Each rewritten description now states both what the skill does (concrete
capability, named tools/artifacts) and an explicit when-to-use trigger,
improving agent discovery/activation. Grounded in each skill's own body;
changes confined to the `description` field only (bodies and all other
frontmatter untouched). Produced by a gated audit->rewrite->recheck loop
(548 -> 0 flagged) with a sampled anti-invention check (0 ungrounded).
Schema: 817/817 pass. Framework-ID gate: 0 defects.
Detect Kerberos Golden Ticket forgery (e.g. Mimikatz-forged tickets) by analyzing Windows Event ID 4769 for RC4 encryption downgrades (0x17), abnormal ticket lifetimes, and krbtgt account anomalies using Splunk and Elastic SIEM queries. Use when investigating suspected forged Kerberos tickets or krbtgt credential theft in Active Directory.
cybersecurity
threat-detection
golden-ticket
kerberos
active-directory
mimikatz
splunk
credential-theft
windows-security
1.0
mahipal
Apache-2.0
Token Binding
Restore Access
Reissue Credential
Decoy User Credential
Authentication Cache Invalidation
DE.CM-01
DE.AE-02
DE.AE-06
ID.RA-05
T1078
T1190
T1059
T1003
T1110
Detecting Golden Ticket Forgery
Overview
A Golden Ticket attack (MITRE ATT&CK T1558.001) involves forging a Kerberos Ticket Granting Ticket (TGT) using the krbtgt account NTLM hash, granting unrestricted access to any service in the Active Directory domain. This skill detects Golden Ticket usage by analyzing Event ID 4769 for RC4 encryption type (0x17) in environments enforcing AES, identifying tickets with abnormal lifetimes exceeding domain policy, correlating TGS requests with missing corresponding TGT requests (Event ID 4768), and detecting krbtgt password age anomalies.
When to Use
When investigating security incidents that require detecting golden ticket forgery
When building detection rules or threat hunting queries for this domain
When SOC analysts need structured procedures for this analysis type
When validating security monitoring coverage for related attack techniques
Prerequisites
Windows Domain Controller with Kerberos audit logging enabled
Splunk or Elastic SIEM ingesting Windows Security event logs
Python 3.8+ for offline event log analysis
Knowledge of domain Kerberos encryption policy (AES vs RC4)
Steps
Audit domain Kerberos encryption policy to establish AES-only baseline
Forward Event IDs 4768 and 4769 to SIEM platform
Detect RC4 (0x17) encryption in TGS requests where AES is enforced
Identify TGS requests without corresponding TGT requests (forged ticket indicator)
Alert on ticket lifetimes exceeding MaxTicketAge domain policy
Monitor krbtgt account password age and last reset date
Correlate findings with host/user context for risk scoring
Expected Output
JSON report with Golden Ticket indicators including RC4 downgrades, orphaned TGS requests, abnormal ticket lifetimes, and risk-scored alerts with MITRE ATT&CK technique mapping.
Mahipal
2fb6a9faff