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Pre-deployment security audit skill for Solidity contracts in Foundry projects. Complements analyzing-ethereum-smart-contract-vulnerabilities (which it is based on) with a dev-side, Foundry-first workflow and full key-hygiene coverage. Layers four independent techniques: - Static analysis: Slither (90+ detectors) + Aderyn (Cyfrin) - Symbolic execution: Mythril (optional) - Property-based testing: forge fuzz + invariant tests (handler pattern) - Manual review checklist + secrets/keystore audit Includes scripts/agent.py (orchestrator aggregating Slither/Aderyn/Mythril/forge test + coverage + private-key scan into a JSON report with a PASS/FAIL deploy gate) and three references (tool cheat-sheets, SWC vulnerability checklist, secure deployment & key hygiene with cast keystore / multisig). Passes tools/validate-skill.py. Slither, Aderyn, forge test/coverage parsing and the gate logic were verified end-to-end against a reentrancy-vulnerable contract. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
6.4 KiB
6.4 KiB
API Reference — Tooling
Slither (static analysis)
slither . # whole project (reads foundry.toml + remappings)
slither . --json slither-report.json # machine-readable
slither . --json - # JSON to stdout (used by agent.py)
slither . --print human-summary # quick overview
slither . --print inheritance-graph # inheritance / proxy layout
slither . --detect reentrancy-eth,unprotected-upgrade # specific detectors
slither --list-detectors # all 90+ detectors
slither . --exclude-informational --exclude-low # focus high/medium
slither . --triage-mode # interactively suppress false positives -> slither.db.json
Severity matrix (impact × confidence):
| Impact | Confidence | Example detectors |
|---|---|---|
| High | High | reentrancy-eth, suicidal, arbitrary-send-eth |
| High | Medium | controlled-delegatecall, reentrancy-no-eth |
| Medium | High | locked-ether, incorrect-equality, tx-origin |
| Medium | Medium | uninitialized-state, shadowing-state, unchecked-transfer |
| Low | High | naming-convention, solc-version, low-level-calls |
| Informational | High | pragma, dead-code, assembly |
Aderyn (Cyfrin, Rust static analyzer — complementary to Slither)
aderyn . # markdown report.md by default
aderyn . -o aderyn-report.json # JSON (used by agent.py)
aderyn . --scope src/ # limit scope
Mythril (symbolic execution — slow, use on critical contracts only)
myth analyze src/Vault.sol -o json
myth analyze src/Vault.sol --execution-timeout 300 --max-depth 50 -o json
myth analyze --address 0x... --rpc <url> # deployed bytecode (read-only)
Foundry — testing
forge build # required before static analysis
forge test -vvv # unit + fuzz; -vvvv shows traces
forge test --match-contract VaultTest
forge test --match-test invariant_ # invariant suite only
forge coverage --report summary # line/branch coverage table
forge coverage --report lcov # for CI / tooling
forge snapshot # gas snapshots (DoS-by-gas review)
forge fmt --check # style gate
Fuzz test (property over random inputs)
function testFuzz_SetNumber(uint256 x) public {
counter.setNumber(x);
assertEq(counter.number(), x);
}
Revert test (replaces deprecated testFail)
function test_RevertWhen_Unauthorized() public {
vm.prank(attacker);
vm.expectRevert("Not authorized"); // or vm.expectRevert(MyError.selector)
target.adminOnly();
}
Key cheatcodes (vm.*)
| Cheatcode | Use |
|---|---|
vm.prank(addr) / vm.startPrank |
impersonate caller (test access control) |
vm.warp(ts) / vm.roll(n) |
manipulate block.timestamp / block.number |
vm.deal(addr, amt) |
set ETH balance |
vm.store(addr, slot, val) |
overwrite storage (test invariants under hostile state) |
vm.expectRevert(...) |
assert a call reverts (with msg / custom error selector) |
vm.expectEmit(...) |
assert events |
bound(x, lo, hi) |
constrain fuzz inputs in handlers |
makeAddr("name") |
deterministic labelled actor |
Invariant testing — handler pattern (the important one)
A handler wraps the target, bounds inputs, rotates actors, and tracks
ghost variables; targetContract(handler) makes the fuzzer drive only the
handler so sequences stay realistic.
// test/Invariant.t.sol
contract VaultInvariantTest is Test {
Vault vault;
VaultHandler handler;
function setUp() public {
vault = new Vault();
handler = new VaultHandler(vault);
targetContract(address(handler)); // fuzz the handler, not the vault directly
}
function invariant_ConservationOfDeposits() public view {
assertEq(address(vault).balance,
handler.ghost_depositSum() - handler.ghost_withdrawSum());
}
function invariant_Solvency() public view {
assertGe(address(vault).balance, vault.totalDeposits());
}
}
// test/handlers/VaultHandler.sol
contract VaultHandler is Test {
Vault public vault;
uint256 public ghost_depositSum;
uint256 public ghost_withdrawSum;
address[] public actors;
address internal currentActor;
modifier useActor(uint256 seed) {
currentActor = actors[bound(seed, 0, actors.length - 1)];
vm.startPrank(currentActor); _; vm.stopPrank();
}
constructor(Vault _v) {
vault = _v;
for (uint256 i; i < 10; i++) { actors.push(makeAddr(string(abi.encodePacked("actor", i)))); vm.deal(actors[i], 100 ether); }
}
function deposit(uint256 amt, uint256 seed) external useActor(seed) {
amt = bound(amt, 0.01 ether, 10 ether);
vault.deposit{value: amt}(); ghost_depositSum += amt;
}
function withdraw(uint256 amt, uint256 seed) external useActor(seed) {
uint256 bal = vault.balanceOf(currentActor);
if (bal == 0) return;
amt = bound(amt, 1, bal);
vault.withdraw(amt); ghost_withdrawSum += amt;
}
}
Tune in foundry.toml:
[invariant]
runs = 256
depth = 128
fail_on_revert = false # set true once the handler fully constrains inputs
[fuzz]
runs = 10000
SWC Registry (key entries)
| SWC | Title | Detected by |
|---|---|---|
| SWC-101 | Integer Overflow/Underflow | Mythril (pre-0.8 only) |
| SWC-104 | Unchecked Call Return | Slither + Mythril |
| SWC-105 | Unprotected Ether Withdrawal | Slither + Mythril |
| SWC-106 | Unprotected SELFDESTRUCT | Slither + Mythril |
| SWC-107 | Reentrancy | Slither + Mythril |
| SWC-112 | Delegatecall to Untrusted Callee | Slither |
| SWC-114 | Transaction Order Dependence (front-running) | manual |
| SWC-115 | tx.origin Authentication | Slither |
| SWC-116 | Block Timestamp Dependence | Mythril |
| SWC-120 | Weak Randomness | Slither + manual |
References
- Slither: https://github.com/crytic/slither
- Aderyn: https://github.com/Cyfrin/aderyn
- Mythril: https://github.com/Consensys/mythril
- Foundry Book: https://getfoundry.sh/
- SWC Registry: https://swcregistry.io/
- Solidity security: https://docs.soliditylang.org/en/latest/security-considerations.html
- Solodit (audit findings DB): https://solodit.xyz/