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All 33 container-security skills now carry what it does, an explicit "Use when" trigger, keywords, and a negative trigger naming the nearest neighbour. Six collision clusters resolved by differentiating scope rather than merging, so no skill is removed: - kube-bench: running the tool vs interpreting findings into an audit - Calico: portable upstream NetworkPolicy vs Calico-as-CNI vs Calico-only CRDs (GlobalNetworkPolicy, HostEndpoint, DNS egress) - Falco: deploying and operating it vs authoring escape rules - container escape: tool-agnostic runtime signals vs Falco rule syntax vs static posture audit vs offensive breakout - Trivy: all-target platform and operator vs single-image scan - Docker: images and Dockerfiles vs daemon.json vs the CIS audit script Also replaces the templated "When to Use" boilerplate in these files, including bullets that only restated the skill's own name. Worst pair (Pod Security Standards vs Pod Security Admission) drops from 0.77 cosine to below the 0.45 threshold. Repo-wide: colliding pairs 60 -> 56, skills involved 105 -> 94.
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name, description, domain, subdomain, tags, version, author, license, nist_csf, mitre_attack
| name | description | domain | subdomain | tags | version | author | license | nist_csf | mitre_attack | |||||||||||||||
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| securing-container-registry-with-harbor | Configures the security features of the Harbor open-source container registry - integrated Trivy scanning, Cosign and Notary content trust policies, project-level RBAC, immutable tag and retention rules, and OIDC authentication - to enforce provenance and block deployment of vulnerable images. Use when deploying or hardening Harbor, or when compliance requires that only signed and scanned images can be pulled. Keywords: Harbor, project policy, content trust, immutable tag, retention, robot account, OIDC, replication. Do not use for signing images with Cosign outside a registry - use implementing-image-provenance-verification-with-cosign. | cybersecurity | container-security |
|
1.0 | mahipal | Apache-2.0 |
|
|
Securing Container Registry with Harbor
Overview
Harbor is an open-source container registry that provides security features including vulnerability scanning (integrated Trivy), image signing (Notary/Cosign), RBAC, content trust policies, replication, and audit logging. Securing Harbor involves configuring these features to enforce image provenance, prevent vulnerable image deployment, and maintain registry access control.
When to Use
- When deploying or configuring securing container registry with harbor capabilities in your environment
- When establishing security controls aligned to compliance requirements
- When building or improving security architecture for this domain
- When conducting security assessments that require this implementation
Prerequisites
- Harbor 2.10+ installed (Helm or Docker Compose)
- TLS certificates for HTTPS
- Trivy scanner integration
- OIDC/LDAP for authentication
- Kubernetes cluster (for deployment target)
Workflow
Step 1: Install Harbor with Security Configuration
# harbor-values.yaml for Helm deployment
expose:
type: ingress
tls:
enabled: true
certSource: secret
secret:
secretName: harbor-tls
notarySecretName: harbor-tls
ingress:
hosts:
core: harbor.example.com
notary: notary.example.com
externalURL: https://harbor.example.com
persistence:
enabled: true
resourcePolicy: "keep"
harborAdminPassword: "<strong-password>"
trivy:
enabled: true
gitHubToken: "<github-token>"
severity: "CRITICAL,HIGH,MEDIUM"
autoScan: true
notary:
enabled: true
core:
secretKey: "<32-char-secret>"
database:
type: external
external:
host: postgres.example.com
port: "5432"
username: harbor
password: "<db-password>"
sslmode: require
helm repo add harbor https://helm.getharbor.io
helm install harbor harbor/harbor -f harbor-values.yaml -n harbor --create-namespace
Step 2: Configure Vulnerability Scanning Policies
# Enable auto-scan on push (via Harbor API)
curl -k -X PUT "https://harbor.example.com/api/v2.0/projects/myproject" \
-H "Authorization: Basic $(echo -n admin:Harbor12345 | base64)" \
-H "Content-Type: application/json" \
-d '{
"metadata": {
"auto_scan": "true",
"severity": "critical",
"prevent_vul": "true",
"reuse_sys_cve_allowlist": "true"
}
}'
Step 3: Configure Content Trust
# Enable content trust at project level
curl -k -X PUT "https://harbor.example.com/api/v2.0/projects/myproject" \
-H "Authorization: Basic $(echo -n admin:Harbor12345 | base64)" \
-H "Content-Type: application/json" \
-d '{
"metadata": {
"enable_content_trust": "true",
"enable_content_trust_cosign": "true"
}
}'
# Sign image with Cosign
cosign sign --key cosign.key harbor.example.com/myproject/myapp:v1.0.0
# Verify signature
cosign verify --key cosign.pub harbor.example.com/myproject/myapp:v1.0.0
Step 4: Configure RBAC and Project Isolation
# Create project with private visibility
curl -k -X POST "https://harbor.example.com/api/v2.0/projects" \
-H "Authorization: Basic $(echo -n admin:Harbor12345 | base64)" \
-H "Content-Type: application/json" \
-d '{
"project_name": "production",
"metadata": {
"public": "false",
"auto_scan": "true",
"prevent_vul": "true",
"severity": "high"
}
}'
# Harbor roles: ProjectAdmin, Maintainer, Developer, Guest, LimitedGuest
# Add member with specific role
curl -k -X POST "https://harbor.example.com/api/v2.0/projects/production/members" \
-H "Authorization: Basic $(echo -n admin:Harbor12345 | base64)" \
-H "Content-Type: application/json" \
-d '{
"role_id": 3,
"member_user": {"username": "developer1"}
}'
Step 5: Configure Immutable Tags and Retention
# Create tag immutability rule (prevent overwriting release tags)
curl -k -X POST "https://harbor.example.com/api/v2.0/projects/production/immutabletagrules" \
-H "Authorization: Basic $(echo -n admin:Harbor12345 | base64)" \
-H "Content-Type: application/json" \
-d '{
"tag_filter": "v*",
"scope_selectors": {
"repository": [{"kind": "doublestar", "decoration": "repoMatches", "pattern": "**"}]
}
}'
# Configure retention policy (keep last 10 tags, delete untagged after 7 days)
curl -k -X POST "https://harbor.example.com/api/v2.0/retentions" \
-H "Authorization: Basic $(echo -n admin:Harbor12345 | base64)" \
-H "Content-Type: application/json" \
-d '{
"algorithm": "or",
"rules": [
{
"action": "retain",
"template": "latestPushedK",
"params": {"latestPushedK": 10},
"tag_selectors": [{"kind": "doublestar", "decoration": "matches", "pattern": "**"}],
"scope_selectors": {"repository": [{"kind": "doublestar", "decoration": "repoMatches", "pattern": "**"}]}
}
],
"trigger": {"kind": "Schedule", "settings": {"cron": "0 0 * * *"}}
}'
Step 6: OIDC Authentication Integration
# Harbor configuration for OIDC
auth_mode: oidc_auth
oidc_name: "Okta"
oidc_endpoint: "https://company.okta.com/oauth2/default"
oidc_client_id: "harbor-client-id"
oidc_client_secret: "harbor-client-secret"
oidc_groups_claim: "groups"
oidc_admin_group: "harbor-admins"
oidc_scope: "openid,profile,email,groups"
oidc_verify_cert: true
oidc_auto_onboard: true
Validation Commands
# Test vulnerability prevention (should block pull of vulnerable image)
docker pull harbor.example.com/production/vulnerable-app:latest
# Expected: Error - image blocked due to vulnerabilities
# Verify content trust enforcement
DOCKER_CONTENT_TRUST=0 docker push harbor.example.com/production/unsigned:latest
# Expected: Push rejected due to content trust policy
# Check scan results via API
curl -k "https://harbor.example.com/api/v2.0/projects/production/repositories/myapp/artifacts/v1.0.0/additions/vulnerabilities" \
-H "Authorization: Basic $(echo -n admin:Harbor12345 | base64)"
# Audit log check
curl -k "https://harbor.example.com/api/v2.0/audit-logs?page=1&page_size=10" \
-H "Authorization: Basic $(echo -n admin:Harbor12345 | base64)"