mirror of https://github.com/mukul975/Anthropic-Cybersecurity-Skills.git synced 2026-08-02 00:57:42 +03:00

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mukul975 cb8d79e068 Map all 754 skills to MITRE ATT&CK v19.1

- Add validated mitre_attack frontmatter to all 754 skills (286 distinct
  techniques), verified against MITRE ATT&CK v19.1 via the official
  mitreattack-python library: 0 revoked, deprecated, or invalid IDs
- Curate precise per-skill technique IDs for forensics, malware-analysis,
  threat-intel, and red-team skills (e.g. DCSync -> T1003.006,
  Kerberoasting -> T1558.003, Pass-the-Ticket -> T1550.003)
- Reconcile v19.1 tactic restructuring: Defense Evasion split into
  Stealth (TA0005) and Defense Impairment (TA0112); revoked T1562.*
  family and T1070.001/.002 remapped to active equivalents (T1685.*)
- Normalize word-split tags across 35 skills (remove filename-derived
  stopword tags, add semantic cybersecurity tags)
- Add api-reference.md for 3 skills that were missing it
- Update README ATT&CK section with accurate v19.1 tactic distribution

2026-06-01 12:13:29 +02:00

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Detecting Supply Chain Attacks in CI/CD

When to Use

When investigating security incidents that require detecting supply chain attacks in ci cd
When building detection rules or threat hunting queries for this domain
When SOC analysts need structured procedures for this analysis type
When validating security monitoring coverage for related attack techniques

Prerequisites

Familiarity with security operations concepts and tools
Access to a test or lab environment for safe execution
Python 3.8+ with required dependencies installed
Appropriate authorization for any testing activities

Instructions

Scan CI/CD workflow files for supply chain risks by parsing GitHub Actions YAML, checking for unpinned dependencies, script injection vectors, and secrets exposure.

import yaml
from pathlib import Path

for wf in Path(".github/workflows").glob("*.yml"):
    with open(wf) as f:
        workflow = yaml.safe_load(f)
    for job_name, job in workflow.get("jobs", {}).items():
        for step in job.get("steps", []):
            uses = step.get("uses", "")
            if uses and "@" in uses and not uses.split("@")[1].startswith("sha"):
                print(f"Unpinned action: {uses} in {wf.name}")

Key supply chain risks:

Unpinned GitHub Actions (using @main instead of SHA)
Script injection via ${{ github.event }} expressions
Overly permissive GITHUB_TOKEN permissions
Third-party actions with write access to repo
Dependency confusion via public/private package name collision

Examples

# Check for script injection in run steps
for step in job.get("steps", []):
    run_cmd = step.get("run", "")
    if "${{" in run_cmd and "github.event" in run_cmd:
        print(f"Script injection risk: {run_cmd[:80]}")

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