docs(skills): rewrite container-security descriptions to a uniform standard

All 33 container-security skills now carry what it does, an explicit
"Use when" trigger, keywords, and a negative trigger naming the nearest
neighbour. Six collision clusters resolved by differentiating scope
rather than merging, so no skill is removed:

- kube-bench: running the tool vs interpreting findings into an audit
- Calico: portable upstream NetworkPolicy vs Calico-as-CNI vs Calico-only
  CRDs (GlobalNetworkPolicy, HostEndpoint, DNS egress)
- Falco: deploying and operating it vs authoring escape rules
- container escape: tool-agnostic runtime signals vs Falco rule syntax vs
  static posture audit vs offensive breakout
- Trivy: all-target platform and operator vs single-image scan
- Docker: images and Dockerfiles vs daemon.json vs the CIS audit script

Also replaces the templated "When to Use" boilerplate in these files,
including bullets that only restated the skill's own name.

Worst pair (Pod Security Standards vs Pod Security Admission) drops from
0.77 cosine to below the 0.45 threshold. Repo-wide: colliding pairs
60 -> 56, skills involved 105 -> 94.
This commit is contained in:
Mahipal
2026-08-23 17:15:30 +02:00
parent a81b233649
commit 6972fe933e
33 changed files with 300 additions and 149 deletions
@@ -1,12 +1,13 @@
---
name: implementing-supply-chain-security-with-in-toto
description: Implement software supply chain integrity verification for container
builds using the in-toto framework, covering signing-key generation, defining a
supply chain layout, recording pipeline steps as signed link metadata, verifying
before deployment, Kubernetes admission control, and SLSA integration. Use when
generating in-toto attestations for CI/CD pipeline steps, verifying that a container
image followed an approved build process, or enforcing supply chain provenance
at admission time.
description: >-
Implements supply chain integrity verification for container builds with the in-toto
framework: generating signing keys, defining a supply chain layout, recording pipeline steps
as signed link metadata, verifying before deployment, enforcing at Kubernetes admission, and
integrating with SLSA. Use when attesting CI/CD pipeline steps, proving an image followed
the approved build process, or enforcing provenance at admission. Keywords: in-toto, layout,
link metadata, step, inspection, SLSA, provenance, admission. Do not use for signing and
verifying images with Cosign - use implementing-image-provenance-verification-with-cosign.
domain: cybersecurity
subdomain: container-security
tags: