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Demand-driven expansion targeting the fastest-growing 2025-2026 threat and
skills categories (ISC2/WEF/CrowdStrike/Mandiant signals):
- AI Security (NEW domain, 12 skills): LLM red-teaming with garak/PyRIT,
prompt injection (direct/indirect/RAG), MCP tool-poisoning, agentic tool
invocation, guardrails, model/data poisoning, system-prompt leakage,
embedding/vector weaknesses, model extraction, continuous red-teaming
- Supply Chain Security (NEW domain, 5 skills): SBOMs, dependency confusion,
malicious-npm triage, typosquatting, SLSA/Sigstore provenance
- Hardware & Firmware Security (NEW domain, 4 skills): CHIPSEC/UEFI audit,
Secure Boot bypass, TPM measured-boot attestation, ESP bootkit hunting
- Identity (10): Entra ID/ROADtools, GraphRunner, AADInternals, ADCS/Certipy,
shadow credentials, coercion, BloodHound CE, device-code phishing, SSO abuse
- Cloud-native (8): Stratus, Pacu, CloudFox, container escape, K8s RBAC,
Falco, Trivy, kube-bench
- Offensive C2 (6): Sliver, Havoc, NetExec, DPAPI, NTLM relay ESC8, redirectors
- DFIR (6): Hayabusa, Chainsaw, KAPE, Velociraptor, EZ Tools, Plaso
- Backfill (4): OpenCTI, MISP, honeytokens, post-quantum crypto migration
Each skill follows the repo taxonomy (SKILL.md + references/{standards,api-reference}.md
+ scripts/agent.py + LICENSE), with researched real tool commands (no placeholders),
complete frontmatter, and ATT&CK/ATLAS + NIST CSF mappings. Updates README domain
table, skill count, and index.json.
1.3 KiB
1.3 KiB
Standards Mapping — Coercing Authentication with Coercer and PetitPotam
MITRE ATT&CK (Enterprise)
| ID | Name | Rationale |
|---|---|---|
| T1187 | Forced Authentication | Coercer and PetitPotam abuse RPC methods (MS-EFSR, MS-RPRN, MS-DFSNM, MS-FSRVP) to force a target's machine account to authenticate to an attacker-controlled host — the textbook definition of forced authentication. |
Reference: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1187/
Chained techniques:
- T1557.001 (Adversary-in-the-Middle: LLMNR/NBT-NS Poisoning and SMB/NTLM Relay) — relaying the coerced auth.
- T1649 (Steal or Forge Authentication Certificates) — when relayed into AD CS web enrollment (ESC8).
NIST Cybersecurity Framework 2.0
| ID | Name | Rationale |
|---|---|---|
| DE.CM-01 | Networks and network services are monitored to find potentially adverse events | Coercion produces detectable RPC calls and inbound NTLM authentication to non-standard hosts; this skill exercises and validates the monitoring needed to catch forced-authentication and relay activity. |
Reference: https://csrc.nist.gov/projects/cybersecurity-framework
Mitigation references
- Microsoft KB5005413 (NTLM relay to AD CS mitigation), Extended Protection for Authentication (EPA).
- Disable Print Spooler on DCs (MS-RPRN), enforce SMB/LDAP signing.