Add 55 new skills across 3 new domains + 6 undercovered areas (762 -> 817)

Demand-driven expansion targeting the fastest-growing 2025-2026 threat and
skills categories (ISC2/WEF/CrowdStrike/Mandiant signals):

- AI Security (NEW domain, 12 skills): LLM red-teaming with garak/PyRIT,
  prompt injection (direct/indirect/RAG), MCP tool-poisoning, agentic tool
  invocation, guardrails, model/data poisoning, system-prompt leakage,
  embedding/vector weaknesses, model extraction, continuous red-teaming
- Supply Chain Security (NEW domain, 5 skills): SBOMs, dependency confusion,
  malicious-npm triage, typosquatting, SLSA/Sigstore provenance
- Hardware & Firmware Security (NEW domain, 4 skills): CHIPSEC/UEFI audit,
  Secure Boot bypass, TPM measured-boot attestation, ESP bootkit hunting
- Identity (10): Entra ID/ROADtools, GraphRunner, AADInternals, ADCS/Certipy,
  shadow credentials, coercion, BloodHound CE, device-code phishing, SSO abuse
- Cloud-native (8): Stratus, Pacu, CloudFox, container escape, K8s RBAC,
  Falco, Trivy, kube-bench
- Offensive C2 (6): Sliver, Havoc, NetExec, DPAPI, NTLM relay ESC8, redirectors
- DFIR (6): Hayabusa, Chainsaw, KAPE, Velociraptor, EZ Tools, Plaso
- Backfill (4): OpenCTI, MISP, honeytokens, post-quantum crypto migration

Each skill follows the repo taxonomy (SKILL.md + references/{standards,api-reference}.md
+ scripts/agent.py + LICENSE), with researched real tool commands (no placeholders),
complete frontmatter, and ATT&CK/ATLAS + NIST CSF mappings. Updates README domain
table, skill count, and index.json.

skills/post-exploiting-microsoft-graph-with-graphrunner/references/api-reference.md

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+# GraphRunner Module Reference
+
+Import with `Import-Module .\GraphRunner.ps1`. Run `List-GraphRunnerModules` for the live list.
+
+## Authentication
+| Function | Purpose |
+|----------|---------|
+| `Get-GraphTokens` | Device-code login; returns `$tokens` object (access + refresh) |
+| `Invoke-RefreshGraphTokens` | Refresh the access token from the refresh token |
+| `Invoke-AutoTokenRefresh` | Background auto-refresh during long operations |
+| `Invoke-ImportTokens` | Import externally captured access/refresh tokens |
+| `Invoke-RefreshToSharePointToken` | Exchange a Graph token for a SharePoint token |
+| `Get-AzureAppTokens` / `Invoke-RefreshAzureAppTokens` | App (consent-grant) token flow |
+| `Invoke-AutoOAuthFlow` / `Invoke-BruteClientIDAccess` | OAuth consent flow helpers |
+
+## Recon & Enumeration
+| Function | Purpose |
+|----------|---------|
+| `Invoke-GraphRecon` | Tenant + current-user permission summary (`-PermissionEnum`) |
+| `Invoke-DumpCAPS` | Dump conditional-access policies (`-ResolveGuids`) |
+| `Invoke-DumpApps` | App registrations, service principals, consent grants, reply URLs |
+| `Get-AzureADUsers` | Enumerate all users (`-OutFile`) |
+| `Get-SecurityGroups` / `Get-DirectoryRoles` | Enumerate groups / directory roles |
+| `Get-UpdatableGroups` | Groups the current principal can modify (privesc) |
+| `Get-DynamicGroups` | Dynamic membership groups |
+| `Invoke-SearchUserAttributes` | Search all user attributes for a term (`-SearchTerm`) |
+| `Invoke-GraphOpenInboxFinder` | Find mailboxes readable by the current user |
+| `Find-PermissiveCalendars` | Find over-shared calendars |
+| `Invoke-CheckAccess` | Check token validity/scope |
+| `Get-EntraIDGroupInfo` / `Invoke-GroupLookup` | Group detail lookups |
+
+## Privilege Escalation / Account Manipulation
+| Function | Purpose |
+|----------|---------|
+| `Invoke-AddGroupMember` | Add a member to a group (`-GroupId -UserId`) |
+| `Invoke-RemoveGroupMember` | Remove a group member |
+| `Invoke-SecurityGroupCloner` | Clone a group's membership into a controlled group |
+| `Create-SecurityGroupWithMembers` | Create a group with chosen members |
+| `Invoke-InviteGuest` | Invite an external guest account |
+
+## Persistence
+| Function | Purpose |
+|----------|---------|
+| `Invoke-InjectOAuthApp` | Deploy a malicious OAuth app (`-AppName -ReplyUrl -Scope`) |
+| `Invoke-DeleteOAuthApp` | Remove an injected app (cleanup) |
+| `Invoke-CreateInboxForwardingRule` | Hidden inbox forwarding rule (`-ForwardTo -RuleName`) |
+
+## Pillage / Data Search
+| Function | Purpose |
+|----------|---------|
+| `Invoke-SearchMailbox` | Search mailbox(es) (`-SearchTerm -MessageCount -OutFile`) |
+| `Invoke-SearchSharePointAndOneDrive` | Search SharePoint/OneDrive (`-SearchTerm`) |
+| `Get-SharePointSiteURLs` | Enumerate SharePoint sites |
+| `Invoke-DriveFileDownload` | Download a drive item (`-DriveItemIDs -FileName`) |
+| `Invoke-SearchTeams` | Search Teams messages (`-SearchTerm`) |
+| `Get-TeamsChat` / `Get-TeamsChannels` / `Get-TeamsApps` | Teams enumeration |
+| `Get-Inbox` / `Invoke-ImmersiveFileReader` | Read inbox / files |
+
+## Orchestration
+| Function | Purpose |
+|----------|---------|
+| `Invoke-GraphRunner` | Automated recon + pillage pass |
+| `List-GraphRunnerModules` | Print all available modules |
+
+## Underlying Graph endpoints (examples)
+| Action | Endpoint |
+|--------|----------|
+| List users | `GET https://graph.microsoft.com/v1.0/users` |
+| List groups | `GET https://graph.microsoft.com/v1.0/groups` |
+| Add group member | `POST /groups/{id}/members/$ref` |
+| Search mail | `GET /me/messages?$search="term"` |
+| Create app | `POST /applications` |
+| Mail forwarding rule | `POST /me/mailFolders/inbox/messageRules` |

skills/post-exploiting-microsoft-graph-with-graphrunner/references/standards.md

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+# Standards and Framework Mapping
+
+## NIST Cybersecurity Framework 2.0
+
+| ID | Name | Rationale |
+|----|------|-----------|
+| PR.AA-05 | Access permissions, entitlements, and authorizations are defined in a policy, managed, enforced, and reviewed, incorporating least privilege and separation of duties | GraphRunner abuses over-broad Graph permissions, updatable groups, and OAuth consent; the engagement validates whether PR.AA-05 least-privilege controls actually constrain a token holder. |
+
+## MITRE ATT&CK (Enterprise)
+
+| ID | Name | Rationale |
+|----|------|-----------|
+| T1098 | Account Manipulation | Adding group members, cloning groups, inviting guests to retain/escalate access. |
+| T1098.003 | Account Manipulation: Additional Cloud Roles | Adding members to privileged/updatable groups. |
+| T1528 | Steal Application Access Token | `Get-GraphTokens` device-code token acquisition. |
+| T1087.004 | Account Discovery: Cloud Account | `Get-AzureADUsers`, `Invoke-SearchUserAttributes`. |
+| T1114.002 | Email Collection: Remote Email Collection | `Invoke-SearchMailbox` via Graph. |
+| T1606.002 | Forge Web Credentials: SAML/OAuth | `Invoke-InjectOAuthApp` consent-grant persistence. |
+| T1564.008 | Hide Artifacts: Email Hiding Rules | `Invoke-CreateInboxForwardingRule`. |
+
+## Detection cross-reference
+
+GraphRunner activity surfaces in `MicrosoftGraphActivityLogs` and `AADGraphActivityLogs`; OAuth app injection appears in audit logs as "Add service principal" / "Consent to application"; group manipulation appears as "Add member to group". These map to NIST DE.CM-09 (computing hardware/software/runtime monitoring) for the defensive counterpart.