mirror of
https://github.com/mukul975/Anthropic-Cybersecurity-Skills.git
synced 2026-07-25 22:00:58 +03:00
mukul975
8cae0648ec
Demand-driven expansion targeting the fastest-growing 2025-2026 threat and
skills categories (ISC2/WEF/CrowdStrike/Mandiant signals):
- AI Security (NEW domain, 12 skills): LLM red-teaming with garak/PyRIT,
prompt injection (direct/indirect/RAG), MCP tool-poisoning, agentic tool
invocation, guardrails, model/data poisoning, system-prompt leakage,
embedding/vector weaknesses, model extraction, continuous red-teaming
- Supply Chain Security (NEW domain, 5 skills): SBOMs, dependency confusion,
malicious-npm triage, typosquatting, SLSA/Sigstore provenance
- Hardware & Firmware Security (NEW domain, 4 skills): CHIPSEC/UEFI audit,
Secure Boot bypass, TPM measured-boot attestation, ESP bootkit hunting
- Identity (10): Entra ID/ROADtools, GraphRunner, AADInternals, ADCS/Certipy,
shadow credentials, coercion, BloodHound CE, device-code phishing, SSO abuse
- Cloud-native (8): Stratus, Pacu, CloudFox, container escape, K8s RBAC,
Falco, Trivy, kube-bench
- Offensive C2 (6): Sliver, Havoc, NetExec, DPAPI, NTLM relay ESC8, redirectors
- DFIR (6): Hayabusa, Chainsaw, KAPE, Velociraptor, EZ Tools, Plaso
- Backfill (4): OpenCTI, MISP, honeytokens, post-quantum crypto migration
Each skill follows the repo taxonomy (SKILL.md + references/{standards,api-reference}.md
+ scripts/agent.py + LICENSE), with researched real tool commands (no placeholders),
complete frontmatter, and ATT&CK/ATLAS + NIST CSF mappings. Updates README domain
table, skill count, and index.json.
1.4 KiB
1.4 KiB
Standards Mapping — Hunting Bootkits in the EFI System Partition
MITRE ATT&CK
| ID | Name | Rationale |
|---|---|---|
| T1542.003 | Pre-OS Boot: Bootkit | Adversaries install malicious boot loaders on the ESP to execute before the OS and security tooling; this skill hunts and validates those ESP boot artifacts. |
NIST Cybersecurity Framework (CSF 2.0)
| ID | Name | Rationale |
|---|---|---|
| DE.CM-01 | Networks and network services are monitored to find potentially adverse events (extended here to host boot-chain integrity monitoring) | Continuous baselining and integrity monitoring of ESP boot binaries detects out-of-band bootkit persistence. |
Supporting References
- Eclypsium — "Enhanced Threat Detection: Bootloaders, Bootkits, and Secure Boot": https://eclypsium.com/blog/threat-detection-bootloaders-bootkits-secureboot/
- Eclypsium — "Bootkitty and Linux Bootkits": https://eclypsium.com/blog/bootkitty-linux-bootkit/
- ESET — "UEFI threats moving to the ESP: Introducing ESPecter bootkit": https://www.welivesecurity.com/2021/10/05/uefi-threats-moving-esp-introducing-especter-bootkit/
- Rapid7 — "How To Hunt For UEFI Malware Using Velociraptor": https://www.rapid7.com/blog/post/2024/02/29/how-to-hunt-for-uefi-malware-using-velociraptor/
- NSA — "UEFI Secure Boot Customization" guidance
- UEFI Specification — EFI System Partition layout (
\EFI\directory structure)