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mukul975
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Demand-driven expansion targeting the fastest-growing 2025-2026 threat and
skills categories (ISC2/WEF/CrowdStrike/Mandiant signals):
- AI Security (NEW domain, 12 skills): LLM red-teaming with garak/PyRIT,
prompt injection (direct/indirect/RAG), MCP tool-poisoning, agentic tool
invocation, guardrails, model/data poisoning, system-prompt leakage,
embedding/vector weaknesses, model extraction, continuous red-teaming
- Supply Chain Security (NEW domain, 5 skills): SBOMs, dependency confusion,
malicious-npm triage, typosquatting, SLSA/Sigstore provenance
- Hardware & Firmware Security (NEW domain, 4 skills): CHIPSEC/UEFI audit,
Secure Boot bypass, TPM measured-boot attestation, ESP bootkit hunting
- Identity (10): Entra ID/ROADtools, GraphRunner, AADInternals, ADCS/Certipy,
shadow credentials, coercion, BloodHound CE, device-code phishing, SSO abuse
- Cloud-native (8): Stratus, Pacu, CloudFox, container escape, K8s RBAC,
Falco, Trivy, kube-bench
- Offensive C2 (6): Sliver, Havoc, NetExec, DPAPI, NTLM relay ESC8, redirectors
- DFIR (6): Hayabusa, Chainsaw, KAPE, Velociraptor, EZ Tools, Plaso
- Backfill (4): OpenCTI, MISP, honeytokens, post-quantum crypto migration
Each skill follows the repo taxonomy (SKILL.md + references/{standards,api-reference}.md
+ scripts/agent.py + LICENSE), with researched real tool commands (no placeholders),
complete frontmatter, and ATT&CK/ATLAS + NIST CSF mappings. Updates README domain
table, skill count, and index.json.
1.8 KiB
1.8 KiB
Standards and References - Kubernetes RBAC Privilege Escalation Audit
MITRE ATT&CK
| Technique ID | Name | Tactic | Rationale |
|---|---|---|---|
| T1078 | Valid Accounts | Defense Evasion / Privilege Escalation | RBAC abuse leverages legitimate service-account credentials to gain higher access. |
| T1098 | Account Manipulation | Persistence | escalate/bind/impersonate and token minting create or modify accounts/bindings. |
| T1528 | Steal Application Access Token | Credential Access | Reading secrets or serviceaccounts/token yields other accounts' tokens. |
| T1613 | Container and Resource Discovery | Discovery | Enumerating roles, bindings, and pod-to-SA mappings. |
| T1611 | Escape to Host | Privilege Escalation | create pods plus node access yields a privileged host-mounting pod. |
NIST CSF 2.0
| ID | Name | Rationale |
|---|---|---|
| PR.AA-05 | Access permissions, entitlements, and authorizations are defined, managed, and enforced incorporating least privilege | The audit directly measures and enforces least-privilege RBAC, removing escalation primitives. |
Official Resources
- Kubernetes RBAC Good Practices: https://kubernetes.io/docs/concepts/security/rbac-good-practices/
- Using RBAC Authorization: https://kubernetes.io/docs/reference/access-authn-authz/rbac/
- Authorization Overview (
auth can-i): https://kubernetes.io/docs/reference/access-authn-authz/authorization/ - rbac-police: https://github.com/PaloAltoNetworks/rbac-police
- kubectl-who-can: https://github.com/aquasecurity/kubectl-who-can
- rakkess: https://github.com/corneliusweig/rakkess
- rbac-lookup: https://github.com/FairwindsOps/rbac-lookup
Key Research
- Unit 42: Kubernetes RBAC privilege escalation research
- Kubernetes SIG-Auth: documented privilege-escalation primitives (escalate, bind, impersonate)