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mukul975
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Demand-driven expansion targeting the fastest-growing 2025-2026 threat and
skills categories (ISC2/WEF/CrowdStrike/Mandiant signals):
- AI Security (NEW domain, 12 skills): LLM red-teaming with garak/PyRIT,
prompt injection (direct/indirect/RAG), MCP tool-poisoning, agentic tool
invocation, guardrails, model/data poisoning, system-prompt leakage,
embedding/vector weaknesses, model extraction, continuous red-teaming
- Supply Chain Security (NEW domain, 5 skills): SBOMs, dependency confusion,
malicious-npm triage, typosquatting, SLSA/Sigstore provenance
- Hardware & Firmware Security (NEW domain, 4 skills): CHIPSEC/UEFI audit,
Secure Boot bypass, TPM measured-boot attestation, ESP bootkit hunting
- Identity (10): Entra ID/ROADtools, GraphRunner, AADInternals, ADCS/Certipy,
shadow credentials, coercion, BloodHound CE, device-code phishing, SSO abuse
- Cloud-native (8): Stratus, Pacu, CloudFox, container escape, K8s RBAC,
Falco, Trivy, kube-bench
- Offensive C2 (6): Sliver, Havoc, NetExec, DPAPI, NTLM relay ESC8, redirectors
- DFIR (6): Hayabusa, Chainsaw, KAPE, Velociraptor, EZ Tools, Plaso
- Backfill (4): OpenCTI, MISP, honeytokens, post-quantum crypto migration
Each skill follows the repo taxonomy (SKILL.md + references/{standards,api-reference}.md
+ scripts/agent.py + LICENSE), with researched real tool commands (no placeholders),
complete frontmatter, and ATT&CK/ATLAS + NIST CSF mappings. Updates README domain
table, skill count, and index.json.
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1.5 KiB
Standards Mapping
MITRE ATT&CK
| ID | Name | Tactic | Rationale |
|---|---|---|---|
| T1528 | Steal Application Access Token | Credential Access | Device-code and illicit-consent phishing cause Entra ID to mint OAuth access/refresh tokens to the attacker; the stolen bearer tokens are then reused to access cloud services without re-authenticating. |
Related techniques chained in this workflow
| ID | Name | Rationale |
|---|---|---|
| T1566 | Phishing | Delivery vector for the device-code message or consent URL. |
| T1550.001 | Use Alternate Authentication Material: Application Access Token | Replaying the stolen OAuth tokens against M365 resources. |
| T1098.003 | Account Manipulation: Additional Cloud Roles | Illicit-consent grants persist as a service-principal OAuth grant surviving password resets. |
NIST Cybersecurity Framework 2.0
| ID | Name | Rationale |
|---|---|---|
| PR.AA-03 | Users, services, and hardware are authenticated | The attack defeats authentication assurance by abusing the OAuth device-code grant to bypass MFA; the control objective being tested is robust, phishing-resistant authentication. |
References
- RFC 8628 — OAuth 2.0 Device Authorization Grant: https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/rfc8628
- MITRE ATT&CK T1528: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1528/
- NIST CSF 2.0: https://www.nist.gov/cyberframework
- Mandiant M-Trends: https://cloud.google.com/security/resources/m-trends