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skills/detecting-bluetooth-low-energy-attacks/SKILL.md
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---
name: detecting-bluetooth-low-energy-attacks
description: >
Detects and analyzes Bluetooth Low Energy (BLE) security attacks including sniffing,
replay attacks, GATT enumeration abuse, and Man-in-the-Middle interception. Uses
Ubertooth One and nRF52840 sniffers for packet capture, the bleak Python library for
GATT service enumeration, and crackle for BLE encryption cracking. Use when assessing
IoT device BLE security, monitoring for BLE-based attacks on wireless infrastructure,
or performing authorized BLE penetration testing. Activates for requests involving
BLE security assessment, Ubertooth sniffing, GATT enumeration, or BLE replay detection.
domain: cybersecurity
subdomain: wireless-security
author: mukul975
tags: [ble, bluetooth, ubertooth, nrf-sniffer, gatt, wireless-security, iot-security, replay-attack]
version: 1.0.0
license: Apache-2.0
---
# Detecting Bluetooth Low Energy Attacks
## Disclaimer
This skill is intended for authorized security testing, penetration testing engagements, CTF competitions, and educational purposes only. Sniffing, intercepting, or manipulating Bluetooth communications without authorization may violate federal wiretapping laws and local regulations. Always obtain explicit written permission before conducting any wireless security assessment.
## When to Use
Use this skill when:
- Performing authorized BLE security assessments of IoT devices, medical devices, or smart locks
- Monitoring a wireless environment for BLE-based replay attacks, spoofing, or unauthorized enumeration
- Analyzing BLE packet captures to detect Man-in-the-Middle attacks or pairing exploitation
- Enumerating GATT services and characteristics to identify insecure read/write permissions on BLE peripherals
- Assessing BLE encryption strength and testing for crackable pairing exchanges
- Building BLE intrusion detection capabilities for wireless security monitoring
**Do not use** for intercepting BLE communications without explicit authorization. Do not deploy BLE scanning tools in environments where wireless monitoring is prohibited.
## Prerequisites
- Ubertooth One hardware for passive BLE sniffing, or Nordic nRF52840 USB Dongle with nRF Sniffer firmware
- Python 3.10+ with pip
- bleak library: `pip install bleak` (cross-platform BLE GATT client)
- Wireshark with BLE dissector plugins for packet analysis
- crackle tool for BLE encryption analysis: built from source at github.com/mikeryan/crackle
- ubertooth-btle CLI tools: `apt install ubertooth` (Linux) or build from source
- Bluetooth 4.0+ adapter on the host system for bleak-based scanning
- Linux recommended for full Ubertooth/nRF sniffer support
## Workflow
### Step 1: BLE Environment Discovery and Device Scanning
Scan the environment to identify BLE devices and their advertising data:
```bash
# Scan for BLE devices using bleak (cross-platform)
python -c "
import asyncio
from bleak import BleakScanner
async def scan():
devices = await BleakScanner.discover(timeout=10.0)
for d in devices:
print(f'{d.address} | RSSI: {d.rssi} | Name: {d.name or \"Unknown\"}')
for uuid in d.metadata.get('uuids', []):
print(f' Service: {uuid}')
asyncio.run(scan())
"
# Passive BLE sniffing with Ubertooth One (promiscuous mode)
ubertooth-btle -p -r capture.pcapng
# Follow a specific BLE connection
ubertooth-btle -f -t AA:BB:CC:DD:EE:FF -r connection.pcapng
# Use nRF Sniffer with Wireshark (via extcap interface)
wireshark -i nRF_Sniffer -k
```
### Step 2: GATT Service and Characteristic Enumeration
Connect to target BLE peripherals and enumerate their GATT profile:
```bash
# Enumerate all services, characteristics, and descriptors
python -c "
import asyncio
from bleak import BleakClient
async def enum_gatt(address):
async with BleakClient(address) as client:
print(f'Connected: {client.is_connected}')
for service in client.services:
print(f'Service: {service.uuid} - {service.description}')
for char in service.characteristics:
props = ','.join(char.properties)
print(f' Char: {char.uuid} | Props: {props}')
for desc in char.descriptors:
val = await client.read_gatt_descriptor(desc.handle)
print(f' Desc: {desc.uuid} = {val}')
asyncio.run(enum_gatt('AA:BB:CC:DD:EE:FF'))
"
```
Security-relevant findings during GATT enumeration:
- Characteristics with `write-without-response` or `write` without authentication
- Readable characteristics exposing device configuration, credentials, or firmware versions
- Missing Client Characteristic Configuration Descriptor (CCCD) protection on notification characteristics
### Step 3: BLE Packet Capture and Analysis
Capture BLE traffic for offline analysis:
```bash
# Capture with Ubertooth in PcapNG format (recommended)
ubertooth-btle -f -r capture.pcapng
# Capture in PCAP/PPI format for crackle compatibility
ubertooth-btle -f -c capture_ppi.pcap
# Analyze capture in Wireshark
wireshark capture.pcapng
# Apply display filter: btle
# Filter connection requests: btle.advertising_header.pdu_type == 0x05
# Filter data packets: btle.data_header
# Extract pairing information with tshark
tshark -r capture.pcapng -Y "btle.control_opcode == 0x01" -T fields \
-e btle.master_bd_addr -e btle.slave_bd_addr
```
### Step 4: BLE Encryption Analysis with Crackle
Analyze captured pairing exchanges to test encryption strength:
```bash
# Crack BLE Legacy Pairing (Just Works / passkey)
crackle -i capture_ppi.pcap -o decrypted.pcap
# Crack with known Temporary Key (TK)
crackle -i capture_ppi.pcap -o decrypted.pcap -l 000000
# Analyze decrypted traffic
wireshark decrypted.pcap
```
BLE Legacy Pairing with Just Works mode uses a TK of all zeros, making it trivially
crackable. Passkey entry uses a 6-digit PIN (000000-999999) that can be brute-forced
in under a second. Only BLE Secure Connections (LE Secure Connections with ECDH)
provides adequate protection against passive eavesdropping.
### Step 5: Replay Attack Detection and Testing
Monitor for and test BLE replay attack susceptibility:
```bash
# Capture characteristic write operations
# Record the raw bytes written to a target characteristic
# Then replay the exact same bytes to test if the device accepts stale commands
python -c "
import asyncio
from bleak import BleakClient
TARGET = 'AA:BB:CC:DD:EE:FF'
CHAR_UUID = '0000fff1-0000-1000-8000-00805f9b34fb'
async def replay_test():
async with BleakClient(TARGET) as client:
# Step 1: Read current state
val = await client.read_gatt_char(CHAR_UUID)
print(f'Current value: {val.hex()}')
# Step 2: Write a command (captured from previous session)
captured_command = bytes.fromhex('0102030405')
await client.write_gatt_char(CHAR_UUID, captured_command)
print('Replayed captured command')
# Step 3: Verify if command was accepted
new_val = await client.read_gatt_char(CHAR_UUID)
print(f'New value: {new_val.hex()}')
if new_val != val:
print('VULNERABLE: Device accepted replayed command')
asyncio.run(replay_test())
"
```
Indicators of replay vulnerability:
- Device accepts previously captured write commands without freshness validation
- No sequence number, timestamp, or challenge-response mechanism in the protocol
- Device state changes in response to replayed commands
### Step 6: Man-in-the-Middle Detection
Detect BLE MITM attacks by monitoring for anomalous behavior:
```bash
# Monitor for BLE address spoofing (device impersonation)
# Compare advertising data fingerprints over time
# Monitor for unexpected connection parameter changes
tshark -r capture.pcapng -Y "btle.control_opcode == 0x00" -T fields \
-e btle.control.interval.min -e btle.control.interval.max
# Detect GATTacker/BTLEjuice MITM patterns:
# - Cloned advertising data with different BD_ADDR
# - Rapid connect/disconnect cycles on the same channel
# - Duplicate service UUIDs from different addresses
# Monitor for suspicious pairing requests
tshark -r capture.pcapng -Y "btl2cap.cid == 0x0006" -T fields \
-e btsmp.opcode -e btsmp.io_capability -e btsmp.auth_req
```
### Step 7: Continuous BLE Security Monitoring
Deploy ongoing BLE monitoring for threat detection:
```bash
# Run the agent in monitoring mode
python agent.py --mode monitor --duration 3600 --output ble_alerts.json
# Combine with Ubertooth for passive monitoring
ubertooth-btle -p -r - | python agent.py --mode analyze --pcap-stdin
# Alert on specific threat indicators
python agent.py --mode monitor --alert-on replay,spoofing,weak-pairing
```
## Key Concepts
| Term | Definition |
|------|-----------|
| **BLE (Bluetooth Low Energy)** | Low-power wireless protocol (Bluetooth 4.0+) optimized for IoT devices, operating on 2.4 GHz with 40 channels (3 advertising, 37 data) |
| **GATT (Generic Attribute Profile)** | BLE data model organizing device capabilities into services, characteristics, and descriptors; the primary interface for reading/writing BLE device data |
| **Ubertooth One** | Open-source 2.4 GHz wireless development platform capable of passive BLE and Bluetooth Classic sniffing across all BLE channels |
| **nRF Sniffer** | Nordic Semiconductor firmware for nRF52840 USB dongle that enables BLE packet capture with Wireshark integration via extcap |
| **Replay Attack** | Attack where previously captured BLE commands are retransmitted to a device to trigger unauthorized actions without knowledge of encryption keys |
| **Just Works Pairing** | BLE Legacy Pairing method using TK=0 with no user confirmation, providing zero protection against passive eavesdropping and MITM attacks |
| **LE Secure Connections** | BLE 4.2+ pairing mode using ECDH key exchange (P-256 curve) that provides protection against passive eavesdropping; recommended over Legacy Pairing |
| **Crackle** | Open-source tool that exploits weaknesses in BLE Legacy Pairing to recover the Long Term Key (LTK) and decrypt captured BLE traffic |
| **GATTacker** | BLE MITM framework that clones a peripheral's GATT profile and advertising data, then relays traffic between the real device and the victim central |
## Tools & Systems
- **Ubertooth One + ubertooth-btle**: Hardware sniffer and CLI tool for passive BLE packet capture in pcapng/pcap format
- **nRF52840 USB Dongle + nRF Sniffer**: Nordic Semiconductor BLE sniffer with native Wireshark extcap integration
- **bleak**: Cross-platform Python asyncio BLE GATT client library for device scanning, connection, and characteristic read/write
- **crackle**: BLE Legacy Pairing encryption cracker that recovers LTK from captured pairing exchanges
- **Wireshark**: Network protocol analyzer with BLE/BTLE dissectors for packet-level inspection of captured traffic
- **GATTacker / BTLEjuice**: BLE Man-in-the-Middle frameworks for intercepting and modifying BLE traffic between central and peripheral
- **tshark**: Command-line Wireshark for scripted BLE packet extraction and field analysis
## Common Pitfalls
- **Ubertooth channel hopping limitations**: Ubertooth follows one connection at a time. If multiple BLE connections are active, you must target a specific device address with `-t` to follow its data channels.
- **BLE 5.0 extended advertising**: Devices using BLE 5.0 extended advertising on secondary channels may not be captured by older Ubertooth firmware. Update to the latest firmware.
- **bleak platform differences**: BLE scanning behavior varies across OS backends. On Linux, scanning requires root or appropriate capabilities. On macOS, device addresses are randomized UUIDs.
- **crackle requires Legacy Pairing**: crackle only works against BLE Legacy Pairing (Bluetooth 4.0/4.1). LE Secure Connections (4.2+) use ECDH and cannot be cracked with this approach.
- **BLE address randomization**: Many modern BLE devices use random resolvable private addresses (RPA) that rotate periodically, making device tracking and connection following more difficult.
- **Capture format matters**: Use PCAP with PPI headers (`-c` flag) for crackle compatibility. PcapNG (`-r` flag) is recommended for Wireshark analysis but not supported by crackle.
## Output Format
```
## Finding: BLE Smart Lock Accepts Replayed Unlock Commands
**ID**: BLE-001
**Severity**: Critical (CVSS 9.3)
**Device**: SmartLock-Pro (AA:BB:CC:DD:EE:FF)
**Attack Type**: Replay Attack
**Description**:
The BLE smart lock accepts previously captured GATT write commands
on characteristic 0000fff1-0000-1000-8000-00805f9b34fb without
any freshness validation. An attacker who captures a single unlock
command can replay it indefinitely to unlock the device.
**Proof of Concept**:
1. Capture unlock command: ubertooth-btle -f -t AA:BB:CC:DD:EE:FF -r capture.pcap
2. Extract write payload from characteristic fff1: 01 42 A3 7F 00
3. Replay via bleak: await client.write_gatt_char(CHAR_UUID, bytes.fromhex('0142a37f00'))
4. Lock disengages without re-authentication
**Impact**:
Any attacker within BLE range (~100m with directional antenna) who
captures a single unlock event can replay it to gain physical access
to the protected area indefinitely.
**Remediation**:
Implement challenge-response authentication with per-session nonces.
Each command should include a server-generated challenge that expires
after use. Use LE Secure Connections for pairing to prevent passive
capture of the pairing exchange.
```
skills/detecting-bluetooth-low-energy-attacks/references/api-reference.md
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# API Reference: BLE Attack Detection Agent
## Overview
Scans, enumerates, and analyzes Bluetooth Low Energy devices for security vulnerabilities including weak pairing, replay attack susceptibility, insecure GATT permissions, advertising spoofing, and Man-in-the-Middle indicators. Combines Ubertooth/nRF hardware sniffing with bleak-based GATT enumeration and crackle-based encryption analysis. For authorized wireless security testing only.
## Dependencies
| Package | Version | Purpose |
|---------|---------|---------|
| bleak | >=0.21 | Cross-platform asyncio BLE GATT client for scanning and enumeration |
| tshark | (system) | Command-line Wireshark for BLE packet extraction and field analysis |
| ubertooth-btle | (system) | Ubertooth One CLI for passive BLE sniffing and packet capture |
| crackle | (system) | BLE Legacy Pairing encryption cracker for LTK recovery |
## CLI Usage
```bash
# Scan for BLE devices in range
python agent.py --mode scan --scan-duration 15 --output scan_report.json
# Enumerate GATT services on a target device
python agent.py --mode enumerate --target AA:BB:CC:DD:EE:FF --output gatt_report.json
# Test replay vulnerability on a specific characteristic
python agent.py --mode replay --target AA:BB:CC:DD:EE:FF \
--char-uuid 0000fff1-0000-1000-8000-00805f9b34fb \
--replay-payload 0102030405 --output replay_report.json
# Monitor for BLE advertising spoofing
python agent.py --mode monitor --scan-duration 60 \
--known-devices known.json --output monitor_report.json
# Analyze a BLE packet capture
python agent.py --mode analyze --pcap capture.pcapng --output pcap_report.json
# Full assessment with Ubertooth capture
python agent.py --mode full --target AA:BB:CC:DD:EE:FF \
--ubertooth-capture 120 --pcap-format ppi \
--char-uuid 0000fff1-0000-1000-8000-00805f9b34fb \
--replay-payload 0102030405 --output full_report.json
```
## Arguments
| Argument | Required | Description |
|----------|----------|-------------|
| `--mode` | No | Operating mode: `scan`, `enumerate`, `replay`, `monitor`, `analyze`, `full` (default: `scan`) |
| `--target` | Conditional | Target BLE device address (required for enumerate/replay modes) |
| `--scan-duration` | No | BLE scan duration in seconds (default: 10) |
| `--char-uuid` | Conditional | GATT characteristic UUID for replay testing |
| `--replay-payload` | Conditional | Hex-encoded payload for replay test |
| `--pcap` | Conditional | Path to BLE pcap/pcapng file for analysis mode |
| `--ubertooth-capture` | No | Capture with Ubertooth for N seconds; 0 to disable (default: 0) |
| `--pcap-format` | No | Ubertooth capture format: `pcapng`, `ppi`, `le` (default: `pcapng`) |
| `--known-devices` | No | JSON file mapping known device addresses to names for spoofing detection |
| `--output` | No | Output report file path (default: `ble_security_report.json`) |
## Key Functions
### `scan_ble_devices(scan_duration)`
Discovers BLE devices using bleak BleakScanner. Returns device address, name, RSSI, service UUIDs, manufacturer data, service data, and TX power for each device found.
### `enumerate_gatt_services(target_address, timeout)`
Connects to a BLE peripheral and enumerates all GATT services, characteristics, and descriptors. Reads characteristic values when readable. Flags writable characteristics, write-without-response properties, and characteristics containing sensitive keyword patterns.
### `test_replay_vulnerability(target_address, char_uuid, test_payload_hex, read_after)`
Writes a captured/test payload to a characteristic, then replays the same payload to detect if the device accepts stale commands without freshness validation. Reads state before and after to confirm replay effect.
### `detect_advertising_spoofing(scan_duration, known_devices)`
Monitors BLE advertising in real-time to detect spoofing indicators: same device name from multiple addresses (cloned device), known device names from unknown addresses (impersonation), and abnormal RSSI fluctuations (relay attack).
### `analyze_pcap_for_ble_attacks(pcap_path)`
Analyzes BLE packet captures using tshark and crackle. Detects Just Works pairing, Legacy Pairing without Secure Connections, excessive connection attempts, and attempts LTK recovery with crackle.
### `run_ubertooth_capture(output_path, target_address, duration, pcap_format)`
Starts a passive BLE capture using Ubertooth One in either promiscuous or follow mode. Supports pcapng, PPI (crackle-compatible), and LE pseudoheader output formats.
### `generate_report(scan_results, gatt_profiles, replay_results, spoofing_findings, pcap_findings, output_path)`
Aggregates all findings into a JSON report with severity breakdown and full device/GATT data.
## Threat Detection Coverage
| Threat | Detection Method | Finding ID |
|--------|-----------------|------------|
| Insecure GATT Permissions | GATT enumeration, property analysis | BLE-GATT-001/002/003 |
| Replay Attack | Payload write + re-write + state comparison | BLE-REPLAY-001 |
| Device Spoofing | Multi-address name monitoring | BLE-SPOOF-001/002/003 |
| Just Works Pairing | PCAP SMP opcode analysis | BLE-PAIR-001 |
| Legacy Pairing (No SC) | PCAP auth_req flag analysis | BLE-PAIR-002 |
| Weak Encryption | crackle LTK recovery | BLE-CRACK-001 |
| Connection Flooding | PCAP connection event counting | BLE-PCAP-002 |
skills/detecting-bluetooth-low-energy-attacks/scripts/agent.py
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#!/usr/bin/env python3
# For authorized penetration testing and lab environments only
"""BLE Attack Detection Agent - Scans, enumerates, and analyzes Bluetooth Low Energy
devices for security vulnerabilities including weak pairing, replay susceptibility,
insecure GATT permissions, and advertising spoofing."""
import argparse
import asyncio
import json
import logging
import struct
import subprocess
import sys
import time
from collections import defaultdict
from datetime import datetime
from pathlib import Path
logging.basicConfig(level=logging.INFO, format="%(asctime)s [%(levelname)s] %(message)s")
logger = logging.getLogger(__name__)
# Standard BLE service UUIDs for identification
KNOWN_SERVICES = {
"00001800-0000-1000-8000-00805f9b34fb": "Generic Access",
"00001801-0000-1000-8000-00805f9b34fb": "Generic Attribute",
"0000180a-0000-1000-8000-00805f9b34fb": "Device Information",
"0000180f-0000-1000-8000-00805f9b34fb": "Battery Service",
"00001809-0000-1000-8000-00805f9b34fb": "Health Thermometer",
"0000180d-0000-1000-8000-00805f9b34fb": "Heart Rate",
"00001812-0000-1000-8000-00805f9b34fb": "HID (Human Interface Device)",
"0000fee0-0000-1000-8000-00805f9b34fb": "Firmware Update Service",
"0000fff0-0000-1000-8000-00805f9b34fb": "Vendor-Specific Control",
}
# Properties that indicate potential security concerns
WRITABLE_PROPS = {"write", "write-without-response"}
READABLE_PROPS = {"read"}
NOTIFY_PROPS = {"notify", "indicate"}
async def scan_ble_devices(scan_duration=10.0):
"""Scan for BLE devices and collect advertising data."""
try:
from bleak import BleakScanner
except ImportError:
logger.error("bleak not installed: pip install bleak")
return []
logger.info("Scanning for BLE devices (%0.1fs)...", scan_duration)
devices_found = []
devices = await BleakScanner.discover(timeout=scan_duration, return_adv=True)
for address, (device, adv_data) in devices.items():
device_info = {
"address": address,
"name": device.name or "Unknown",
"rssi": adv_data.rssi,
"service_uuids": adv_data.service_uuids or [],
"manufacturer_data": {
str(k): v.hex() for k, v in (adv_data.manufacturer_data or {}).items()
},
"service_data": {
k: v.hex() for k, v in (adv_data.service_data or {}).items()
},
"tx_power": adv_data.tx_power,
"connectable": getattr(adv_data, "connectable", None),
}
devices_found.append(device_info)
logger.info("Found: %s (%s) RSSI: %d dBm", device.name or "Unknown", address, adv_data.rssi)
logger.info("Scan complete: %d devices found", len(devices_found))
return devices_found
async def enumerate_gatt_services(target_address, timeout=30.0):
"""Connect to a BLE device and enumerate all GATT services, characteristics, and descriptors."""
try:
from bleak import BleakClient
except ImportError:
logger.error("bleak not installed: pip install bleak")
return None
gatt_profile = {
"address": target_address,
"services": [],
"security_findings": [],
}
try:
async with BleakClient(target_address, timeout=timeout) as client:
if not client.is_connected:
logger.error("Failed to connect to %s", target_address)
return gatt_profile
logger.info("Connected to %s", target_address)
for service in client.services:
svc_name = KNOWN_SERVICES.get(service.uuid, "Custom/Vendor Service")
service_info = {
"uuid": service.uuid,
"name": svc_name,
"characteristics": [],
}
for char in service.characteristics:
char_info = {
"uuid": char.uuid,
"properties": list(char.properties),
"handle": char.handle,
"descriptors": [],
"value": None,
}
# Read characteristic value if readable
if READABLE_PROPS & set(char.properties):
try:
value = await client.read_gatt_char(char.uuid)
char_info["value"] = value.hex()
# Check for sensitive data exposure
try:
decoded = value.decode("utf-8", errors="ignore")
if any(kw in decoded.lower() for kw in
["password", "key", "token", "secret", "admin"]):
gatt_profile["security_findings"].append({
"id": "BLE-GATT-001",
"severity": "High",
"title": "Sensitive Data in Readable Characteristic",
"detail": f"Characteristic {char.uuid} contains potentially "
f"sensitive data readable without authentication: "
f"{decoded[:50]}",
})
except Exception:
pass
except Exception as e:
char_info["value"] = f"read_error: {e}"
# Flag writable characteristics without authentication
if WRITABLE_PROPS & set(char.properties):
gatt_profile["security_findings"].append({
"id": "BLE-GATT-002",
"severity": "Medium",
"title": "Writable Characteristic Without Authentication",
"detail": f"Characteristic {char.uuid} in service {svc_name} "
f"allows write operations ({', '.join(char.properties)}). "
"Verify authentication is enforced at the application layer.",
})
# Flag write-without-response (no confirmation)
if "write-without-response" in char.properties:
gatt_profile["security_findings"].append({
"id": "BLE-GATT-003",
"severity": "Medium",
"title": "Write-Without-Response Characteristic",
"detail": f"Characteristic {char.uuid} supports write-without-response. "
"Commands sent to this characteristic have no delivery "
"confirmation, making replay attacks harder to detect.",
})
# Read descriptors
for desc in char.descriptors:
try:
desc_val = await client.read_gatt_descriptor(desc.handle)
char_info["descriptors"].append({
"uuid": desc.uuid,
"handle": desc.handle,
"value": desc_val.hex(),
})
except Exception:
char_info["descriptors"].append({
"uuid": desc.uuid,
"handle": desc.handle,
"value": "read_error",
})
service_info["characteristics"].append(char_info)
gatt_profile["services"].append(service_info)
logger.info("Enumerated %d services, %d findings",
len(gatt_profile["services"]),
len(gatt_profile["security_findings"]))
except Exception as e:
logger.error("GATT enumeration failed for %s: %s", target_address, e)
gatt_profile["error"] = str(e)
return gatt_profile
async def test_replay_vulnerability(target_address, char_uuid, test_payload_hex, read_after=True):
"""Test if a BLE characteristic is vulnerable to replay attacks."""
try:
from bleak import BleakClient
except ImportError:
logger.error("bleak not installed: pip install bleak")
return None
result = {
"target": target_address,
"characteristic": char_uuid,
"test_payload": test_payload_hex,
"vulnerable": False,
"detail": "",
}
payload = bytes.fromhex(test_payload_hex)
try:
async with BleakClient(target_address, timeout=30) as client:
if not client.is_connected:
result["detail"] = "Connection failed"
return result
# Read initial state if possible
initial_value = None
if read_after:
try:
initial_value = await client.read_gatt_char(char_uuid)
logger.info("Initial value: %s", initial_value.hex())
except Exception:
pass
# Write the captured/test payload
try:
await client.write_gatt_char(char_uuid, payload)
logger.info("Wrote replay payload: %s", test_payload_hex)
except Exception as e:
result["detail"] = f"Write rejected: {e}"
return result
# Small delay for device to process
await asyncio.sleep(0.5)
# Write the same payload again (replay)
try:
await client.write_gatt_char(char_uuid, payload)
logger.info("Replayed same payload successfully")
result["replay_accepted"] = True
except Exception as e:
result["detail"] = f"Replay rejected: {e}"
result["replay_accepted"] = False
return result
# Read final state to check if replay had effect
if read_after:
try:
final_value = await client.read_gatt_char(char_uuid)
logger.info("Final value: %s", final_value.hex())
if initial_value and final_value != initial_value:
result["vulnerable"] = True
result["detail"] = (
"Device accepted replayed command and state changed. "
"No freshness validation detected."
)
else:
result["detail"] = "Replay accepted but no observable state change."
result["vulnerable"] = True # Still accepted, just no visible effect
except Exception:
result["vulnerable"] = True
result["detail"] = "Replay accepted; could not verify state change."
else:
result["vulnerable"] = True
result["detail"] = "Replay payload accepted without error."
except Exception as e:
result["detail"] = f"Test failed: {e}"
return result
async def detect_advertising_spoofing(scan_duration=30.0, known_devices=None):
"""Monitor BLE advertising for spoofing indicators."""
try:
from bleak import BleakScanner
except ImportError:
logger.error("bleak not installed: pip install bleak")
return []
findings = []
device_history = defaultdict(list)
logger.info("Monitoring BLE advertising for spoofing (%0.1fs)...", scan_duration)
def detection_callback(device, advertisement_data):
key = device.name or device.address
entry = {
"address": device.address,
"rssi": advertisement_data.rssi,
"timestamp": time.time(),
"service_uuids": advertisement_data.service_uuids or [],
"manufacturer_data": {
str(k): v.hex() for k, v in (advertisement_data.manufacturer_data or {}).items()
},
}
device_history[key].append(entry)
scanner = BleakScanner(detection_callback=detection_callback)
await scanner.start()
await asyncio.sleep(scan_duration)
await scanner.stop()
# Analyze for spoofing indicators
for name, entries in device_history.items():
addresses = set(e["address"] for e in entries)
# Multiple addresses with same name (possible spoofing)
if len(addresses) > 1 and name != "Unknown":
findings.append({
"id": "BLE-SPOOF-001",
"severity": "High",
"title": "Multiple Addresses for Same Device Name",
"detail": f"Device '{name}' advertised from {len(addresses)} different "
f"addresses: {', '.join(addresses)}. This may indicate address "
"spoofing or a cloned device (GATTacker-style MITM).",
"addresses": list(addresses),
})
# Check for known device impersonation
if known_devices:
for entry in entries:
if entry["address"] not in known_devices and name in known_devices.values():
findings.append({
"id": "BLE-SPOOF-002",
"severity": "Critical",
"title": "Known Device Name from Unknown Address",
"detail": f"Device '{name}' is advertising from unknown address "
f"{entry['address']}. Expected address for this device "
f"is in the known device list. Possible impersonation.",
})
# Rapid RSSI fluctuations (possible relay attack)
if len(entries) >= 5:
rssi_values = [e["rssi"] for e in entries]
rssi_range = max(rssi_values) - min(rssi_values)
if rssi_range > 40:
findings.append({
"id": "BLE-SPOOF-003",
"severity": "Medium",
"title": "Abnormal RSSI Fluctuation",
"detail": f"Device '{name}' ({entries[0]['address']}) shows RSSI range "
f"of {rssi_range} dBm (min: {min(rssi_values)}, max: "
f"{max(rssi_values)}). Large fluctuations may indicate a "
"relay attack or signal amplification.",
})
logger.info("Spoofing detection complete: %d findings", len(findings))
return findings
def analyze_pcap_for_ble_attacks(pcap_path):
"""Analyze a BLE packet capture file for attack indicators using tshark."""
findings = []
if not Path(pcap_path).exists():
logger.error("PCAP file not found: %s", pcap_path)
return findings
# Check for Legacy Pairing (vulnerable to crackle)
try:
result = subprocess.run(
["tshark", "-r", pcap_path, "-Y", "btsmp.opcode == 0x01",
"-T", "fields", "-e", "btsmp.io_capability", "-e", "btsmp.auth_req"],
capture_output=True, text=True, timeout=60,
)
if result.stdout.strip():
lines = result.stdout.strip().split("\n")
for line in lines:
parts = line.split("\t")
io_cap = parts[0] if len(parts) > 0 else ""
auth_req = parts[1] if len(parts) > 1 else ""
# io_capability 0x03 = NoInputNoOutput (Just Works)
if io_cap == "0x03" or io_cap == "3":
findings.append({
"id": "BLE-PAIR-001",
"severity": "Critical",
"title": "BLE Just Works Pairing Detected",
"detail": "Pairing exchange uses NoInputNoOutput IO capability "
"(Just Works). TK=0, trivially crackable with crackle. "
"No MITM protection.",
})
# Check if Secure Connections flag is not set
if auth_req and not (int(auth_req, 0) & 0x08):
findings.append({
"id": "BLE-PAIR-002",
"severity": "High",
"title": "BLE Legacy Pairing (No Secure Connections)",
"detail": "Pairing uses Legacy Pairing without SC flag. "
"Vulnerable to passive eavesdropping and LTK recovery "
"via crackle tool.",
})
except FileNotFoundError:
logger.warning("tshark not found; skipping pcap pairing analysis")
except subprocess.TimeoutExpired:
logger.warning("tshark analysis timed out")
# Count unique connection events
try:
result = subprocess.run(
["tshark", "-r", pcap_path, "-Y",
"btle.advertising_header.pdu_type == 0x05",
"-T", "fields", "-e", "btle.master_bd_addr", "-e", "btle.slave_bd_addr"],
capture_output=True, text=True, timeout=60,
)
if result.stdout.strip():
connections = result.stdout.strip().split("\n")
unique_pairs = set()
for conn in connections:
unique_pairs.add(conn.strip())
findings.append({
"id": "BLE-PCAP-001",
"severity": "Informational",
"title": "BLE Connection Events Summary",
"detail": f"Captured {len(connections)} connection requests across "
f"{len(unique_pairs)} unique device pairs.",
})
# Multiple rapid connections to same device (possible attack)
if len(connections) > 10 and len(unique_pairs) < 3:
findings.append({
"id": "BLE-PCAP-002",
"severity": "Medium",
"title": "Excessive Connection Attempts",
"detail": f"{len(connections)} connection attempts to "
f"{len(unique_pairs)} devices. May indicate brute-force "
"pairing or denial-of-service attack.",
})
except (FileNotFoundError, subprocess.TimeoutExpired):
pass
# Attempt crackle analysis
try:
result = subprocess.run(
["crackle", "-i", pcap_path],
capture_output=True, text=True, timeout=120,
)
if "LTK" in result.stdout or "key" in result.stdout.lower():
findings.append({
"id": "BLE-CRACK-001",
"severity": "Critical",
"title": "BLE Encryption Key Recovered",
"detail": f"crackle successfully recovered encryption key from captured "
f"pairing exchange. Encrypted traffic can be decrypted. "
f"Output: {result.stdout[:200]}",
})
elif "LE Secure Connections" in result.stdout:
findings.append({
"id": "BLE-CRACK-002",
"severity": "Informational",
"title": "LE Secure Connections Detected",
"detail": "Pairing uses LE Secure Connections (ECDH). Not vulnerable "
"to crackle-based key recovery.",
})
except FileNotFoundError:
logger.info("crackle not installed; skipping encryption analysis")
except subprocess.TimeoutExpired:
logger.warning("crackle analysis timed out")
logger.info("PCAP analysis complete: %d findings", len(findings))
return findings
def run_ubertooth_capture(output_path, target_address=None, duration=60, pcap_format="pcapng"):
"""Start a BLE packet capture with Ubertooth One."""
cmd = ["ubertooth-btle"]
if target_address:
cmd.extend(["-f", "-t", target_address]) # Follow mode targeting specific device
else:
cmd.append("-p") # Promiscuous mode
if pcap_format == "pcapng":
cmd.extend(["-r", output_path])
elif pcap_format == "ppi":
cmd.extend(["-c", output_path]) # PCAP/PPI for crackle compatibility
else:
cmd.extend(["-q", output_path]) # PCAP with LE pseudoheader
logger.info("Starting Ubertooth capture: %s", " ".join(cmd))
logger.info("Capturing for %d seconds...", duration)
try:
proc = subprocess.Popen(cmd, stdout=subprocess.PIPE, stderr=subprocess.PIPE)
time.sleep(duration)
proc.terminate()
proc.wait(timeout=10)
logger.info("Capture saved to %s", output_path)
return True
except FileNotFoundError:
logger.error("ubertooth-btle not found. Install: apt install ubertooth")
return False
except Exception as e:
logger.error("Ubertooth capture failed: %s", e)
return False
def generate_report(scan_results, gatt_profiles, replay_results, spoofing_findings,
pcap_findings, output_path):
"""Generate comprehensive BLE security assessment report."""
all_findings = []
# Collect GATT findings
for profile in gatt_profiles:
all_findings.extend(profile.get("security_findings", []))
# Collect other findings
for result in replay_results:
if result and result.get("vulnerable"):
all_findings.append({
"id": "BLE-REPLAY-001",
"severity": "Critical",
"title": "Replay Attack Vulnerability",
"detail": f"Device {result['target']} characteristic {result['characteristic']} "
f"is vulnerable to replay attacks. {result.get('detail', '')}",
})
all_findings.extend(spoofing_findings)
all_findings.extend(pcap_findings)
critical = [f for f in all_findings if f.get("severity") == "Critical"]
high = [f for f in all_findings if f.get("severity") == "High"]
medium = [f for f in all_findings if f.get("severity") == "Medium"]
report = {
"assessment": "BLE Security Assessment",
"timestamp": datetime.utcnow().isoformat(),
"devices_scanned": len(scan_results),
"devices_enumerated": len(gatt_profiles),
"summary": {
"total_findings": len(all_findings),
"critical": len(critical),
"high": len(high),
"medium": len(medium),
"informational": len(all_findings) - len(critical) - len(high) - len(medium),
},
"scan_results": scan_results,
"gatt_profiles": gatt_profiles,
"replay_tests": replay_results,
"findings": all_findings,
}
with open(output_path, "w") as f:
json.dump(report, f, indent=2, default=str)
logger.info("Report saved to %s (%d findings)", output_path, len(all_findings))
return report
def main():
parser = argparse.ArgumentParser(description="BLE Attack Detection Agent")
parser.add_argument("--mode", choices=["scan", "enumerate", "replay", "monitor",
"analyze", "full"],
default="scan", help="Operating mode")
parser.add_argument("--target", help="Target BLE device address (AA:BB:CC:DD:EE:FF)")
parser.add_argument("--scan-duration", type=float, default=10.0,
help="BLE scan duration in seconds (default: 10)")
parser.add_argument("--char-uuid", help="Target GATT characteristic UUID for replay test")
parser.add_argument("--replay-payload", help="Hex payload for replay test (e.g., 0102030405)")
parser.add_argument("--pcap", help="Path to BLE pcap/pcapng file for analysis")
parser.add_argument("--ubertooth-capture", type=int, default=0,
help="Capture with Ubertooth for N seconds (0=disabled)")
parser.add_argument("--pcap-format", choices=["pcapng", "ppi", "le"],
default="pcapng", help="Ubertooth capture format")
parser.add_argument("--known-devices", help="JSON file mapping known device addresses to names")
parser.add_argument("--output", default="ble_security_report.json",
help="Output report file path")
args = parser.parse_args()
scan_results = []
gatt_profiles = []
replay_results = []
spoofing_findings = []
pcap_findings = []
# Load known devices for spoofing detection
known_devices = None
if args.known_devices:
try:
with open(args.known_devices) as f:
known_devices = json.load(f)
except Exception as e:
logger.warning("Could not load known devices: %s", e)
# Ubertooth capture
if args.ubertooth_capture > 0:
capture_path = args.pcap or "ubertooth_capture.pcapng"
run_ubertooth_capture(capture_path, args.target, args.ubertooth_capture, args.pcap_format)
if not args.pcap:
args.pcap = capture_path
if args.mode in ("scan", "full"):
scan_results = asyncio.run(scan_ble_devices(args.scan_duration))
if args.mode in ("enumerate", "full") and args.target:
profile = asyncio.run(enumerate_gatt_services(args.target))
if profile:
gatt_profiles.append(profile)
if args.mode in ("replay", "full") and args.target and args.char_uuid and args.replay_payload:
result = asyncio.run(
test_replay_vulnerability(args.target, args.char_uuid, args.replay_payload)
)
if result:
replay_results.append(result)
if args.mode in ("monitor", "full"):
spoofing_findings = asyncio.run(
detect_advertising_spoofing(args.scan_duration, known_devices)
)
if args.mode in ("analyze", "full") and args.pcap:
pcap_findings = analyze_pcap_for_ble_attacks(args.pcap)
report = generate_report(scan_results, gatt_profiles, replay_results,
spoofing_findings, pcap_findings, args.output)
print(json.dumps(report["summary"], indent=2))
if __name__ == "__main__":
main()