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https://github.com/mukul975/Anthropic-Cybersecurity-Skills.git
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Demand-driven expansion targeting the fastest-growing 2025-2026 threat and
skills categories (ISC2/WEF/CrowdStrike/Mandiant signals):
- AI Security (NEW domain, 12 skills): LLM red-teaming with garak/PyRIT,
prompt injection (direct/indirect/RAG), MCP tool-poisoning, agentic tool
invocation, guardrails, model/data poisoning, system-prompt leakage,
embedding/vector weaknesses, model extraction, continuous red-teaming
- Supply Chain Security (NEW domain, 5 skills): SBOMs, dependency confusion,
malicious-npm triage, typosquatting, SLSA/Sigstore provenance
- Hardware & Firmware Security (NEW domain, 4 skills): CHIPSEC/UEFI audit,
Secure Boot bypass, TPM measured-boot attestation, ESP bootkit hunting
- Identity (10): Entra ID/ROADtools, GraphRunner, AADInternals, ADCS/Certipy,
shadow credentials, coercion, BloodHound CE, device-code phishing, SSO abuse
- Cloud-native (8): Stratus, Pacu, CloudFox, container escape, K8s RBAC,
Falco, Trivy, kube-bench
- Offensive C2 (6): Sliver, Havoc, NetExec, DPAPI, NTLM relay ESC8, redirectors
- DFIR (6): Hayabusa, Chainsaw, KAPE, Velociraptor, EZ Tools, Plaso
- Backfill (4): OpenCTI, MISP, honeytokens, post-quantum crypto migration
Each skill follows the repo taxonomy (SKILL.md + references/{standards,api-reference}.md
+ scripts/agent.py + LICENSE), with researched real tool commands (no placeholders),
complete frontmatter, and ATT&CK/ATLAS + NIST CSF mappings. Updates README domain
table, skill count, and index.json.
2.3 KiB
2.3 KiB
Standards and References - Container Escape to Host
MITRE ATT&CK
| Technique ID | Name | Tactic | Rationale |
|---|---|---|---|
| T1611 | Escape to Host | Privilege Escalation | The core technique: breaking container isolation to execute on the host kernel/namespace. |
| T1610 | Deploy Container | Defense Evasion / Execution | Docker-socket escapes spawn a new privileged container mounting host root. |
| T1613 | Container and Resource Discovery | Discovery | Enumerating caps, namespaces, mounts to find a viable escape path. |
| T1068 | Exploitation for Privilege Escalation | Privilege Escalation | runC CVE exploitation (CVE-2024-21626, CVE-2025-31133/52565/52881). |
NIST CSF 2.0
| ID | Name | Rationale |
|---|---|---|
| PR.PS-01 | Configuration management practices are established and applied | Hardening container runtime/pod config (no --privileged, no socket mount, no hostPath /) and keeping runC patched is the primary control against breakout. |
Real CVEs Covered
| CVE | Runtime | Fixed In | Note |
|---|---|---|---|
| CVE-2024-21626 | runC <=1.1.11 | runC 1.1.12, containerd 1.6.28/1.7.13, Docker 25.0.2 | "Leaky Vessels" host-cwd fd leak |
| CVE-2025-31133 | runC <=1.2.7/1.3.2/1.4.0-rc.2 | runC 1.2.8/1.3.3/1.4.0-rc.3 | /dev/null masked-path race |
| CVE-2025-52565 | runC <=1.2.7/1.3.2/1.4.0-rc.2 | runC 1.2.8/1.3.3/1.4.0-rc.3 | /dev/console bind-mount race |
| CVE-2025-52881 | runC <=1.2.7/1.3.2/1.4.0-rc.2 | runC 1.2.8/1.3.3/1.4.0-rc.3 | Arbitrary procfs write redirection |
Official Resources
- runC security advisories: https://github.com/opencontainers/runc/security/advisories
- GHSA-cgrx-mc8f-2prm (2025 write gadgets): https://github.com/opencontainers/runc/security/advisories/GHSA-cgrx-mc8f-2prm
- GHSA-9493-h29p-rfm2 (2025 masked-path): https://github.com/opencontainers/runc/security/advisories/GHSA-9493-h29p-rfm2
- Palo Alto Leaky Vessels: https://www.paloaltonetworks.com/blog/cloud-security/leaky-vessels-vulnerabilities-container-escape/
- Sysdig runc 2025 escape blog: https://www.sysdig.com/blog/runc-container-escape-vulnerabilities
- HackTricks Docker Breakout: https://book.hacktricks.xyz/linux-hardening/privilege-escalation/docker-security/docker-breakout-privilege-escalation