- Add validated mitre_attack frontmatter to all 754 skills (286 distinct
techniques), verified against MITRE ATT&CK v19.1 via the official
mitreattack-python library: 0 revoked, deprecated, or invalid IDs
- Curate precise per-skill technique IDs for forensics, malware-analysis,
threat-intel, and red-team skills (e.g. DCSync -> T1003.006,
Kerberoasting -> T1558.003, Pass-the-Ticket -> T1550.003)
- Reconcile v19.1 tactic restructuring: Defense Evasion split into
Stealth (TA0005) and Defense Impairment (TA0112); revoked T1562.*
family and T1070.001/.002 remapped to active equivalents (T1685.*)
- Normalize word-split tags across 35 skills (remove filename-derived
stopword tags, add semantic cybersecurity tags)
- Add api-reference.md for 3 skills that were missing it
- Update README ATT&CK section with accurate v19.1 tactic distribution
Detect Kerberos Golden Ticket forgery by analyzing Windows Event ID 4769 for RC4 encryption downgrades (0x17), abnormal ticket lifetimes, and krbtgt account anomalies in Splunk and Elastic SIEM
cybersecurity
threat-detection
golden-ticket
kerberos
active-directory
mimikatz
splunk
credential-theft
windows-security
1.0
mahipal
Apache-2.0
Token Binding
Restore Access
Reissue Credential
Decoy User Credential
Authentication Cache Invalidation
DE.CM-01
DE.AE-02
DE.AE-06
ID.RA-05
T1078
T1190
T1059
T1003
T1110
Detecting Golden Ticket Forgery
Overview
A Golden Ticket attack (MITRE ATT&CK T1558.001) involves forging a Kerberos Ticket Granting Ticket (TGT) using the krbtgt account NTLM hash, granting unrestricted access to any service in the Active Directory domain. This skill detects Golden Ticket usage by analyzing Event ID 4769 for RC4 encryption type (0x17) in environments enforcing AES, identifying tickets with abnormal lifetimes exceeding domain policy, correlating TGS requests with missing corresponding TGT requests (Event ID 4768), and detecting krbtgt password age anomalies.
When to Use
When investigating security incidents that require detecting golden ticket forgery
When building detection rules or threat hunting queries for this domain
When SOC analysts need structured procedures for this analysis type
When validating security monitoring coverage for related attack techniques
Prerequisites
Windows Domain Controller with Kerberos audit logging enabled
Splunk or Elastic SIEM ingesting Windows Security event logs
Python 3.8+ for offline event log analysis
Knowledge of domain Kerberos encryption policy (AES vs RC4)
Steps
Audit domain Kerberos encryption policy to establish AES-only baseline
Forward Event IDs 4768 and 4769 to SIEM platform
Detect RC4 (0x17) encryption in TGS requests where AES is enforced
Identify TGS requests without corresponding TGT requests (forged ticket indicator)
Alert on ticket lifetimes exceeding MaxTicketAge domain policy
Monitor krbtgt account password age and last reset date
Correlate findings with host/user context for risk scoring
Expected Output
JSON report with Golden Ticket indicators including RC4 downgrades, orphaned TGS requests, abnormal ticket lifetimes, and risk-scored alerts with MITRE ATT&CK technique mapping.
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