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mukul975
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Demand-driven expansion targeting the fastest-growing 2025-2026 threat and
skills categories (ISC2/WEF/CrowdStrike/Mandiant signals):
- AI Security (NEW domain, 12 skills): LLM red-teaming with garak/PyRIT,
prompt injection (direct/indirect/RAG), MCP tool-poisoning, agentic tool
invocation, guardrails, model/data poisoning, system-prompt leakage,
embedding/vector weaknesses, model extraction, continuous red-teaming
- Supply Chain Security (NEW domain, 5 skills): SBOMs, dependency confusion,
malicious-npm triage, typosquatting, SLSA/Sigstore provenance
- Hardware & Firmware Security (NEW domain, 4 skills): CHIPSEC/UEFI audit,
Secure Boot bypass, TPM measured-boot attestation, ESP bootkit hunting
- Identity (10): Entra ID/ROADtools, GraphRunner, AADInternals, ADCS/Certipy,
shadow credentials, coercion, BloodHound CE, device-code phishing, SSO abuse
- Cloud-native (8): Stratus, Pacu, CloudFox, container escape, K8s RBAC,
Falco, Trivy, kube-bench
- Offensive C2 (6): Sliver, Havoc, NetExec, DPAPI, NTLM relay ESC8, redirectors
- DFIR (6): Hayabusa, Chainsaw, KAPE, Velociraptor, EZ Tools, Plaso
- Backfill (4): OpenCTI, MISP, honeytokens, post-quantum crypto migration
Each skill follows the repo taxonomy (SKILL.md + references/{standards,api-reference}.md
+ scripts/agent.py + LICENSE), with researched real tool commands (no placeholders),
complete frontmatter, and ATT&CK/ATLAS + NIST CSF mappings. Updates README domain
table, skill count, and index.json.
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1.4 KiB
Standards Mapping — Verifying Build Provenance with SLSA and Sigstore
MITRE ATT&CK
| ID | Technique Name | Rationale |
|---|---|---|
| T1195 | Supply Chain Compromise | Verifying signatures and SLSA provenance detects artifacts tampered with or substituted anywhere in the build and distribution chain, blocking supply-chain compromise before deployment. Ref: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1195/ |
NIST Cybersecurity Framework 2.0
| ID | Subcategory | Rationale |
|---|---|---|
| PR.DS-06 | Integrity-checking mechanisms are used to verify software, firmware, and information integrity | cosign signature verification and SLSA provenance verification are integrity-checking mechanisms that cryptographically confirm an artifact was built from the expected source by the expected builder and was not modified. |
SLSA Build Levels
| Level | Guarantee |
|---|---|
| Build L1 | Provenance exists (may be forgeable) |
| Build L2 | Provenance signed by a hosted build service |
| Build L3 | Non-forgeable provenance from a hardened, isolated builder |
Ref: https://slsa.dev/spec/v1.0/levels
Supporting References
- Sigstore architecture (Fulcio short-lived certs, Rekor transparency log): https://docs.sigstore.dev/
- slsa-github-generator (L3 producer): https://github.com/slsa-framework/slsa-github-generator