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Anthropic-Cybersecurity-Skills/skills/conducting-full-scope-red-team-engagement/assets/template.md
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Red Team Engagement Report Template

Document Control

Field Value
Engagement ID RT-2025-XXX
Client Name [Organization Name]
Report Date YYYY-MM-DD
Classification CONFIDENTIAL
Report Version 1.0
Lead Operator [Name]
Reviewed By [Name]

1. Executive Summary

1.1 Engagement Overview

[Organization Name] engaged [Red Team Company] to conduct a full-scope red team assessment from [start date] to [end date]. The engagement simulated the tactics, techniques, and procedures (TTPs) of [Threat Actor], targeting [objectives].

1.2 Key Findings Summary

# Finding Severity Detected
1 [Finding Title] Critical No
2 [Finding Title] High Yes
3 [Finding Title] High No
4 [Finding Title] Medium Yes

1.3 Overall Risk Rating

[CRITICAL / HIGH / MEDIUM / LOW]

The red team achieved [X of Y] defined objectives, with [Z]% of activities detected by the security operations center. Critical gaps were identified in [area 1], [area 2], and [area 3].

1.4 Metrics at a Glance

Metric Value
Total TTPs Executed XX
Detection Rate XX%
Mean Time to Detect XX hours
Objectives Achieved X/Y
Dwell Time (Undetected) XX days
Unique Hosts Compromised XX
Credentials Harvested XX

2. Scope and Rules of Engagement

2.1 Engagement Scope

In-Scope:

  • Network ranges: [CIDR ranges]
  • Domains: [domains]
  • Physical locations: [if applicable]
  • Personnel: [if social engineering in scope]

Out-of-Scope:

  • [Systems/networks excluded]
  • [Actions prohibited]

2.2 Rules of Engagement

  • Authorization document reference: [RoE document ID]
  • Approved hours of operation: [hours]
  • Emergency contact: [name, phone]
  • Deconfliction process: [description]

2.3 Threat Profile

Emulated Adversary: [Threat Actor Name]

  • MITRE ATT&CK Group: [Group ID]
  • Known Targets: [industries/regions]
  • Typical TTPs: [summary of techniques]

3. Attack Narrative

3.1 Engagement Timeline

Day 1-5:   Reconnaissance and OSINT
Day 6-8:   Infrastructure setup and payload development
Day 9-12:  Initial access attempts
Day 13-20: Post-exploitation, lateral movement, persistence
Day 21-25: Objective pursuit and data exfiltration
Day 26-28: Cleanup and evidence collection

3.2 Phase 1: Reconnaissance

Objective: Identify attack surface and high-value targets

Action Technique Result
Subdomain enumeration T1593 Found XX subdomains
Employee enumeration T1589.002 Identified XX employees
Credential search T1589.001 Found XX breached credentials

Key Discoveries:

  • [Discovery 1 with evidence]
  • [Discovery 2 with evidence]

3.3 Phase 2: Initial Access

Objective: Establish initial foothold on target network

Vector Used: [T1566.001 Spearphishing / T1190 Exploit / etc.]

Detailed Walkthrough:

  1. [Step 1 with screenshot reference]
  2. [Step 2 with screenshot reference]
  3. [Step 3 with screenshot reference]

Detection Status: [Detected/Undetected] by [source] at [time]

3.4 Phase 3: Post-Exploitation

Objective: Escalate privileges and establish persistence

Action Technique Host Result Detected
Credential dump T1003.001 WS-XXX Obtained X creds Yes/No
Kerberoasting T1558.003 DC01 Cracked X SPNs Yes/No
Scheduled task T1053.005 WS-XXX Persistence set Yes/No

3.5 Phase 4: Lateral Movement

Objective: Move toward crown jewel systems

Attack Path:

Initial Foothold (WS-042)
    └── Credential Reuse (T1078)
        └── File Server (FS01) via PsExec (T1021.002)
            └── Database Server (DB01) via RDP (T1021.001)
                └── Domain Controller (DC01) via DCSync (T1003.006)

3.6 Phase 5: Objective Achievement

Objective Status Evidence
Domain Admin Access Achieved DCSync of krbtgt hash
PII Data Exfiltration Achieved 50MB exfiled over C2
SCADA Network Access Not Achieved Network segmentation prevented access

4. MITRE ATT&CK Mapping

4.1 Technique Heat Map

[Insert ATT&CK Navigator layer screenshot]

Navigator JSON file: engagement_navigator.json

4.2 Techniques Used

Technique ID Technique Name Tactic Used Detected
T1566.001 Spearphishing Attachment Initial Access Yes Yes
T1059.001 PowerShell Execution Yes No
T1003.001 LSASS Memory Credential Access Yes Yes
T1558.003 Kerberoasting Credential Access Yes No
T1021.002 SMB Admin Shares Lateral Movement Yes No
T1003.006 DCSync Credential Access Yes Yes
T1041 Exfil Over C2 Channel Exfiltration Yes No

5. Findings

Finding 1: [Title]

Field Value
Severity Critical
CVSS Score 9.8
Affected Systems [list]
MITRE ATT&CK [technique ID]

Description: [Detailed description of the vulnerability or gap]

Evidence: [Screenshots, logs, proof of exploitation]

Impact: [Business impact assessment]

Recommendation: [Specific remediation steps]


6. Detection Gap Analysis

6.1 Summary

Category Count Percentage
Actions Detected X XX%
Actions Undetected X XX%
Techniques with Zero Coverage X -

6.2 Gaps by Tactic

Tactic Actions Detected Gap
Initial Access X X XX%
Execution X X XX%
Persistence X X XX%
Credential Access X X XX%
Lateral Movement X X XX%
Exfiltration X X XX%

6.3 Priority Detection Rules Needed

  1. [Detection Rule Name] - Detect [technique] via [data source]
  2. [Detection Rule Name] - Detect [technique] via [data source]
  3. [Detection Rule Name] - Detect [technique] via [data source]

7. Recommendations

7.1 Immediate (0-30 days)

  1. [Critical remediation action]
  2. [Critical remediation action]

7.2 Short-Term (30-90 days)

  1. [High-priority improvement]
  2. [High-priority improvement]

7.3 Long-Term (90-180 days)

  1. [Strategic improvement]
  2. [Strategic improvement]

8. Appendices

Appendix A: Tools Used

Tool Purpose Version
Havoc C2 Framework 0.7
Impacket AD Attacks 0.11.0
Rubeus Kerberos Attacks 2.3.0
BloodHound AD Reconnaissance 4.3

Appendix B: IOCs for Deconfliction

Type Value Context
IP X.X.X.X C2 Server
Domain c2.example.com C2 Domain
Hash [SHA256] Payload
User-Agent [string] C2 Callback

Appendix C: Cleanup Confirmation

  • All implants removed
  • All persistence mechanisms removed
  • All created accounts deleted
  • All modified configurations restored
  • Infrastructure decommissioned