feat: add 5 new cybersecurity skills - RDP brute force, Covenant C2, Calico network policies, heap spray analysis, T1098 hunting

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MIT License
Copyright (c) 2025 Mahipal
Permission is hereby granted, free of charge, to any person obtaining a copy
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The above copyright notice and this permission notice shall be included in all
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OUT OF OR IN CONNECTION WITH THE SOFTWARE OR THE USE OR OTHER DEALINGS IN THE
SOFTWARE.
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---
name: hunting-for-t1098-account-manipulation
description: Hunt for MITRE ATT&CK T1098 account manipulation including shadow admin creation, SID history injection, group membership changes, and credential modifications using Windows Security Event Logs.
domain: cybersecurity
subdomain: threat-hunting
tags: [threat-hunting, mitre-attack, t1098, account-manipulation, active-directory, persistence]
version: "1.0"
author: mahipal
license: MIT
---
# Hunting for T1098 Account Manipulation
## Overview
MITRE ATT&CK T1098 (Account Manipulation) covers adversary actions to maintain or expand access to compromised accounts, including adding credentials, modifying group memberships, SID history injection, and creating shadow admin accounts. This skill covers detecting these techniques through Windows Security Event Log analysis (Event IDs 4738, 4728, 4732, 4756, 4670, 5136), correlating group membership changes with privilege escalation indicators, and identifying anomalous account modification patterns.
## Prerequisites
- Windows Security Event Logs (EVTX format) or SIEM access
- Python 3.9+ with `python-evtx`, `lxml` libraries
- Understanding of Active Directory group structure and SID architecture
- Familiarity with MITRE ATT&CK T1098 sub-techniques
## Steps
### Step 1: Parse Account Modification Events
Extract Event IDs 4738 (user account changed), 4728/4732/4756 (member added to security groups), and 5136 (directory service object modified).
### Step 2: Detect Privileged Group Changes
Flag additions to Domain Admins, Enterprise Admins, Schema Admins, Administrators, and Backup Operators groups.
### Step 3: Identify Shadow Admin Indicators
Detect accounts receiving AdminSDHolder protection, direct privilege assignment, or SID history injection.
### Step 4: Correlate with Attack Timeline
Cross-reference account changes with authentication events to identify initial compromise and persistence establishment.
## Expected Output
JSON report with detected account manipulation events, privileged group changes, shadow admin indicators, and timeline correlation.
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# API Reference: Hunting for T1098 Account Manipulation
## Key Windows Security Event IDs
| Event ID | Description | T1098 Relevance |
|----------|-------------|-----------------|
| 4738 | User account changed | Account property modification |
| 4728 | Member added to global security group | Domain Admins, etc. |
| 4732 | Member added to local security group | Administrators, etc. |
| 4756 | Member added to universal security group | Enterprise Admins |
| 4729 | Member removed from global security group | Evidence cleanup |
| 4670 | Permissions on object changed | ACL manipulation |
| 5136 | Directory service object modified | SID History, SPNs |
| 4724 | Password reset attempted | Credential takeover |
| 4781 | Account name changed | Account rename evasion |
## Privileged Groups to Monitor
| Group | Risk | Impact |
|-------|------|--------|
| Domain Admins | Critical | Full domain control |
| Enterprise Admins | Critical | Forest-wide admin |
| Schema Admins | Critical | AD schema modification |
| Administrators | High | Local admin on DCs |
| Backup Operators | High | Read any file, backup SAM |
| DNS Admins | High | DLL injection on DCs |
| Account Operators | Medium | Create/modify accounts |
## Sensitive AD Attributes
| Attribute | Attack Technique |
|-----------|-----------------|
| SIDHistory | T1134.005 - SID History Injection |
| servicePrincipalName | T1558.003 - Kerberoasting setup |
| msDS-AllowedToDelegateTo | Constrained delegation abuse |
| msDS-AllowedToActOnBehalfOfOtherIdentity | RBCD attack |
| AdminCount | AdminSDHolder persistence |
| userAccountControl | Account flag manipulation |
## python-evtx Parsing
```python
import Evtx.Evtx as evtx
with evtx.Evtx("Security.evtx") as log:
for record in log.records():
xml_str = record.xml()
# Parse XML to extract EventID and Data fields
```
Install: `pip install python-evtx lxml`
## MITRE T1098 Sub-Techniques
| ID | Name | Key Indicator |
|----|------|---------------|
| T1098.001 | Additional Cloud Credentials | New keys/certs added |
| T1098.002 | Additional Email Delegate Access | Mailbox permission grants |
| T1098.003 | Additional Cloud Roles | Role assignment changes |
| T1098.004 | SSH Authorized Keys | authorized_keys modification |
| T1098.005 | Device Registration | Rogue device enrollment |
## References
- MITRE T1098: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1098/
- CISA Eviction Guide: https://www.cisa.gov/eviction-strategies-tool/info-attack/T1098
- Windows Event Mapping: https://www.socinvestigation.com/mapping-mitre-attck-with-window-event-log-ids/
- python-evtx: https://github.com/williballenthin/python-evtx
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#!/usr/bin/env python3
"""Agent for hunting MITRE ATT&CK T1098 account manipulation.
Detects shadow admin creation, SID history injection, privileged
group membership changes, and credential modifications by parsing
Windows Security Event Logs for key event IDs.
"""
# For authorized threat hunting and blue team use only
import argparse
import json
import os
import xml.etree.ElementTree as ET
from collections import Counter, defaultdict
from datetime import datetime
from pathlib import Path
try:
import Evtx.Evtx as evtx
except ImportError:
evtx = None
NS = "{http://schemas.microsoft.com/win/2004/08/events/event}"
T1098_EVENT_IDS = {
"4738": "User account changed",
"4728": "Member added to global security group",
"4732": "Member added to local security group",
"4756": "Member added to universal security group",
"4729": "Member removed from global security group",
"4733": "Member removed from local security group",
"4670": "Permissions on object changed",
"5136": "Directory service object modified",
"4724": "Password reset attempted",
"4723": "Password change attempted",
"4781": "Account name changed",
}
PRIVILEGED_GROUPS = {
"domain admins", "enterprise admins", "schema admins",
"administrators", "backup operators", "server operators",
"account operators", "print operators", "dns admins",
"group policy creator owners", "remote desktop users",
}
SENSITIVE_ATTRIBUTES = {
"sidhistory", "serviceprincipalname", "msds-allowedtodelegateto",
"msds-allowedtoactonbehalfofotheridentity", "admincount",
"useraccountcontrol", "primarygroupid",
}
def _parse_event(xml_str):
"""Extract event ID, timestamp, and data fields from event XML."""
root = ET.fromstring(xml_str)
sys_node = root.find(f"{NS}System")
event_id = sys_node.find(f"{NS}EventID").text if sys_node is not None else None
tc = sys_node.find(f"{NS}TimeCreated") if sys_node is not None else None
timestamp = tc.get("SystemTime", "") if tc is not None else ""
data = {}
for d in root.iter(f"{NS}Data"):
name = d.get("Name", "")
data[name] = d.text or ""
return event_id, timestamp, data
class T1098HuntingAgent:
"""Hunts for T1098 account manipulation in Windows Event Logs."""
def __init__(self, evtx_path, output_dir="./t1098_hunt"):
self.evtx_path = evtx_path
self.output_dir = Path(output_dir)
self.output_dir.mkdir(parents=True, exist_ok=True)
self.events = []
self.findings = []
def parse_events(self):
"""Parse EVTX for T1098-relevant event IDs."""
if evtx is None:
raise RuntimeError("python-evtx required: pip install python-evtx")
with evtx.Evtx(self.evtx_path) as log:
for record in log.records():
try:
xml_str = record.xml()
except Exception:
continue
event_id, ts, data = _parse_event(xml_str)
if event_id in T1098_EVENT_IDS:
self.events.append({
"event_id": event_id,
"description": T1098_EVENT_IDS[event_id],
"timestamp": ts,
"subject_user": data.get("SubjectUserName", ""),
"subject_domain": data.get("SubjectDomainName", ""),
"target_user": data.get("TargetUserName", data.get("MemberName", "")),
"target_domain": data.get("TargetDomainName", ""),
"group_name": data.get("TargetUserName", ""),
"member_sid": data.get("MemberSid", ""),
"attribute_name": data.get("AttributeLDAPDisplayName", ""),
"attribute_value": data.get("AttributeValue", "")[:200],
})
def detect_privileged_group_changes(self):
"""Detect additions to privileged security groups."""
group_add_ids = {"4728", "4732", "4756"}
alerts = []
for event in self.events:
if event["event_id"] in group_add_ids:
group = event["group_name"].lower()
if any(pg in group for pg in PRIVILEGED_GROUPS):
alerts.append(event)
self.findings.append({
"severity": "critical",
"type": "Privileged Group Addition",
"detail": f"{event['subject_user']} added {event['target_user']} "
f"to '{event['group_name']}' at {event['timestamp']}",
"mitre": "T1098.001",
})
return alerts
def detect_sid_history_injection(self):
"""Detect SID History modifications via directory service changes."""
alerts = []
for event in self.events:
if event["event_id"] == "5136":
attr = event["attribute_name"].lower()
if attr == "sidhistory":
alerts.append(event)
self.findings.append({
"severity": "critical",
"type": "SID History Injection",
"detail": f"SID History modified on {event['target_user']} "
f"by {event['subject_user']} at {event['timestamp']}",
"mitre": "T1134.005",
})
return alerts
def detect_sensitive_attribute_changes(self):
"""Detect changes to sensitive AD attributes."""
alerts = []
for event in self.events:
if event["event_id"] == "5136":
attr = event["attribute_name"].lower()
if attr in SENSITIVE_ATTRIBUTES:
alerts.append(event)
self.findings.append({
"severity": "high",
"type": "Sensitive Attribute Modified",
"detail": f"Attribute '{event['attribute_name']}' changed on "
f"{event['target_user']} by {event['subject_user']}",
"mitre": "T1098",
})
return alerts
def detect_shadow_admin(self):
"""Detect potential shadow admin creation patterns."""
alerts = []
admin_adds = [e for e in self.events
if e["event_id"] in ("4728", "4732", "4756") and
any(pg in e["group_name"].lower() for pg in PRIVILEGED_GROUPS)]
account_changes = [e for e in self.events if e["event_id"] == "4738"]
changed_accounts = {e["target_user"].lower() for e in account_changes}
for add_event in admin_adds:
target = add_event["target_user"].lower()
if target in changed_accounts:
alerts.append(add_event)
self.findings.append({
"severity": "critical",
"type": "Shadow Admin Indicator",
"detail": f"Account '{add_event['target_user']}' modified and then "
f"added to '{add_event['group_name']}'",
"mitre": "T1098",
})
return alerts
def generate_report(self):
self.parse_events()
priv_group = self.detect_privileged_group_changes()
sid_history = self.detect_sid_history_injection()
sensitive = self.detect_sensitive_attribute_changes()
shadow = self.detect_shadow_admin()
event_summary = Counter(e["event_id"] for e in self.events)
actor_summary = Counter(e["subject_user"] for e in self.events if e["subject_user"])
report = {
"report_date": datetime.utcnow().isoformat(),
"evtx_file": str(self.evtx_path),
"mitre_technique": "T1098 - Account Manipulation",
"total_t1098_events": len(self.events),
"event_id_summary": dict(event_summary),
"top_actors": actor_summary.most_common(10),
"privileged_group_changes": len(priv_group),
"sid_history_injections": len(sid_history),
"sensitive_attr_changes": len(sensitive),
"shadow_admin_indicators": len(shadow),
"findings": self.findings,
"total_findings": len(self.findings),
}
out = self.output_dir / "t1098_hunt_report.json"
with open(out, "w") as f:
json.dump(report, f, indent=2, default=str)
print(json.dumps(report, indent=2, default=str))
return report
def main():
parser = argparse.ArgumentParser(
description="Hunt for MITRE T1098 account manipulation in Windows Event Logs"
)
parser.add_argument("evtx_file", help="Path to Security.evtx log file")
parser.add_argument("--output-dir", default="./t1098_hunt",
help="Output directory for hunt report")
args = parser.parse_args()
os.makedirs(args.output_dir, exist_ok=True)
agent = T1098HuntingAgent(args.evtx_file, output_dir=args.output_dir)
agent.generate_report()
if __name__ == "__main__":
main()