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Each rewritten description now states both what the skill does (concrete capability, named tools/artifacts) and an explicit when-to-use trigger, improving agent discovery/activation. Grounded in each skill's own body; changes confined to the `description` field only (bodies and all other frontmatter untouched). Produced by a gated audit->rewrite->recheck loop (548 -> 0 flagged) with a sampled anti-invention check (0 ungrounded). Schema: 817/817 pass. Framework-ID gate: 0 defects.
3.5 KiB
3.5 KiB
name, description, domain, subdomain, tags, version, author, license, d3fend_techniques, nist_csf, mitre_attack
| name | description | domain | subdomain | tags | version | author | license | d3fend_techniques | nist_csf | mitre_attack | ||||||||||||||||||||
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| detecting-pass-the-hash-attacks | Detect Pass-the-Hash (T1550.002) attacks by analyzing NTLM authentication patterns, flagging Type 3 logons using NTLM where Kerberos would be expected, and correlating with credential-dumping indicators. Use when threat hunting for lateral movement via stolen NTLM hashes, triaging EDR/SIEM alerts on suspicious NTLM logons, scoping compromise during incident response, or validating detection coverage in a purple team exercise. | cybersecurity | threat-hunting |
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1.0 | mahipal | Apache-2.0 |
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Detecting Pass The Hash Attacks
When to Use
- When proactively hunting for indicators of detecting pass the hash attacks in the environment
- After threat intelligence indicates active campaigns using these techniques
- During incident response to scope compromise related to these techniques
- When EDR or SIEM alerts trigger on related indicators
- During periodic security assessments and purple team exercises
Prerequisites
- EDR platform with process and network telemetry (CrowdStrike, MDE, SentinelOne)
- SIEM with relevant log data ingested (Splunk, Elastic, Sentinel)
- Sysmon deployed with comprehensive configuration
- Windows Security Event Log forwarding enabled
- Threat intelligence feeds for IOC correlation
Workflow
- Formulate Hypothesis: Define a testable hypothesis based on threat intelligence or ATT&CK gap analysis.
- Identify Data Sources: Determine which logs and telemetry are needed to validate or refute the hypothesis.
- Execute Queries: Run detection queries against SIEM and EDR platforms to collect relevant events.
- Analyze Results: Examine query results for anomalies, correlating across multiple data sources.
- Validate Findings: Distinguish true positives from false positives through contextual analysis.
- Correlate Activity: Link findings to broader attack chains and threat actor TTPs.
- Document and Report: Record findings, update detection rules, and recommend response actions.
Key Concepts
| Concept | Description |
|---|---|
| T1550.002 | Pass the Hash |
| T1550.003 | Pass the Ticket |
| T1078 | Valid Accounts |
Tools & Systems
| Tool | Purpose |
|---|---|
| CrowdStrike Falcon | EDR telemetry and threat detection |
| Microsoft Defender for Endpoint | Advanced hunting with KQL |
| Splunk Enterprise | SIEM log analysis with SPL queries |
| Elastic Security | Detection rules and investigation timeline |
| Sysmon | Detailed Windows event monitoring |
| Velociraptor | Endpoint artifact collection and hunting |
| Sigma Rules | Cross-platform detection rule format |
Common Scenarios
- Scenario 1: Mimikatz sekurlsa::pth with stolen NTLM hash
- Scenario 2: Impacket psexec.py remote execution with hash
- Scenario 3: CrackMapExec hash spraying across hosts
- Scenario 4: WMI lateral movement via pass-the-hash
Output Format
Hunt ID: TH-DETECT-[DATE]-[SEQ]
Technique: T1550.002
Host: [Hostname]
User: [Account context]
Evidence: [Log entries, process trees, network data]
Risk Level: [Critical/High/Medium/Low]
Confidence: [High/Medium/Low]
Recommended Action: [Containment, investigation, monitoring]