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docs(skills): rewrite container-security descriptions to a uniform standard
All 33 container-security skills now carry what it does, an explicit "Use when" trigger, keywords, and a negative trigger naming the nearest neighbour. Six collision clusters resolved by differentiating scope rather than merging, so no skill is removed: - kube-bench: running the tool vs interpreting findings into an audit - Calico: portable upstream NetworkPolicy vs Calico-as-CNI vs Calico-only CRDs (GlobalNetworkPolicy, HostEndpoint, DNS egress) - Falco: deploying and operating it vs authoring escape rules - container escape: tool-agnostic runtime signals vs Falco rule syntax vs static posture audit vs offensive breakout - Trivy: all-target platform and operator vs single-image scan - Docker: images and Dockerfiles vs daemon.json vs the CIS audit script Also replaces the templated "When to Use" boilerplate in these files, including bullets that only restated the skill's own name. Worst pair (Pod Security Standards vs Pod Security Admission) drops from 0.77 cosine to below the 0.45 threshold. Repo-wide: colliding pairs 60 -> 56, skills involved 105 -> 94.
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---
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name: implementing-supply-chain-security-with-in-toto
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description: Implement software supply chain integrity verification for container
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builds using the in-toto framework, covering signing-key generation, defining a
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supply chain layout, recording pipeline steps as signed link metadata, verifying
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before deployment, Kubernetes admission control, and SLSA integration. Use when
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generating in-toto attestations for CI/CD pipeline steps, verifying that a container
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image followed an approved build process, or enforcing supply chain provenance
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at admission time.
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description: >-
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Implements supply chain integrity verification for container builds with the in-toto
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framework: generating signing keys, defining a supply chain layout, recording pipeline steps
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as signed link metadata, verifying before deployment, enforcing at Kubernetes admission, and
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integrating with SLSA. Use when attesting CI/CD pipeline steps, proving an image followed
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the approved build process, or enforcing provenance at admission. Keywords: in-toto, layout,
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link metadata, step, inspection, SLSA, provenance, admission. Do not use for signing and
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verifying images with Cosign - use implementing-image-provenance-verification-with-cosign.
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domain: cybersecurity
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subdomain: container-security
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tags:
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