--- name: validating-backup-integrity-for-recovery description: Validates backup integrity through cryptographic hash verification, automated restore testing, corruption detection, and recoverability checks to confirm backups are reliable for disaster recovery and ransomware response. Use before relying on backups for recovery, when building post-backup validation pipelines, auditing backup infrastructure for compliance, or checking immutable/air-gapped backups for silent corruption or tampering. domain: cybersecurity subdomain: incident-response tags: - incident-response - backup - integrity - hash-verification - restore-testing - disaster-recovery version: '1.0' author: mahipal license: Apache-2.0 nist_csf: - RS.MA-01 - RS.MA-02 - RS.AN-03 - RC.RP-01 mitre_attack: - T1486 - T1490 - T1070 - T1078 - T1489 mitre_f3: version: '1.1' tactics: - positioning - monetization techniques: - id: T1531 name: Account Access Removal tactic: positioning source: attack - id: F1018 name: Convert to Cryptocurrency tactic: monetization source: f3 - id: F1047 name: Transfer of funds tactic: monetization source: f3 - id: F1017.001 name: 'Conversion to Physical Monetary Instruments: Cash' tactic: monetization source: f3 --- # Validating Backup Integrity for Recovery ## When to Use Use this skill when: - Verifying backup integrity before relying on backups for ransomware recovery - Building automated backup validation pipelines that run after each backup job - Auditing backup infrastructure to confirm recoverability for compliance (SOC 2, ISO 27001, NIST CSF RC.RP-03) - Detecting silent data corruption (bit rot) in backup storage before a disaster occurs - Validating that immutable or air-gapped backups have not been tampered with **Do not use** for initial backup configuration or scheduling. This skill focuses on post-backup validation. ## Prerequisites - Access to backup storage (local, NAS, S3, Azure Blob, GCS) - Python 3.9+ with `hashlib` (standard library) - Backup manifests or baseline hash files for comparison - Isolated restore environment for restore testing - Backup tool CLI access (restic, borgbackup, rclone, or vendor-specific) ## Workflow ### Step 1: Generate Baseline Hash Manifest Create a cryptographic fingerprint of every file at backup time: ```bash # Generate SHA-256 manifest for a directory find /data/production -type f -exec sha256sum {} \; > /manifests/prod_baseline_$(date +%Y%m%d).sha256 # Verify manifest format head -5 /manifests/prod_baseline_20260319.sha256 # e3b0c44298fc1c149afbf4c8996fb924... /data/production/config.yaml # a7ffc6f8bf1ed76651c14756a061d662... /data/production/database.sql ``` ### Step 2: Verify Backup Archive Integrity Check that the backup archive itself is not corrupted: ```bash # Restic: verify backup repository integrity restic -r s3:s3.amazonaws.com/backup-bucket check --read-data # Borg: verify backup archive borg check --verify-data /backup/repo::archive-2026-03-19 # Tar with gzip: verify archive integrity gzip -t backup_20260319.tar.gz && echo "Archive OK" || echo "Archive CORRUPTED" # AWS S3: verify object checksums aws s3api head-object --bucket backup-bucket --key daily/2026-03-19.tar.gz \ --checksum-mode ENABLED ``` ### Step 3: Perform Restore Test to Isolated Environment ```bash # Restore to isolated test directory restic -r s3:s3.amazonaws.com/backup-bucket restore latest --target /restore-test/ # Generate hash manifest of restored data find /restore-test -type f -exec sha256sum {} \; > /manifests/restored_$(date +%Y%m%d).sha256 # Compare baseline and restored manifests diff <(sort /manifests/prod_baseline_20260319.sha256) \ <(sort /manifests/restored_20260319.sha256) ``` ### Step 4: Validate Data Completeness ```bash # Count files in original vs restored echo "Original: $(find /data/production -type f | wc -l) files" echo "Restored: $(find /restore-test -type f | wc -l) files" # Check total size echo "Original: $(du -sh /data/production | cut -f1)" echo "Restored: $(du -sh /restore-test | cut -f1)" # Database consistency check after restore pg_restore --list backup.dump | wc -l # Count objects in dump psql -c "SELECT schemaname, tablename FROM pg_tables WHERE schemaname='public';" restored_db ``` ### Step 5: Detect Ransomware Artifacts in Backups Before trusting a backup for recovery, scan for ransomware indicators: ```bash # Check for common ransomware file extensions find /restore-test -type f \( \ -name "*.encrypted" -o -name "*.locked" -o -name "*.crypt" \ -o -name "*.ransom" -o -name "*.pay" -o -name "*.wncry" \ -o -name "*.cerber" -o -name "*.locky" -o -name "*.zepto" \ \) -print # Check for ransom notes find /restore-test -type f \( \ -name "README_TO_DECRYPT*" -o -name "HOW_TO_RECOVER*" \ -o -name "DECRYPT_INSTRUCTIONS*" -o -name "HELP_DECRYPT*" \ \) -print # Check file entropy (high entropy = possible encryption) # Files with entropy > 7.9 out of 8.0 are likely encrypted python agent.py --entropy-scan /restore-test ``` ### Step 6: Automate and Schedule Validation ```yaml # cron-based validation schedule # Run nightly after backup window 0 4 * * * /opt/backup-validator/agent.py --validate-latest --notify-on-failure # Weekly full restore test 0 6 * * 0 /opt/backup-validator/agent.py --full-restore-test --config /etc/backup-validator/config.json ``` ## Key Concepts | Term | Definition | |------|-----------| | **Hash Manifest** | File containing cryptographic hashes (SHA-256) for every file in a dataset, used as integrity baseline | | **Bit Rot** | Gradual data corruption on storage media that silently alters file contents | | **Immutable Backup** | Backup that cannot be modified or deleted for a defined retention period | | **Restore Test** | Process of recovering data from backup to an isolated environment to verify recoverability | | **File Entropy** | Measure of randomness in file contents; encrypted files have entropy near 8.0 bits/byte | | **3-2-1 Rule** | Keep 3 copies of data, on 2 different media types, with 1 offsite copy | | **Backup Chain** | Sequence of full and incremental backups that must all be intact for recovery | ## Tools & Systems | Tool | Purpose | |------|---------| | Restic | Encrypted, deduplicated backup with built-in integrity verification | | BorgBackup | Deduplicating backup with archive verification | | Rclone | Cloud storage sync with checksum verification | | AWS S3 Object Lock | Immutable backup storage with WORM compliance | | Azure Immutable Blob | Tamper-proof backup storage for compliance | | sha256sum | Standard hash computation for file integrity | | pg_restore | PostgreSQL backup validation and restore testing | ## Common Pitfalls - **Never testing restores**: The most common failure mode. Backups that are never restored are untested assumptions. - **Checking only archive integrity, not data integrity**: A valid tar.gz can contain corrupted file contents. Always hash individual files. - **Trusting last backup without scanning for ransomware**: Backups may contain encrypted files if the infection predates the backup. - **Ignoring incremental chain integrity**: A single corrupted incremental backup can break the entire restore chain. - **No alerting on validation failures**: Backup validation must be monitored with alerts, not just logged silently. - **Using MD5 for integrity**: MD5 is cryptographically broken. Use SHA-256 or SHA-3 for integrity verification. ## References - NIST SP 800-184: Guide for Cybersecurity Event Recovery - NIST CSF 2.0 RC.RP-03: Backup Integrity Verification - CIS Controls v8: Control 11 - Data Recovery - CISA Ransomware Guide: https://www.cisa.gov/stopransomware