Anthropic-Cybersecurity-Skills

186 Commits 1 Branch 4 Tags

2 Commits

Include renames

Author	SHA1	Message	Date
Mahipal	2545b2d3d5	Fix framework-ID defects across 53 skills (grounded in authoritative data) Deterministic audit against vendored MITRE/NIST oracles (ATT&CK v19.1, ATLAS 2026.07, NIST CSF 2.0, D3FEND v1.4.0) found and fixed: - 27 wrong-framework leaks on 12 AI-security skills: ATLAS AML.* IDs were under `mitre_attack` (-> `atlas_techniques`) and AI-RMF GOVERN/MEASURE IDs under `nist_csf` (-> `nist_ai_rmf`). - RS.AN-01 -> RS.AN-03 on 37 forensics/incident-analysis skills (CSF 1.1 ID retired in CSF 2.0; RS.AN-03 is the incident-analysis successor). - PR.DS-06 -> PR.DS-01 on the SLSA/Sigstore provenance skill (CSF 1.1 ID absorbed into PR.DS-01 in CSF 2.0; body prose updated too). - AML.T0104 -> AML.T0010 on 3 software-supply-chain skills (T0104 is "Publish Poisoned AI Agent Tool" -- wrong topic; T0010 "AI Supply Chain Compromise" is correct). CSF/ATLAS replacements verified against NIST CSWP.29, the official CSF 1.1->2.0 transition workbook, and mitre-atlas/atlas-data. Framework-ID gate: 0 defects. Schema: 817/817 pass.	2026-08-02 06:00:54 -07:00
mukul975	8cae0648ec	Add 55 new skills across 3 new domains + 6 undercovered areas (762 -> 817) Demand-driven expansion targeting the fastest-growing 2025-2026 threat and skills categories (ISC2/WEF/CrowdStrike/Mandiant signals): - AI Security (NEW domain, 12 skills): LLM red-teaming with garak/PyRIT, prompt injection (direct/indirect/RAG), MCP tool-poisoning, agentic tool invocation, guardrails, model/data poisoning, system-prompt leakage, embedding/vector weaknesses, model extraction, continuous red-teaming - Supply Chain Security (NEW domain, 5 skills): SBOMs, dependency confusion, malicious-npm triage, typosquatting, SLSA/Sigstore provenance - Hardware & Firmware Security (NEW domain, 4 skills): CHIPSEC/UEFI audit, Secure Boot bypass, TPM measured-boot attestation, ESP bootkit hunting - Identity (10): Entra ID/ROADtools, GraphRunner, AADInternals, ADCS/Certipy, shadow credentials, coercion, BloodHound CE, device-code phishing, SSO abuse - Cloud-native (8): Stratus, Pacu, CloudFox, container escape, K8s RBAC, Falco, Trivy, kube-bench - Offensive C2 (6): Sliver, Havoc, NetExec, DPAPI, NTLM relay ESC8, redirectors - DFIR (6): Hayabusa, Chainsaw, KAPE, Velociraptor, EZ Tools, Plaso - Backfill (4): OpenCTI, MISP, honeytokens, post-quantum crypto migration Each skill follows the repo taxonomy (SKILL.md + references/{standards,api-reference}.md + scripts/agent.py + LICENSE), with researched real tool commands (no placeholders), complete frontmatter, and ATT&CK/ATLAS + NIST CSF mappings. Updates README domain table, skill count, and index.json.	2026-06-22 19:08:16 +02:00

Author

SHA1

Message

Date

Mahipal

2545b2d3d5

Fix framework-ID defects across 53 skills (grounded in authoritative data)

Deterministic audit against vendored MITRE/NIST oracles (ATT&CK v19.1,
ATLAS 2026.07, NIST CSF 2.0, D3FEND v1.4.0) found and fixed:

- 27 wrong-framework leaks on 12 AI-security skills: ATLAS AML.* IDs were
  under `mitre_attack` (-> `atlas_techniques`) and AI-RMF GOVERN/MEASURE IDs
  under `nist_csf` (-> `nist_ai_rmf`).
- RS.AN-01 -> RS.AN-03 on 37 forensics/incident-analysis skills (CSF 1.1 ID
  retired in CSF 2.0; RS.AN-03 is the incident-analysis successor).
- PR.DS-06 -> PR.DS-01 on the SLSA/Sigstore provenance skill (CSF 1.1 ID
  absorbed into PR.DS-01 in CSF 2.0; body prose updated too).
- AML.T0104 -> AML.T0010 on 3 software-supply-chain skills (T0104 is
  "Publish Poisoned AI Agent Tool" -- wrong topic; T0010 "AI Supply Chain
  Compromise" is correct).

CSF/ATLAS replacements verified against NIST CSWP.29, the official CSF
1.1->2.0 transition workbook, and mitre-atlas/atlas-data.
Framework-ID gate: 0 defects. Schema: 817/817 pass.

2026-08-02 06:00:54 -07:00

mukul975

8cae0648ec

Add 55 new skills across 3 new domains + 6 undercovered areas (762 -> 817)

Demand-driven expansion targeting the fastest-growing 2025-2026 threat and
skills categories (ISC2/WEF/CrowdStrike/Mandiant signals):

- AI Security (NEW domain, 12 skills): LLM red-teaming with garak/PyRIT,
  prompt injection (direct/indirect/RAG), MCP tool-poisoning, agentic tool
  invocation, guardrails, model/data poisoning, system-prompt leakage,
  embedding/vector weaknesses, model extraction, continuous red-teaming
- Supply Chain Security (NEW domain, 5 skills): SBOMs, dependency confusion,
  malicious-npm triage, typosquatting, SLSA/Sigstore provenance
- Hardware & Firmware Security (NEW domain, 4 skills): CHIPSEC/UEFI audit,
  Secure Boot bypass, TPM measured-boot attestation, ESP bootkit hunting
- Identity (10): Entra ID/ROADtools, GraphRunner, AADInternals, ADCS/Certipy,
  shadow credentials, coercion, BloodHound CE, device-code phishing, SSO abuse
- Cloud-native (8): Stratus, Pacu, CloudFox, container escape, K8s RBAC,
  Falco, Trivy, kube-bench
- Offensive C2 (6): Sliver, Havoc, NetExec, DPAPI, NTLM relay ESC8, redirectors
- DFIR (6): Hayabusa, Chainsaw, KAPE, Velociraptor, EZ Tools, Plaso
- Backfill (4): OpenCTI, MISP, honeytokens, post-quantum crypto migration

Each skill follows the repo taxonomy (SKILL.md + references/{standards,api-reference}.md
+ scripts/agent.py + LICENSE), with researched real tool commands (no placeholders),
complete frontmatter, and ATT&CK/ATLAS + NIST CSF mappings. Updates README domain
table, skill count, and index.json.

2026-06-22 19:08:16 +02:00