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mukul975
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Demand-driven expansion targeting the fastest-growing 2025-2026 threat and
skills categories (ISC2/WEF/CrowdStrike/Mandiant signals):
- AI Security (NEW domain, 12 skills): LLM red-teaming with garak/PyRIT,
prompt injection (direct/indirect/RAG), MCP tool-poisoning, agentic tool
invocation, guardrails, model/data poisoning, system-prompt leakage,
embedding/vector weaknesses, model extraction, continuous red-teaming
- Supply Chain Security (NEW domain, 5 skills): SBOMs, dependency confusion,
malicious-npm triage, typosquatting, SLSA/Sigstore provenance
- Hardware & Firmware Security (NEW domain, 4 skills): CHIPSEC/UEFI audit,
Secure Boot bypass, TPM measured-boot attestation, ESP bootkit hunting
- Identity (10): Entra ID/ROADtools, GraphRunner, AADInternals, ADCS/Certipy,
shadow credentials, coercion, BloodHound CE, device-code phishing, SSO abuse
- Cloud-native (8): Stratus, Pacu, CloudFox, container escape, K8s RBAC,
Falco, Trivy, kube-bench
- Offensive C2 (6): Sliver, Havoc, NetExec, DPAPI, NTLM relay ESC8, redirectors
- DFIR (6): Hayabusa, Chainsaw, KAPE, Velociraptor, EZ Tools, Plaso
- Backfill (4): OpenCTI, MISP, honeytokens, post-quantum crypto migration
Each skill follows the repo taxonomy (SKILL.md + references/{standards,api-reference}.md
+ scripts/agent.py + LICENSE), with researched real tool commands (no placeholders),
complete frontmatter, and ATT&CK/ATLAS + NIST CSF mappings. Updates README domain
table, skill count, and index.json.
1.6 KiB
1.6 KiB
Standards and Framework Mapping
MITRE ATT&CK
| ID | Name | Rationale |
|---|---|---|
| T1195.001 | Supply Chain Compromise: Compromise Software Dependencies and Development Tools | Dependency confusion substitutes a malicious public package for a private dependency, compromising the dev/build toolchain. |
| T1195.002 | Supply Chain Compromise: Compromise Software Supply Chain | Covers the tainted build artifacts shipped downstream once confusion succeeds. |
| T1059.007 | Command and Scripting Interpreter: JavaScript | npm install lifecycle scripts run attacker JS during resolution. |
| T1071.001 | Application Layer Protocol: Web Protocols | Substituted packages exfiltrate stolen secrets over HTTP(S). |
NIST Cybersecurity Framework 2.0
| ID | Name | Rationale |
|---|---|---|
| ID.RA-09 | The authenticity and integrity of hardware and software are assessed prior to acquisition and use | Detecting confusable names and pinning registries validates that resolved packages are the authentic internal artifacts, not public substitutes. |
Supporting Standards
- OWASP Top 10 CI/CD Security Risks — CICD-SEC-03: Dependency Chain Abuse. Dependency confusion is the canonical example of dependency chain abuse; remediation guidance aligns with this control.
- NIST SP 800-161r1 — Cybersecurity Supply Chain Risk Management Practices. Provides organizational SCRM controls (C-SCRM) into which namespace governance and registry pinning fit.
- SLSA (Supply-chain Levels for Software Artifacts). Source/build provenance requirements reduce the blast radius of a successful substitution.