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https://github.com/mukul975/Anthropic-Cybersecurity-Skills.git
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Demand-driven expansion targeting the fastest-growing 2025-2026 threat and
skills categories (ISC2/WEF/CrowdStrike/Mandiant signals):
- AI Security (NEW domain, 12 skills): LLM red-teaming with garak/PyRIT,
prompt injection (direct/indirect/RAG), MCP tool-poisoning, agentic tool
invocation, guardrails, model/data poisoning, system-prompt leakage,
embedding/vector weaknesses, model extraction, continuous red-teaming
- Supply Chain Security (NEW domain, 5 skills): SBOMs, dependency confusion,
malicious-npm triage, typosquatting, SLSA/Sigstore provenance
- Hardware & Firmware Security (NEW domain, 4 skills): CHIPSEC/UEFI audit,
Secure Boot bypass, TPM measured-boot attestation, ESP bootkit hunting
- Identity (10): Entra ID/ROADtools, GraphRunner, AADInternals, ADCS/Certipy,
shadow credentials, coercion, BloodHound CE, device-code phishing, SSO abuse
- Cloud-native (8): Stratus, Pacu, CloudFox, container escape, K8s RBAC,
Falco, Trivy, kube-bench
- Offensive C2 (6): Sliver, Havoc, NetExec, DPAPI, NTLM relay ESC8, redirectors
- DFIR (6): Hayabusa, Chainsaw, KAPE, Velociraptor, EZ Tools, Plaso
- Backfill (4): OpenCTI, MISP, honeytokens, post-quantum crypto migration
Each skill follows the repo taxonomy (SKILL.md + references/{standards,api-reference}.md
+ scripts/agent.py + LICENSE), with researched real tool commands (no placeholders),
complete frontmatter, and ATT&CK/ATLAS + NIST CSF mappings. Updates README domain
table, skill count, and index.json.
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1.8 KiB
Standards and References - Falco Container Runtime Detection
MITRE ATT&CK
| Technique ID | Name | Tactic | Rationale |
|---|---|---|---|
| T1611 | Escape to Host | Privilege Escalation | Falco rules detect the syscalls/files used in container breakout (release_agent, setns, privileged mount). |
| T1059.004 | Command and Scripting Interpreter: Unix Shell | Execution | Reverse-shell rule detects shells wired to network sockets in containers. |
| T1610 | Deploy Container | Defense Evasion / Execution | docker.sock access rule detects daemon-API container spawning. |
| T1543 | Create or Modify System Process | Persistence | Anomalous process/service creation inside containers. |
| T1071.001 | Application Layer Protocol: Web Protocols | Command and Control | Unexpected outbound connections from containers. |
NIST CSF 2.0
| ID | Name | Rationale |
|---|---|---|
| DE.CM-01 | Networks and network services are monitored to find potentially adverse events | Falco continuously monitors syscall and network behavior at runtime, surfacing adverse container activity. |
Official Resources
- Falco documentation: https://falco.org/docs/
- Custom ruleset guide: https://falco.org/docs/concepts/rules/custom-ruleset/
- Default rules: https://falco.org/docs/reference/rules/default-rules/
- falcosecurity/rules repo: https://github.com/falcosecurity/rules/blob/main/rules/falco_rules.yaml
- Falco Helm chart README: https://github.com/falcosecurity/charts/blob/master/charts/falco/README.md
- falcoctl: https://github.com/falcosecurity/falcoctl
- Falcosidekick: https://github.com/falcosecurity/falcosidekick
Key Research
- Sysdig: "Detecting CVE-2025-22224 with Falco"
- Falco supported fields reference: https://falco.org/docs/reference/rules/supported-fields/