Add 55 new skills across 3 new domains + 6 undercovered areas (762 -> 817)

Demand-driven expansion targeting the fastest-growing 2025-2026 threat and
skills categories (ISC2/WEF/CrowdStrike/Mandiant signals):

- AI Security (NEW domain, 12 skills): LLM red-teaming with garak/PyRIT,
  prompt injection (direct/indirect/RAG), MCP tool-poisoning, agentic tool
  invocation, guardrails, model/data poisoning, system-prompt leakage,
  embedding/vector weaknesses, model extraction, continuous red-teaming
- Supply Chain Security (NEW domain, 5 skills): SBOMs, dependency confusion,
  malicious-npm triage, typosquatting, SLSA/Sigstore provenance
- Hardware & Firmware Security (NEW domain, 4 skills): CHIPSEC/UEFI audit,
  Secure Boot bypass, TPM measured-boot attestation, ESP bootkit hunting
- Identity (10): Entra ID/ROADtools, GraphRunner, AADInternals, ADCS/Certipy,
  shadow credentials, coercion, BloodHound CE, device-code phishing, SSO abuse
- Cloud-native (8): Stratus, Pacu, CloudFox, container escape, K8s RBAC,
  Falco, Trivy, kube-bench
- Offensive C2 (6): Sliver, Havoc, NetExec, DPAPI, NTLM relay ESC8, redirectors
- DFIR (6): Hayabusa, Chainsaw, KAPE, Velociraptor, EZ Tools, Plaso
- Backfill (4): OpenCTI, MISP, honeytokens, post-quantum crypto migration

Each skill follows the repo taxonomy (SKILL.md + references/{standards,api-reference}.md
+ scripts/agent.py + LICENSE), with researched real tool commands (no placeholders),
complete frontmatter, and ATT&CK/ATLAS + NIST CSF mappings. Updates README domain
table, skill count, and index.json.

skills/hunting-saas-sso-token-abuse/references/api-reference.md

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+# SSO Token-Abuse Hunting — Data Source Reference
+
+## Microsoft Entra ID (Sentinel / Log Analytics) Tables
+
+| Table | Description |
+|-------|-------------|
+| `SigninLogs` | Interactive user sign-ins |
+| `AADNonInteractiveUserSignInLogs` | Non-interactive sign-ins; common surface for replayed cookies/refresh tokens |
+| `AADServicePrincipalSignInLogs` | Service-principal sign-ins |
+| `AuditLogs` | Directory changes incl. OAuth consent / permission grants |
+| `AADManagedIdentitySignInLogs` | Managed-identity authentications |
+
+### Key correlation fields
+
+| Field | Meaning |
+|-------|---------|
+| `SessionId` | Linkable identifier joining all artifacts from one root auth event |
+| `UniqueTokenIdentifier` | Per-token identifier; correlate issuance to usage |
+| `IPAddress` / `LocationDetails` | Source IP and GeoIP for impossible-travel/ASN checks |
+| `AppDisplayName` / `ResourceDisplayName` | Which SaaS app/resource the token accessed |
+| `ConditionalAccessStatus` | Whether CA applied (notApplied can indicate replay) |
+| `ResultType` | `0` = success |
+
+## Okta System Log API
+
+`GET https://<org>.okta.com/api/v1/logs` with header `Authorization: SSWS <token>`.
+
+| Parameter | Description |
+|-----------|-------------|
+| `filter` | SCIM filter, e.g. `eventType eq "policy.evaluate_sign_on"` |
+| `since` / `until` | ISO-8601 time bounds |
+| `q` | Free-text search |
+| `limit` | Page size |
+
+### Key event types and fields
+
+| Item | Meaning |
+|------|---------|
+| `user.session.start` | New session created |
+| `policy.evaluate_sign_on` | Sign-on policy evaluation (per-access) |
+| `authentication.sso` | SSO into a downstream app |
+| `authenticationContext.externalSessionId` | Session identifier for reuse detection |
+| `client.ipAddress` / `client.userAgent.rawUserAgent` | Source context for divergence checks |
+| `actor.alternateId` | The user |
+
+## Response / Remediation
+
+| Action | Command/API |
+|--------|-------------|
+| Revoke Entra sessions | `POST https://graph.microsoft.com/v1.0/users/{id}/revokeSignInSessions` |
+| Clear Okta user sessions | `DELETE https://<org>.okta.com/api/v1/users/{id}/sessions` |
+| Enforce token protection | Entra Conditional Access "Require token protection for sign-in sessions" |

skills/hunting-saas-sso-token-abuse/references/standards.md

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+# Standards and Framework Mapping
+
+## NIST Cybersecurity Framework 2.0
+
+| ID | Name | Rationale |
+|----|------|-----------|
+| DE.CM-01 | Networks and network services are monitored to find potentially adverse events | Hunting SSO/OAuth token replay across identity logs is continuous monitoring of authentication services for adverse events. |
+
+## MITRE ATT&CK (Enterprise / Cloud)
+
+| ID | Name | Rationale |
+|----|------|-----------|
+| T1550.001 | Use Alternate Authentication Material: Application Access Token | Core hunted technique — replaying stolen OAuth tokens/cookies. |
+| T1539 | Steal Web Session Cookie | The cookie theft that enables pass-the-cookie. |
+| T1528 | Steal Application Access Token | Token acquisition via phishing/illicit consent. |
+| T1078.004 | Valid Accounts: Cloud Accounts | Replayed tokens provide valid-account SaaS access. |
+| T1098.001 | Account Manipulation: Additional Cloud Credentials | Follow-on persistence after token abuse. |
+
+## Supporting References
+
+- MITRE ATT&CK T1550.001 — https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1550/001/
+- Microsoft Entra sign-in log schema — https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/entra/identity/monitoring-health/reference-azure-monitor-sign-ins-log-schema
+- Okta System Log API — https://developer.okta.com/docs/reference/api/system-log/
+- Mandiant M-Trends — https://www.mandiant.com/m-trends
+- NIST CSF 2.0 — https://www.nist.gov/cyberframework