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mukul975
efca3ec611
Mapped every skill to NIST CSF 2.0 subcategory IDs (GV/ID/PR/DE/RS/RC functions) based on subdomain and content analysis. Restores 11 skills corrupted during prior rebase, re-enriching with ATLAS, D3FEND, NIST AI RMF, and CSF 2.0 fields. All 754 skills now carry structured mappings for all 5 security frameworks: - MITRE ATT&CK (in tags) - MITRE ATLAS v5.5 (atlas_techniques) - MITRE D3FEND v1.3 (d3fend_techniques) - NIST AI RMF 1.0 (nist_ai_rmf) - NIST CSF 2.0 (nist_csf)
3.3 KiB
3.3 KiB
name, description, domain, subdomain, tags, version, author, license, d3fend_techniques, nist_csf
| name | description | domain | subdomain | tags | version | author | license | d3fend_techniques | nist_csf | ||||||||||||||||
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| detecting-suspicious-powershell-execution | Detect suspicious PowerShell execution patterns including encoded commands, download cradles, AMSI bypass attempts, and constrained language mode evasion. | cybersecurity | threat-hunting |
|
1.0 | mahipal | Apache-2.0 |
|
|
Detecting Suspicious Powershell Execution
When to Use
- When proactively hunting for indicators of detecting suspicious powershell execution in the environment
- After threat intelligence indicates active campaigns using these techniques
- During incident response to scope compromise related to these techniques
- When EDR or SIEM alerts trigger on related indicators
- During periodic security assessments and purple team exercises
Prerequisites
- EDR platform with process and network telemetry (CrowdStrike, MDE, SentinelOne)
- SIEM with relevant log data ingested (Splunk, Elastic, Sentinel)
- Sysmon deployed with comprehensive configuration
- Windows Security Event Log forwarding enabled
- Threat intelligence feeds for IOC correlation
Workflow
- Formulate Hypothesis: Define a testable hypothesis based on threat intelligence or ATT&CK gap analysis.
- Identify Data Sources: Determine which logs and telemetry are needed to validate or refute the hypothesis.
- Execute Queries: Run detection queries against SIEM and EDR platforms to collect relevant events.
- Analyze Results: Examine query results for anomalies, correlating across multiple data sources.
- Validate Findings: Distinguish true positives from false positives through contextual analysis.
- Correlate Activity: Link findings to broader attack chains and threat actor TTPs.
- Document and Report: Record findings, update detection rules, and recommend response actions.
Key Concepts
| Concept | Description |
|---|---|
| T1059.001 | PowerShell |
| T1059.003 | Windows Command Shell |
| T1562.001 | Disable or Modify Tools |
Tools & Systems
| Tool | Purpose |
|---|---|
| CrowdStrike Falcon | EDR telemetry and threat detection |
| Microsoft Defender for Endpoint | Advanced hunting with KQL |
| Splunk Enterprise | SIEM log analysis with SPL queries |
| Elastic Security | Detection rules and investigation timeline |
| Sysmon | Detailed Windows event monitoring |
| Velociraptor | Endpoint artifact collection and hunting |
| Sigma Rules | Cross-platform detection rule format |
Common Scenarios
- Scenario 1: Base64 encoded PowerShell command launched by macro document
- Scenario 2: IEX download cradle fetching payload from C2 server
- Scenario 3: AMSI bypass via reflection patching before payload execution
- Scenario 4: PowerShell Empire agent communicating with C2
Output Format
Hunt ID: TH-DETECT-[DATE]-[SEQ]
Technique: T1059.001
Host: [Hostname]
User: [Account context]
Evidence: [Log entries, process trees, network data]
Risk Level: [Critical/High/Medium/Low]
Confidence: [High/Medium/Low]
Recommended Action: [Containment, investigation, monitoring]