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mukul975
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Demand-driven expansion targeting the fastest-growing 2025-2026 threat and
skills categories (ISC2/WEF/CrowdStrike/Mandiant signals):
- AI Security (NEW domain, 12 skills): LLM red-teaming with garak/PyRIT,
prompt injection (direct/indirect/RAG), MCP tool-poisoning, agentic tool
invocation, guardrails, model/data poisoning, system-prompt leakage,
embedding/vector weaknesses, model extraction, continuous red-teaming
- Supply Chain Security (NEW domain, 5 skills): SBOMs, dependency confusion,
malicious-npm triage, typosquatting, SLSA/Sigstore provenance
- Hardware & Firmware Security (NEW domain, 4 skills): CHIPSEC/UEFI audit,
Secure Boot bypass, TPM measured-boot attestation, ESP bootkit hunting
- Identity (10): Entra ID/ROADtools, GraphRunner, AADInternals, ADCS/Certipy,
shadow credentials, coercion, BloodHound CE, device-code phishing, SSO abuse
- Cloud-native (8): Stratus, Pacu, CloudFox, container escape, K8s RBAC,
Falco, Trivy, kube-bench
- Offensive C2 (6): Sliver, Havoc, NetExec, DPAPI, NTLM relay ESC8, redirectors
- DFIR (6): Hayabusa, Chainsaw, KAPE, Velociraptor, EZ Tools, Plaso
- Backfill (4): OpenCTI, MISP, honeytokens, post-quantum crypto migration
Each skill follows the repo taxonomy (SKILL.md + references/{standards,api-reference}.md
+ scripts/agent.py + LICENSE), with researched real tool commands (no placeholders),
complete frontmatter, and ATT&CK/ATLAS + NIST CSF mappings. Updates README domain
table, skill count, and index.json.
1.6 KiB
1.6 KiB
Standards and Framework Mapping
NIST Cybersecurity Framework 2.0
| ID | Name | Rationale |
|---|---|---|
| PR.AA-05 | Access permissions, entitlements, and authorizations are defined in a policy, managed, enforced, and reviewed, incorporating least privilege and separation of duties | GraphRunner abuses over-broad Graph permissions, updatable groups, and OAuth consent; the engagement validates whether PR.AA-05 least-privilege controls actually constrain a token holder. |
MITRE ATT&CK (Enterprise)
| ID | Name | Rationale |
|---|---|---|
| T1098 | Account Manipulation | Adding group members, cloning groups, inviting guests to retain/escalate access. |
| T1098.003 | Account Manipulation: Additional Cloud Roles | Adding members to privileged/updatable groups. |
| T1528 | Steal Application Access Token | Get-GraphTokens device-code token acquisition. |
| T1087.004 | Account Discovery: Cloud Account | Get-AzureADUsers, Invoke-SearchUserAttributes. |
| T1114.002 | Email Collection: Remote Email Collection | Invoke-SearchMailbox via Graph. |
| T1606.002 | Forge Web Credentials: SAML/OAuth | Invoke-InjectOAuthApp consent-grant persistence. |
| T1564.008 | Hide Artifacts: Email Hiding Rules | Invoke-CreateInboxForwardingRule. |
Detection cross-reference
GraphRunner activity surfaces in MicrosoftGraphActivityLogs and AADGraphActivityLogs; OAuth app injection appears in audit logs as "Add service principal" / "Consent to application"; group manipulation appears as "Add member to group". These map to NIST DE.CM-09 (computing hardware/software/runtime monitoring) for the defensive counterpart.