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https://github.com/mukul975/Anthropic-Cybersecurity-Skills.git
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Add 55 new skills across 3 new domains + 6 undercovered areas (762 -> 817)
Demand-driven expansion targeting the fastest-growing 2025-2026 threat and
skills categories (ISC2/WEF/CrowdStrike/Mandiant signals):
- AI Security (NEW domain, 12 skills): LLM red-teaming with garak/PyRIT,
prompt injection (direct/indirect/RAG), MCP tool-poisoning, agentic tool
invocation, guardrails, model/data poisoning, system-prompt leakage,
embedding/vector weaknesses, model extraction, continuous red-teaming
- Supply Chain Security (NEW domain, 5 skills): SBOMs, dependency confusion,
malicious-npm triage, typosquatting, SLSA/Sigstore provenance
- Hardware & Firmware Security (NEW domain, 4 skills): CHIPSEC/UEFI audit,
Secure Boot bypass, TPM measured-boot attestation, ESP bootkit hunting
- Identity (10): Entra ID/ROADtools, GraphRunner, AADInternals, ADCS/Certipy,
shadow credentials, coercion, BloodHound CE, device-code phishing, SSO abuse
- Cloud-native (8): Stratus, Pacu, CloudFox, container escape, K8s RBAC,
Falco, Trivy, kube-bench
- Offensive C2 (6): Sliver, Havoc, NetExec, DPAPI, NTLM relay ESC8, redirectors
- DFIR (6): Hayabusa, Chainsaw, KAPE, Velociraptor, EZ Tools, Plaso
- Backfill (4): OpenCTI, MISP, honeytokens, post-quantum crypto migration
Each skill follows the repo taxonomy (SKILL.md + references/{standards,api-reference}.md
+ scripts/agent.py + LICENSE), with researched real tool commands (no placeholders),
complete frontmatter, and ATT&CK/ATLAS + NIST CSF mappings. Updates README domain
table, skill count, and index.json.
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# OpenSSL PQC Command Reference
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## Discovery
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| Task | Command |
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|------|---------|
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| OpenSSL version (need 3.5+) | `openssl version` |
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| List quantum-safe KEMs | `openssl list -kem-algorithms \| grep -i mlkem` |
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| List quantum-safe signatures | `openssl list -signature-algorithms \| grep -Ei 'mldsa\|slhdsa'` |
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| List TLS groups | `openssl list -tls-groups \| grep -i mlkem` |
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| Inspect cert algorithm | `openssl x509 -in server.crt -noout -text \| grep -E 'Signature Algorithm\|Public Key'` |
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## Key generation
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| Task | Command (OpenSSL 3.5+) | oqs-provider (3.0–3.4) |
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|------|------------------------|------------------------|
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| ML-KEM-768 keypair | `openssl genpkey -algorithm ML-KEM-768 -out mlkem768.key` | `-algorithm mlkem768` |
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| ML-DSA-65 keypair | `openssl genpkey -algorithm ML-DSA-65 -out mldsa65.key` | `-algorithm mldsa65` |
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| Extract public key | `openssl pkey -in mldsa65.key -pubout -out mldsa65.pub` | same |
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## Certificates
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| Task | Command |
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|------|---------|
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| Self-signed ML-DSA cert | `openssl req -new -x509 -key mldsa65.key -out mldsa65.crt -days 365 -subj "/CN=pqc.example.com"` |
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| Inspect signature alg | `openssl x509 -in mldsa65.crt -noout -text \| grep -A1 'Signature Algorithm'` |
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## Sign / verify
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| Task | Command |
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|------|---------|
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| Sign | `openssl dgst -sign mldsa65.key -out artifact.sig artifact.txt` |
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| Verify | `openssl dgst -verify mldsa65.pub -signature artifact.sig artifact.txt` |
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## Hybrid TLS key exchange
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| Task | Command |
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|------|---------|
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| TLS server (hybrid group) | `openssl s_server -accept 4433 -www -tls1_3 -cert mldsa65.crt -key mldsa65.key -groups X25519MLKEM768` |
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| TLS client (hybrid group) | `openssl s_client -connect localhost:4433 -tls1_3 -groups X25519MLKEM768` |
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| Test public PQC endpoint | `openssl s_client -groups X25519MLKEM768 -tls1_3 -connect pq.cloudflareresearch.com:443` |
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### Standardized hybrid TLS groups
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| Group | Classical leg | PQC leg |
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|-------|---------------|---------|
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| X25519MLKEM768 | X25519 | ML-KEM-768 |
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| SecP256r1MLKEM768 | NIST P-256 | ML-KEM-768 |
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| SecP384r1MLKEM1024 | NIST P-384 | ML-KEM-1024 |
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## NGINX hybrid config (OpenSSL 3.5+)
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```nginx
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ssl_protocols TLSv1.3;
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ssl_ecdh_curve X25519MLKEM768:X25519:secp256r1; # hybrid first, classical fallback
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```
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## oqs-provider activation (openssl.cnf)
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```ini
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[provider_sect]
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default = default_sect
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oqsprovider = oqsprovider_sect
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[default_sect]
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activate = 1
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[oqsprovider_sect]
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activate = 1
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```
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## CBOM generation
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| Tool | Command |
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|------|---------|
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| cbomkit-theia (dir) | `cbomkit-theia dir ./myapp --output cbom.json` |
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| cdxgen (Java + crypto) | `cdxgen -t java --include-crypto -o cbom.json ./myapp` |
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# Standards and Framework Mapping
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## NIST Cybersecurity Framework 2.0
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| ID | Name | Rationale |
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|----|------|-----------|
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| PR.DS-02 | The confidentiality, integrity, and availability of data-in-transit are protected | Hybrid PQC key exchange (X25519MLKEM768) protects data in transit against harvest-now-decrypt-later attacks by a future CRQC. |
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## MITRE ATT&CK
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| ID | Name | Rationale |
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|----|------|-----------|
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| T1573 | Encrypted Channel | Migration hardens the encrypted channels protecting data in transit; cryptographic inventory of these channels also underpins detection of adversary encrypted C2. |
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| T1573.001 | Encrypted Channel: Symmetric Cryptography | AES/symmetric ciphers — quantum-weakened by Grover and hardened via 256-bit keys. |
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| T1573.002 | Encrypted Channel: Asymmetric Cryptography | RSA/ECDH — the asymmetric primitives broken by Shor's algorithm and replaced by ML-KEM. |
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## NIST Post-Quantum Standards (finalized 13 Aug 2024)
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| Standard | Algorithm | Former name | Purpose |
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|----------|-----------|-------------|---------|
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| FIPS 203 | ML-KEM (Module-Lattice KEM) | CRYSTALS-Kyber | Key encapsulation / establishment |
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| FIPS 204 | ML-DSA (Module-Lattice DSA) | CRYSTALS-Dilithium | Primary digital signatures |
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| FIPS 205 | SLH-DSA (Stateless Hash-based DSA) | SPHINCS+ | Conservative backup signatures |
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## Migration Guidance
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| Reference | Rationale |
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|-----------|-----------|
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| NIST SP 1800-38 (NCCoE, Migration to Post-Quantum Cryptography) | Crypto-discovery test plan, CBOM-driven inventory, and migration architecture across CI/CD, operational systems, and network services. |
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| Mosca's inequality | Prioritization rule: migrate when data_lifetime + migration_time > time_to_CRQC. |
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| CycloneDX 1.6 CBOM | Cryptography Bill of Materials object model for inventory and dependency tracking. |
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