend(check_action_pinning(str(workflow_path), job_name, uses))
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run_cmd = step.get("run", "")
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if run_cmd:
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findings.extend(check_script_injection(str(workflow_path), job_name, run_cmd))
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env_vars = step.get("env", {})
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for key, val in (env_vars or {}).items():
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if isinstance(val, str) and "${{" in val and "secrets." in val:
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if "run" in step:
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findings.append({
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"file": str(workflow_path),
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"job": job_name,
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"issue": "Secret passed to environment variable in run step",
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"severity": "MEDIUM",
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"detail": f"{key}={val[:60]}",
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})
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return findings
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def check_action_pinning(filepath, job_name, uses):
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"""Check if a GitHub Action is pinned to a commit SHA."""
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findings = []
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if "@" not in uses:
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return findings
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ref = uses.split("@")[1]
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if re.match(r'^[0-9a-f]{40}$', ref):
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return findings
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if ref in ("main", "master", "latest"):
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findings.append({
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"file": filepath,
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"job": job_name,
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"issue": f"Action pinned to mutable branch: {uses}",
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"severity": "CRITICAL",
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})
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elif re.match(r'^v\d+', ref):
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findings.append({
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"file": filepath,
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"job": job_name,
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"issue": f"Action pinned to mutable tag: {uses}",
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"severity": "MEDIUM",
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"recommendation": "Pin to full commit SHA instead of tag",
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})
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return findings
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def check_script_injection(filepath, job_name, run_cmd):
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"""Check for script injection via GitHub context expressions."""
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findings = []
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injection_patterns = [
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r"\$\{\{\s*github\.event\.issue\.title",
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r"\$\{\{\s*github\.event\.issue\.body",
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r"\$\{\{\s*github\.event\.pull_request\.title",
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r"\$\{\{\s*github\.event\.pull_request\.body",
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r"\$\{\{\s*github\.event\.comment\.body",
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r"\$\{\{\s*github\.event\.review\.body",
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r"\$\{\{\s*github\.head_ref",
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]
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for pattern in injection_patterns:
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if re.search(pattern, run_cmd):
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findings.append({
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"file": filepath,
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"job": job_name,
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"issue": f"Script injection via untrusted input",
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"severity": "CRITICAL",
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"pattern": pattern,
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"detail": run_cmd[:100],
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})
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return findings
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def scan_directory(directory):
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"""Scan all workflow files in a directory."""
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all_findings = []
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workflow_dir = Path(directory) / ".github" / "workflows"
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if not workflow_dir.exists():
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workflow_dir = Path(directory)
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for wf in workflow_dir.glob("*.yml"):
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all_findings.extend(scan_workflow_file(str(wf)))
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for wf in workflow_dir.glob("*.yaml"):
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all_findings.extend(scan_workflow_file(str(wf)))
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return all_findings
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def check_dependency_confusion(package_name, registry="npm"):
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"""Check if a private package name exists on public registries."""
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urls = {
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"npm": f"https://registry.npmjs.org/{package_name}",
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"pypi": f"https://pypi.org/pypi/{package_name}/json",
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}
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url = urls.get(registry)
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if not url:
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return {"exists_publicly": False}
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try:
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resp = requests.get(url, timeout=10)
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return {
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"package": package_name,
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"registry": registry,
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"exists_publicly": resp.status_code == 200,
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"severity": "HIGH" if resp.status_code == 200 else "INFO",
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}
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except requests.RequestException:
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return {"package": package_name, "exists_publicly": False}
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def scan_dockerfile(dockerfile_path):
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"""Scan Dockerfile for supply chain risks."""
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findings = []
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with open(dockerfile_path) as f:
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lines = f.readlines()
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for i, line in enumerate(lines, 1):
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stripped = line.strip()
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if stripped.startswith("FROM") and ":latest" in stripped:
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findings.append({
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"file": str(dockerfile_path),
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"line": i,
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"issue": "Using :latest tag in FROM",
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"severity": "MEDIUM",
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"detail": stripped,
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})
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if "curl" in stripped and "| sh" in stripped or "| bash" in stripped:
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findings.append({
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"file": str(dockerfile_path),
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"line": i,
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"issue": "Piping curl output to shell",
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"severity": "HIGH",
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"detail": stripped[:100],
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})
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return findings
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def main():
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parser = argparse.ArgumentParser(description="CI/CD Supply Chain Attack Detection Agent")
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parser.add_argument("--directory", default=".", help="Repository root to scan")
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parser.add_argument("--check-packages", nargs="*", help="Package names to check for confusion")
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parser.add_argument("--output", default="supply_chain_report.json")
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parser.add_argument("--action", choices=[
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"workflows", "dockerfiles", "packages", "full_scan"
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], default="full_scan")
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args = parser.parse_args()
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report = {"generated_at": datetime.utcnow().isoformat(), "findings": {}}
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if args.action in ("workflows", "full_scan"):
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wf_findings = scan_directory(args.directory)
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report["findings"]["workflow_risks"] = wf_findings
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print(f"[+] Workflow risks found: {len(wf_findings)}")
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if args.action in ("dockerfiles", "full_scan"):
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df_findings = []
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for df in Path(args.directory).rglob("Dockerfile*"):
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df_findings.extend(scan_dockerfile(str(df)))
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report["findings"]["dockerfile_risks"] = df_findings
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print(f"[+] Dockerfile risks found: {len(df_findings)}")
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if args.action in ("packages", "full_scan") and args.check_packages:
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pkg_results = []
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for pkg in args.check_packages:
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pkg_results.append(check_dependency_confusion(pkg))
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report["findings"]["dependency_confusion"] = pkg_results
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public = [p for p in pkg_results if p.get("exists_publicly")]
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print(f"[+] Dependency confusion risks: {len(public)}")
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with open(args.output, "w") as f:
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json.dump(report, f, indent=2, default=str)
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print(f"[+] Report saved to {args.output}")
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if __name__ == "__main__":
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main()
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