docs(skills): rewrite container-security descriptions to a uniform standard

All 33 container-security skills now carry what it does, an explicit
"Use when" trigger, keywords, and a negative trigger naming the nearest
neighbour. Six collision clusters resolved by differentiating scope
rather than merging, so no skill is removed:

- kube-bench: running the tool vs interpreting findings into an audit
- Calico: portable upstream NetworkPolicy vs Calico-as-CNI vs Calico-only
  CRDs (GlobalNetworkPolicy, HostEndpoint, DNS egress)
- Falco: deploying and operating it vs authoring escape rules
- container escape: tool-agnostic runtime signals vs Falco rule syntax vs
  static posture audit vs offensive breakout
- Trivy: all-target platform and operator vs single-image scan
- Docker: images and Dockerfiles vs daemon.json vs the CIS audit script

Also replaces the templated "When to Use" boilerplate in these files,
including bullets that only restated the skill's own name.

Worst pair (Pod Security Standards vs Pod Security Admission) drops from
0.77 cosine to below the 0.45 threshold. Repo-wide: colliding pairs
60 -> 56, skills involved 105 -> 94.
This commit is contained in:
Mahipal
2026-08-23 17:15:30 +02:00
parent a81b233649
commit 6972fe933e
33 changed files with 300 additions and 149 deletions
@@ -1,10 +1,13 @@
---
name: implementing-runtime-security-with-tetragon
description: Implement eBPF-based runtime security observability and enforcement in
Kubernetes clusters using Cilium Tetragon, monitoring process execution, file access,
network connections, and syscalls at the kernel level. Use when deploying Tetragon
to detect or block dangerous syscalls (ptrace, mount, unshare), enforce kernel-level
Kubernetes security policy, or add low-overhead runtime threat detection to a cluster.
description: >-
Implements eBPF-based runtime observability and in-kernel enforcement in Kubernetes with
Cilium Tetragon, monitoring process execution, file access, network connections, and
syscalls, and blocking dangerous calls at the kernel level. Use when deploying Tetragon to
detect or block syscalls such as ptrace, mount, and unshare, enforcing kernel-level policy,
or adding low-overhead runtime detection to a cluster. Keywords: Tetragon, Cilium, eBPF,
TracingPolicy, kprobe, enforcement, process lineage. Do not use for Falco-based detection -
use detecting-container-runtime-threats-with-falco.
domain: cybersecurity
subdomain: container-security
tags: