Files
Anthropic-Cybersecurity-Skills/skills/performing-container-escape-detection/SKILL.md
T
Mahipal 6972fe933e docs(skills): rewrite container-security descriptions to a uniform standard
All 33 container-security skills now carry what it does, an explicit
"Use when" trigger, keywords, and a negative trigger naming the nearest
neighbour. Six collision clusters resolved by differentiating scope
rather than merging, so no skill is removed:

- kube-bench: running the tool vs interpreting findings into an audit
- Calico: portable upstream NetworkPolicy vs Calico-as-CNI vs Calico-only
  CRDs (GlobalNetworkPolicy, HostEndpoint, DNS egress)
- Falco: deploying and operating it vs authoring escape rules
- container escape: tool-agnostic runtime signals vs Falco rule syntax vs
  static posture audit vs offensive breakout
- Trivy: all-target platform and operator vs single-image scan
- Docker: images and Dockerfiles vs daemon.json vs the CIS audit script

Also replaces the templated "When to Use" boilerplate in these files,
including bullets that only restated the skill's own name.

Worst pair (Pod Security Standards vs Pod Security Admission) drops from
0.77 cosine to below the 0.45 threshold. Repo-wide: colliding pairs
60 -> 56, skills involved 105 -> 94.
2026-08-23 17:15:30 +02:00

2.5 KiB

name, description, domain, subdomain, tags, version, author, license, nist_csf, mitre_attack
name description domain subdomain tags version author license nist_csf mitre_attack
performing-container-escape-detection Audits container and pod configuration for escape-enabling misconfiguration using the Kubernetes Python client - privileged flags, dangerous capability grants, host path mounts, shared namespaces, and CVE-2022-0492 style cgroup abuse. Use when sweeping a cluster for workloads that could break out, producing a posture report, or checking configuration before enforcement is switched on. Keywords: privileged, hostPath, hostPID, capabilities, CVE-2022-0492, cgroup, kubernetes python client, posture audit. Do not use for runtime syscall-based detection - use detecting-container-escape-attempts. ' cybersecurity container-security
container-security
container-escape
privileged-container
namespace-analysis
linux-capabilities
threat-detection
1.0 mahipal Apache-2.0
PR.PS-01
PR.IR-01
ID.AM-08
DE.CM-01
T1610
T1611
T1609
T1525

Performing Container Escape Detection

When to Use

  • When conducting security assessments that involve performing container escape detection
  • When following incident response procedures for related security events
  • When performing scheduled security testing or auditing activities
  • When validating security controls through hands-on testing

Prerequisites

  • Familiarity with container security concepts and tools
  • Access to a test or lab environment for safe execution
  • Python 3.8+ with required dependencies installed
  • Appropriate authorization for any testing activities

Instructions

Audit Kubernetes pods for container escape vectors including privileged mode, dangerous capabilities, host namespace sharing, and writable hostPath mounts.

from kubernetes import client, config
config.load_kube_config()
v1 = client.CoreV1Api()

pods = v1.list_pod_for_all_namespaces()
for pod in pods.items:
    for container in pod.spec.containers:
        sc = container.security_context
        if sc and sc.privileged:
            print(f"PRIVILEGED: {pod.metadata.namespace}/{pod.metadata.name}")

Key escape vectors:

  1. Privileged containers (full host access)
  2. CAP_SYS_ADMIN capability
  3. Host PID/Network/IPC namespace sharing
  4. Writable hostPath mounts to / or /etc
  5. Docker socket mount (/var/run/docker.sock)

Examples

# Check for docker socket mounts
for vol in pod.spec.volumes or []:
    if vol.host_path and "docker.sock" in (vol.host_path.path or ""):
        print(f"Docker socket exposed: {pod.metadata.name}")