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Standards and References - DCSync Attack Detection

MITRE ATT&CK Credential Access (TA0006)

Technique Name Relevance
T1003.006 OS Credential Dumping: DCSync Primary technique
T1003.001 LSASS Memory Often combined with DCSync for complete credential theft
T1003.003 NTDS Alternative to DCSync using ntdsutil or volume shadow copy
T1078.002 Valid Accounts: Domain Accounts Using dumped credentials
T1558.001 Steal or Forge Kerberos Tickets: Golden Ticket Primary goal of KRBTGT hash extraction
T1222.001 File and Directory Permissions Modification Granting replication rights

Critical Replication GUIDs

GUID Permission Name Risk
1131f6aa-9c07-11d1-f79f-00c04fc2dcd2 DS-Replication-Get-Changes Required for DCSync
1131f6ad-9c07-11d1-f79f-00c04fc2dcd2 DS-Replication-Get-Changes-All Includes confidential attributes (passwords)
89e95b76-444d-4c62-991a-0facbeda640c DS-Replication-Get-Changes-In-Filtered-Set Partial replication rights

Windows Event IDs for DCSync Detection

Event ID Source Description
4662 Security Directory Service Object Access (primary detection)
4624 Security Successful logon (correlate source of replication)
4672 Security Special privileges assigned (admin logon)
4738 Security User account changed (permission grants)
5136 Security Directory Service Object modified (ACL changes)

Known Threat Actors Using DCSync

Actor Context
APT29 (Cozy Bear) Used DCSync in SolarWinds campaign
FIN6 DCSync for credential harvesting in retail/hospitality
Wizard Spider TrickBot/Conti ransomware using DCSync pre-encryption
APT28 (Fancy Bear) DCSync in government network intrusions
LAPSUS$ DCSync after AD compromise for data theft

Legitimate Replication Sources

Source Reason How to Distinguish
Domain Controllers Normal AD replication Computer account ends with $
Azure AD Connect Hybrid identity sync MSOL_ service account
Backup Software AD backup operations Documented service accounts
Migration Tools Cross-forest migrations Temporary, documented operations