Mahipal
6972fe933e
All 33 container-security skills now carry what it does, an explicit "Use when" trigger, keywords, and a negative trigger naming the nearest neighbour. Six collision clusters resolved by differentiating scope rather than merging, so no skill is removed: - kube-bench: running the tool vs interpreting findings into an audit - Calico: portable upstream NetworkPolicy vs Calico-as-CNI vs Calico-only CRDs (GlobalNetworkPolicy, HostEndpoint, DNS egress) - Falco: deploying and operating it vs authoring escape rules - container escape: tool-agnostic runtime signals vs Falco rule syntax vs static posture audit vs offensive breakout - Trivy: all-target platform and operator vs single-image scan - Docker: images and Dockerfiles vs daemon.json vs the CIS audit script Also replaces the templated "When to Use" boilerplate in these files, including bullets that only restated the skill's own name. Worst pair (Pod Security Standards vs Pod Security Admission) drops from 0.77 cosine to below the 0.45 threshold. Repo-wide: colliding pairs 60 -> 56, skills involved 105 -> 94.
2.7 KiB
name, description, domain, subdomain, tags, version, author, license, nist_csf, mitre_attack
| name | description | domain | subdomain | tags | version | author | license | nist_csf | mitre_attack | ||||||||||||||
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| implementing-container-network-policies-with-calico | Uses Calico's own policy CRDs beyond the upstream Kubernetes API - GlobalNetworkPolicy, HostEndpoint, NetworkSet, policy tiers, and DNS-based egress rules - applied and audited with calicoctl. Use when a policy must span namespaces or protect the host itself, when egress has to be expressed by domain name, or when ordering policies into tiers. Keywords: calicoctl, GlobalNetworkPolicy, HostEndpoint, NetworkSet, tier, DNS egress, order. Do not use for portable upstream NetworkPolicy - use implementing-network-policies-for-kubernetes; for installing Calico and writing standard policy with it use implementing-kubernetes-network-policy-with-calico. | cybersecurity | container-security |
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1.0 | mahipal | Apache-2.0 |
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Implementing Container Network Policies with Calico
Overview
Calico provides Kubernetes-native and extended network policy enforcement through its CNI plugin. This skill covers creating and auditing Calico NetworkPolicy and GlobalNetworkPolicy resources to implement pod-to-pod traffic control, namespace isolation, egress restrictions, and DNS-based policy rules using calicoctl and the Kubernetes API.
When to Use
- When deploying or configuring implementing container network policies with calico capabilities in your environment
- When establishing security controls aligned to compliance requirements
- When building or improving security architecture for this domain
- When conducting security assessments that require this implementation
Prerequisites
- Kubernetes cluster with Calico CNI installed
- Python 3.9+ with
kubernetesclient library - calicoctl CLI tool installed and configured
- kubectl access with RBAC permissions for network policy management
Steps
Step 1: Audit Existing Network Policies
Use calicoctl and kubectl to inventory current network policies and identify unprotected namespaces.
Step 2: Implement Default-Deny Policies
Create default-deny ingress and egress policies per namespace as a zero-trust baseline.
Step 3: Create Workload-Specific Allow Rules
Define granular allow rules for legitimate pod-to-pod and pod-to-service communication.
Step 4: Validate Policy Enforcement
Test connectivity between pods to verify policies are correctly enforced.
Expected Output
JSON audit report listing all network policies, unprotected namespaces, policy rule counts, and connectivity test results.