docs(skills): rewrite container-security descriptions to a uniform standard

All 33 container-security skills now carry what it does, an explicit
"Use when" trigger, keywords, and a negative trigger naming the nearest
neighbour. Six collision clusters resolved by differentiating scope
rather than merging, so no skill is removed:

- kube-bench: running the tool vs interpreting findings into an audit
- Calico: portable upstream NetworkPolicy vs Calico-as-CNI vs Calico-only
  CRDs (GlobalNetworkPolicy, HostEndpoint, DNS egress)
- Falco: deploying and operating it vs authoring escape rules
- container escape: tool-agnostic runtime signals vs Falco rule syntax vs
  static posture audit vs offensive breakout
- Trivy: all-target platform and operator vs single-image scan
- Docker: images and Dockerfiles vs daemon.json vs the CIS audit script

Also replaces the templated "When to Use" boilerplate in these files,
including bullets that only restated the skill's own name.

Worst pair (Pod Security Standards vs Pod Security Admission) drops from
0.77 cosine to below the 0.45 threshold. Repo-wide: colliding pairs
60 -> 56, skills involved 105 -> 94.
This commit is contained in:
Mahipal
2026-08-23 17:15:30 +02:00
parent a81b233649
commit 6972fe933e
33 changed files with 300 additions and 149 deletions
@@ -1,10 +1,13 @@
---
name: implementing-rbac-hardening-for-kubernetes
description: Harden Kubernetes RBAC by implementing least-privilege Roles and ClusterRoles,
auditing RoleBindings, eliminating cluster-admin sprawl, separating service accounts,
and integrating external identity providers (OIDC). Use when reviewing or tightening
Kubernetes access control, removing excessive ClusterRoleBindings, or hardening
service-account permissions against privilege escalation and lateral movement.
description: >-
Hardens Kubernetes RBAC by designing least-privilege Roles and ClusterRoles, auditing
RoleBindings, eliminating cluster-admin sprawl, separating service accounts, and integrating
an external OIDC identity provider. Use when tightening cluster access control, removing
excessive ClusterRoleBindings, or hardening service-account permissions against escalation
and lateral movement. Keywords: RBAC, Role, ClusterRole, RoleBinding, least privilege,
service account, OIDC, cluster-admin. Do not use for discovering existing escalation paths -
use auditing-kubernetes-rbac-privilege-escalation.
domain: cybersecurity
subdomain: container-security
tags: