Files
Anthropic-Cybersecurity-Skills/skills/escaping-containers-to-host/references/api-reference.md
T
mukul975 8cae0648ec Add 55 new skills across 3 new domains + 6 undercovered areas (762 -> 817)
Demand-driven expansion targeting the fastest-growing 2025-2026 threat and
skills categories (ISC2/WEF/CrowdStrike/Mandiant signals):

- AI Security (NEW domain, 12 skills): LLM red-teaming with garak/PyRIT,
  prompt injection (direct/indirect/RAG), MCP tool-poisoning, agentic tool
  invocation, guardrails, model/data poisoning, system-prompt leakage,
  embedding/vector weaknesses, model extraction, continuous red-teaming
- Supply Chain Security (NEW domain, 5 skills): SBOMs, dependency confusion,
  malicious-npm triage, typosquatting, SLSA/Sigstore provenance
- Hardware & Firmware Security (NEW domain, 4 skills): CHIPSEC/UEFI audit,
  Secure Boot bypass, TPM measured-boot attestation, ESP bootkit hunting
- Identity (10): Entra ID/ROADtools, GraphRunner, AADInternals, ADCS/Certipy,
  shadow credentials, coercion, BloodHound CE, device-code phishing, SSO abuse
- Cloud-native (8): Stratus, Pacu, CloudFox, container escape, K8s RBAC,
  Falco, Trivy, kube-bench
- Offensive C2 (6): Sliver, Havoc, NetExec, DPAPI, NTLM relay ESC8, redirectors
- DFIR (6): Hayabusa, Chainsaw, KAPE, Velociraptor, EZ Tools, Plaso
- Backfill (4): OpenCTI, MISP, honeytokens, post-quantum crypto migration

Each skill follows the repo taxonomy (SKILL.md + references/{standards,api-reference}.md
+ scripts/agent.py + LICENSE), with researched real tool commands (no placeholders),
complete frontmatter, and ATT&CK/ATLAS + NIST CSF mappings. Updates README domain
table, skill count, and index.json.
2026-06-22 19:08:16 +02:00

2.5 KiB

Container Escape — Command & API Reference

Enumeration Commands

Command Purpose
amicontained Print capabilities, namespaces, seccomp mode, AppArmor profile
grep CapEff /proc/self/status Read effective capability bitmask
capsh --decode=<hex> Decode capability bitmask to names
mount / findmnt List mounts; spot docker.sock, hostPath, /host
ls -la /var/run/docker.sock Detect mounted Docker socket
ls -la /proc/1/root Detect shared host PID namespace
./deepce.sh Automated Docker enumeration + escape checks
./cdk evaluate CDK automated container/K8s posture eval

Docker Daemon REST API (via /var/run/docker.sock)

Endpoint Method Purpose
/version GET Confirm daemon reachability/version
/containers/create?name=<n> POST Create container (set Binds, Privileged)
/containers/<id>/start POST Start the created container
/images/create?fromImage=alpine POST Pull a base image
/containers/<id>/logs?stdout=1 GET Read command output

Create-container JSON keys of interest: Image, Cmd, Binds (["/:/host"]), Privileged (true), HostConfig.PidMode (host), HostConfig.NetworkMode (host).

runC / Runtime Version Checks

Command Vulnerable Range Patched
runc --version 1.0.0-rc93 .. 1.1.11 (CVE-2024-21626) >= 1.1.12
runc --version <= 1.2.7 / 1.3.2 / 1.4.0-rc.2 (2025 CVEs) 1.2.8 / 1.3.3 / 1.4.0-rc.3
docker version --format '{{.Server.Version}}' < 25.0.2 >= 25.0.2
containerd --version < 1.6.28 / 1.7.13 >= 1.6.28 / 1.7.13

Key Privileged-Escape Primitives

File / Path Use
/sys/fs/cgroup/.../release_agent Host command execution on cgroup empty (needs CAP_SYS_ADMIN)
/proc/self/fd/7, /proc/self/fd/8 Leaked host-cwd fd for CVE-2024-21626
/proc/sys/kernel/core_pattern `
/proc/sysrq-trigger Host kernel actions (DoS proof for 2025 CVEs)
/etc/kubernetes/manifests/ Drop a static pod manifest kubelet auto-runs

External References