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Demand-driven expansion targeting the fastest-growing 2025-2026 threat and
skills categories (ISC2/WEF/CrowdStrike/Mandiant signals):
- AI Security (NEW domain, 12 skills): LLM red-teaming with garak/PyRIT,
prompt injection (direct/indirect/RAG), MCP tool-poisoning, agentic tool
invocation, guardrails, model/data poisoning, system-prompt leakage,
embedding/vector weaknesses, model extraction, continuous red-teaming
- Supply Chain Security (NEW domain, 5 skills): SBOMs, dependency confusion,
malicious-npm triage, typosquatting, SLSA/Sigstore provenance
- Hardware & Firmware Security (NEW domain, 4 skills): CHIPSEC/UEFI audit,
Secure Boot bypass, TPM measured-boot attestation, ESP bootkit hunting
- Identity (10): Entra ID/ROADtools, GraphRunner, AADInternals, ADCS/Certipy,
shadow credentials, coercion, BloodHound CE, device-code phishing, SSO abuse
- Cloud-native (8): Stratus, Pacu, CloudFox, container escape, K8s RBAC,
Falco, Trivy, kube-bench
- Offensive C2 (6): Sliver, Havoc, NetExec, DPAPI, NTLM relay ESC8, redirectors
- DFIR (6): Hayabusa, Chainsaw, KAPE, Velociraptor, EZ Tools, Plaso
- Backfill (4): OpenCTI, MISP, honeytokens, post-quantum crypto migration
Each skill follows the repo taxonomy (SKILL.md + references/{standards,api-reference}.md
+ scripts/agent.py + LICENSE), with researched real tool commands (no placeholders),
complete frontmatter, and ATT&CK/ATLAS + NIST CSF mappings. Updates README domain
table, skill count, and index.json.
1.9 KiB
1.9 KiB
Standards and References — Relaying NTLM for ADCS ESC8
NIST CSF 2.0
| ID | Name | Rationale |
|---|---|---|
| DE.CM-01 | Networks and network services are monitored to find potentially adverse events | ESC8 produces detectable network signals: forced authentication (coercion), NTLM relay to the AD CS HTTP endpoint, and anomalous machine-account certificate enrollment. |
MITRE ATT&CK
| Technique ID | Name | Tactic | Rationale |
|---|---|---|---|
| T1557.001 | Adversary-in-the-Middle: LLMNR/NBT-NS Poisoning and SMB Relay | Credential Access / Collection | Core ESC8 primitive — relaying coerced NTLM auth to AD CS web enrollment. |
| T1187 | Forced Authentication | Credential Access | PetitPotam/printerbug coerce the DC to authenticate. |
| T1649 | Steal or Forge Authentication Certificates | Credential Access | The attack yields a DC machine-account certificate. |
| T1003.006 | OS Credential Dumping: DCSync | Credential Access | The recovered DC identity enables DCSync. |
Supporting Frameworks and Standards
- MS-EFSRPC — protocol abused by PetitPotam for coercion.
- MS-RPRN — Print System Remote Protocol abused by printerbug.py.
- MS-WCCE — Windows Client Certificate Enrollment, the target enrollment protocol.
- Microsoft KB5005413 / ADV210003 — mitigations for NTLM relay to AD CS (EPA, disable NTLM on enrollment).
- D3FEND — Certificate-based authentication hardening and network traffic analysis as countermeasures.
Official Resources
- Impacket: https://github.com/fortra/impacket
- Certipy: https://github.com/ly4k/Certipy
- PetitPotam: https://github.com/topotam/PetitPotam
- Coercer: https://github.com/p0dalirius/Coercer
- Certified Pre-Owned: https://specterops.io/wp-content/uploads/sites/3/2022/06/Certified_Pre-Owned.pdf
- dirkjanm "NTLM relaying to AD CS": https://dirkjanm.io/ntlm-relaying-to-ad-certificate-services/