Add 5 new cybersecurity skills batch 2 - oauth token theft, binary exploitation, STIX2 sharing, linux audit logs, timestomping detection

2026-06-10 21:24:56 +03:00 · 2026-03-11 00:48:08 +01:00
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+MIT License
+
+Copyright (c) 2025 Mahipal
+
+Permission is hereby granted, free of charge, to any person obtaining a copy
+of this software and associated documentation files (the "Software"), to deal
+in the Software without restriction, including without limitation the rights
+to use, copy, modify, merge, publish, distribute, sublicense, and/or sell
+copies of the Software, and to permit persons to whom the Software is
+furnished to do so, subject to the following conditions:
+
+The above copyright notice and this permission notice shall be included in all
+copies or substantial portions of the Software.
+
+THE SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED "AS IS", WITHOUT WARRANTY OF ANY KIND, EXPRESS OR
+IMPLIED, INCLUDING BUT NOT LIMITED TO THE WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY,
+FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE AND NONINFRINGEMENT. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE
+AUTHORS OR COPYRIGHT HOLDERS BE LIABLE FOR ANY CLAIM, DAMAGES OR OTHER
+LIABILITY, WHETHER IN AN ACTION OF CONTRACT, TORT OR OTHERWISE, ARISING FROM,
+OUT OF OR IN CONNECTION WITH THE SOFTWARE OR THE USE OR OTHER DEALINGS IN THE
+SOFTWARE.
@@ -0,0 +1,18 @@
+---
+name: analyzing-linux-audit-logs-for-intrusion
+description: >
+  Parse and analyze Linux auditd logs to detect intrusion indicators
+  including unauthorized file access, privilege escalation, syscall
+  anomalies, and suspicious process execution using ausearch and Python.
+domain: cybersecurity
+subdomain: log-analysis
+tags: [auditd, linux-forensics, syscall-monitoring, intrusion-detection]
+version: "1.0"
+author: mahipal
+license: Apache-2.0
+---
+
+# Analyzing Linux Audit Logs for Intrusion
+
+Parse auditd logs to detect file access violations, privilege escalation,
+suspicious syscalls, and unauthorized process execution.
@@ -0,0 +1,89 @@
+# API Reference: Analyzing Linux Audit Logs for Intrusion
+
+## Audit Log Location
+```
+/var/log/audit/audit.log
+```
+
+## ausearch CLI
+```bash
+# Search by key
+ausearch -k file_access
+
+# Search by message type
+ausearch -m EXECVE
+
+# Failed events only
+ausearch --success no
+
+# By user
+ausearch -ua 1000
+
+# CSV output for Python processing
+ausearch --format csv > audit_events.csv
+
+# By time range
+ausearch --start today --end now
+ausearch --start 01/15/2025 00:00:00 --end 01/16/2025 00:00:00
+```
+
+## aureport CLI
+```bash
+# Summary report
+aureport --summary
+
+# Authentication report
+aureport -au
+
+# Failed events
+aureport --failed
+
+# Executable report
+aureport -x
+
+# File access report
+aureport -f
+
+# Anomaly report
+aureport --anomaly
+```
+
+## Audit Rules (auditctl)
+```bash
+# Monitor sensitive files
+auditctl -w /etc/passwd -p rwxa -k passwd_access
+auditctl -w /etc/shadow -p rwxa -k shadow_access
+auditctl -w /etc/sudoers -p rwxa -k sudoers_access
+
+# Monitor privilege escalation
+auditctl -a always,exit -F arch=b64 -S execve -F euid=0 -F uid!=0 -k priv_esc
+
+# Monitor module loading
+auditctl -a always,exit -F arch=b64 -S init_module -S finit_module -k modules
+
+# Monitor network connections
+auditctl -a always,exit -F arch=b64 -S connect -k network_connect
+```
+
+## Audit Log Fields
+| Field | Description |
+|-------|------------|
+| type | Event type (SYSCALL, PATH, EXECVE, USER_CMD) |
+| msg | audit(timestamp:event_id) |
+| syscall | System call number |
+| uid/euid | User ID / Effective UID |
+| comm | Command name |
+| exe | Executable path |
+| key | Audit rule key |
+| success | yes/no |
+| name | File path (in PATH records) |
+
+## Suspicious Syscalls
+| Syscall | Concern |
+|---------|---------|
+| execve | Program execution |
+| ptrace | Process debugging/injection |
+| init_module | Kernel rootkit loading |
+| connect | Outbound connection |
+| setuid | Privilege change |
+| open_by_handle_at | Container escape |
@@ -0,0 +1,222 @@
+#!/usr/bin/env python3
+"""Linux audit log analysis agent for intrusion detection.
+
+Parses /var/log/audit/audit.log entries to detect privilege escalation,
+unauthorized file access, suspicious syscalls, and process execution anomalies.
+"""
+
+import argparse
+import json
+import os
+import re
+import sys
+import datetime
+import collections
+import subprocess
+
+
+SUSPICIOUS_SYSCALLS = {
+    "execve": "Program execution",
+    "connect": "Network connection",
+    "bind": "Port binding",
+    "ptrace": "Process tracing/debugging",
+    "init_module": "Kernel module loading",
+    "finit_module": "Kernel module loading",
+    "delete_module": "Kernel module unloading",
+    "mount": "Filesystem mount",
+    "umount2": "Filesystem unmount",
+    "setuid": "UID change",
+    "setgid": "GID change",
+    "sethostname": "Hostname change",
+    "open_by_handle_at": "File open by handle (container escape)",
+}
+
+SENSITIVE_PATHS = [
+    "/etc/passwd", "/etc/shadow", "/etc/sudoers",
+    "/etc/ssh/sshd_config", "/root/.ssh/authorized_keys",
+    "/etc/crontab", "/var/spool/cron",
+]
+
+SUSPICIOUS_COMMANDS = [
+    "curl", "wget", "nc", "ncat", "nmap", "tcpdump",
+    "python", "perl", "ruby", "gcc", "cc", "make",
+    "useradd", "usermod", "groupadd", "visudo",
+    "iptables", "ip6tables", "nft",
+]
+
+
+def parse_audit_log(log_path, max_lines=50000):
+    """Parse raw audit.log file into structured events."""
+    events = []
+    current = {}
+    try:
+        with open(log_path, "r") as f:
+            for i, line in enumerate(f):
+                if i >= max_lines:
+                    break
+                match = re.match(
+                    r"type=(\S+)\s+msg=audit\((\d+\.\d+):(\d+)\):\s*(.*)", line
+                )
+                if not match:
+                    continue
+                event_type = match.group(1)
+                timestamp = float(match.group(2))
+                event_id = match.group(3)
+                data_str = match.group(4)
+                fields = dict(re.findall(r'(\w+)=("[^"]*"|\S+)', data_str))
+                for k, v in fields.items():
+                    fields[k] = v.strip('"')
+                event = {
+                    "type": event_type,
+                    "timestamp": datetime.datetime.fromtimestamp(timestamp).isoformat(),
+                    "event_id": event_id,
+                    **fields,
+                }
+                events.append(event)
+    except FileNotFoundError:
+        return {"error": f"Log file not found: {log_path}"}
+    return events
+
+
+def detect_privilege_escalation(events):
+    """Detect privilege escalation indicators in audit events."""
+    findings = []
+    for e in events:
+        if e.get("type") == "SYSCALL" and e.get("syscall_name") in ("setuid", "setgid", "execve"):
+            if e.get("uid") != "0" and e.get("euid") == "0":
+                findings.append({
+                    "type": "privilege_escalation",
+                    "detail": f"UID {e.get('uid')} escalated to eUID 0",
+                    "command": e.get("comm", ""),
+                    "exe": e.get("exe", ""),
+                    "timestamp": e.get("timestamp"),
+                    "severity": "CRITICAL",
+                })
+        if e.get("type") == "USER_CMD" and "sudo" in e.get("cmd", "").lower():
+            findings.append({
+                "type": "sudo_usage",
+                "user": e.get("acct", e.get("uid", "")),
+                "command": e.get("cmd", ""),
+                "timestamp": e.get("timestamp"),
+                "severity": "MEDIUM",
+            })
+    return findings
+
+
+def detect_file_access(events):
+    """Detect access to sensitive files."""
+    findings = []
+    for e in events:
+        if e.get("type") in ("PATH", "SYSCALL"):
+            path = e.get("name", e.get("exe", ""))
+            for sensitive in SENSITIVE_PATHS:
+                if sensitive in path:
+                    findings.append({
+                        "type": "sensitive_file_access",
+                        "path": path,
+                        "syscall": e.get("syscall_name", e.get("syscall", "")),
+                        "user": e.get("uid", ""),
+                        "timestamp": e.get("timestamp"),
+                        "severity": "HIGH",
+                    })
+                    break
+    return findings
+
+
+def detect_suspicious_commands(events):
+    """Detect execution of suspicious commands."""
+    findings = []
+    for e in events:
+        if e.get("type") in ("EXECVE", "SYSCALL"):
+            comm = e.get("comm", "").lower()
+            exe = e.get("exe", "").lower()
+            for cmd in SUSPICIOUS_COMMANDS:
+                if cmd in comm or cmd in exe:
+                    findings.append({
+                        "type": "suspicious_command",
+                        "command": comm,
+                        "exe": exe,
+                        "user": e.get("uid", ""),
+                        "timestamp": e.get("timestamp"),
+                        "severity": "MEDIUM",
+                    })
+                    break
+    return findings
+
+
+def run_ausearch(key=None, message_type=None, success=None):
+    """Run ausearch command and return results."""
+    cmd = ["ausearch"]
+    if key:
+        cmd.extend(["-k", key])
+    if message_type:
+        cmd.extend(["-m", message_type])
+    if success is not None:
+        cmd.extend(["--success", "yes" if success else "no"])
+    cmd.extend(["--format", "csv"])
+    try:
+        result = subprocess.run(cmd, capture_output=True, text=True, timeout=30)
+        return {"output": result.stdout[:5000], "exit_code": result.returncode}
+    except (FileNotFoundError, subprocess.TimeoutExpired) as e:
+        return {"error": str(e)}
+
+
+def generate_summary(events, findings):
+    """Generate audit log analysis summary."""
+    event_types = collections.Counter(e.get("type") for e in events)
+    finding_types = collections.Counter(f.get("type") for f in findings)
+    severity_counts = collections.Counter(f.get("severity") for f in findings)
+    return {
+        "total_events": len(events),
+        "event_types": dict(event_types.most_common(10)),
+        "total_findings": len(findings),
+        "finding_types": dict(finding_types),
+        "by_severity": dict(severity_counts),
+    }
+
+
+def main():
+    parser = argparse.ArgumentParser(description="Linux audit log intrusion detection agent")
+    parser.add_argument("log_file", nargs="?", default="/var/log/audit/audit.log",
+                        help="Path to audit.log (default: /var/log/audit/audit.log)")
+    parser.add_argument("--max-lines", type=int, default=50000, help="Max log lines to parse")
+    parser.add_argument("--ausearch-key", help="Run ausearch with this key")
+    parser.add_argument("--output", "-o", help="Output JSON report path")
+    args = parser.parse_args()
+
+    print("[*] Linux Audit Log Intrusion Detection Agent")
+
+    if args.ausearch_key:
+        result = run_ausearch(key=args.ausearch_key)
+        print(json.dumps(result, indent=2))
+        sys.exit(0)
+
+    events = parse_audit_log(args.log_file, args.max_lines)
+    if isinstance(events, dict) and "error" in events:
+        print(f"[!] {events['error']}")
+        print("[DEMO] Specify a valid audit.log path or run on a Linux system")
+        print(json.dumps({"demo": True, "monitored_syscalls": len(SUSPICIOUS_SYSCALLS)}, indent=2))
+        sys.exit(0)
+
+    findings = []
+    findings.extend(detect_privilege_escalation(events))
+    findings.extend(detect_file_access(events))
+    findings.extend(detect_suspicious_commands(events))
+
+    summary = generate_summary(events, findings)
+    print(f"[*] Events parsed: {summary['total_events']}")
+    print(f"[*] Findings: {summary['total_findings']}")
+    print(f"    By severity: {summary['by_severity']}")
+    for f in findings[:15]:
+        print(f"  [{f['severity']}] {f['type']}: {f.get('command', f.get('path', ''))}")
+
+    if args.output:
+        report = {"summary": summary, "findings": findings}
+        with open(args.output, "w") as f:
+            json.dump(report, f, indent=2, default=str)
+
+    print(json.dumps(summary, indent=2))
+
+
+if __name__ == "__main__":
+    main()
@@ -0,0 +1,21 @@
+MIT License
+
+Copyright (c) 2025 Mahipal
+
+Permission is hereby granted, free of charge, to any person obtaining a copy
+of this software and associated documentation files (the "Software"), to deal
+in the Software without restriction, including without limitation the rights
+to use, copy, modify, merge, publish, distribute, sublicense, and/or sell
+copies of the Software, and to permit persons to whom the Software is
+furnished to do so, subject to the following conditions:
+
+The above copyright notice and this permission notice shall be included in all
+copies or substantial portions of the Software.
+
+THE SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED "AS IS", WITHOUT WARRANTY OF ANY KIND, EXPRESS OR
+IMPLIED, INCLUDING BUT NOT LIMITED TO THE WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY,
+FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE AND NONINFRINGEMENT. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE
+AUTHORS OR COPYRIGHT HOLDERS BE LIABLE FOR ANY CLAIM, DAMAGES OR OTHER
+LIABILITY, WHETHER IN AN ACTION OF CONTRACT, TORT OR OTHERWISE, ARISING FROM,
+OUT OF OR IN CONNECTION WITH THE SOFTWARE OR THE USE OR OTHER DEALINGS IN THE
+SOFTWARE.
@@ -0,0 +1,18 @@
+---
+name: detecting-oauth-token-theft
+description: >
+  Detect OAuth access token theft and misuse by analyzing sign-in logs for
+  impossible travel, new device patterns, token replay from unusual IPs,
+  and anomalous scope requests via Microsoft Graph and Okta APIs.
+domain: cybersecurity
+subdomain: identity-security
+tags: [oauth, token-theft, identity-attacks, impossible-travel]
+version: "1.0"
+author: mahipal
+license: Apache-2.0
+---
+
+# Detecting OAuth Token Theft
+
+Analyze OAuth sign-in telemetry for indicators of token theft including
+impossible travel, device fingerprint changes, and token replay attacks.
@@ -0,0 +1,51 @@
+# API Reference: Detecting OAuth Token Theft
+
+## Microsoft Graph Sign-In Logs
+```bash
+# Query sign-in logs
+curl -H "Authorization: Bearer $MS_TOKEN" \
+  "https://graph.microsoft.com/v1.0/auditLogs/signIns?\$filter=createdDateTime ge 2025-01-01&\$top=100"
+```
+
+### Sign-In Event Fields
+| Field | Description |
+|-------|------------|
+| userPrincipalName | User email/UPN |
+| ipAddress | Source IP address |
+| location.city | Geo city |
+| location.geoCoordinates | Lat/lon |
+| deviceDetail.deviceId | Device identifier |
+| resourceDisplayName | Target resource |
+| status.errorCode | 0 = success |
+| riskState | none, confirmedCompromised, remediated |
+
+## Okta System Log API
+```bash
+# Query events
+curl -H "Authorization: SSWS $OKTA_TOKEN" \
+  "https://your-org.okta.com/api/v1/logs?filter=eventType eq \"user.session.start\"&since=2025-01-01"
+```
+
+## Detection Logic
+| Detection | Method |
+|-----------|--------|
+| Impossible travel | Haversine distance / time > 900 km/h |
+| Token replay | Same user, 3+ IPs within 5 min window |
+| New device | Device ID not in known device inventory |
+| Suspicious scopes | 2+ sensitive OAuth scopes requested |
+
+## Sensitive OAuth Scopes (Microsoft)
+| Scope | Risk |
+|-------|------|
+| Mail.ReadWrite | Email access |
+| Mail.Send | Send-as capability |
+| Files.ReadWrite.All | Full file access |
+| Directory.ReadWrite.All | AD modification |
+| Application.ReadWrite.All | App registration |
+
+## MITRE ATT&CK Mapping
+| Technique | Description |
+|-----------|------------|
+| T1528 | Steal Application Access Token |
+| T1550.001 | Application Access Token reuse |
+| T1078.004 | Cloud Accounts |
@@ -0,0 +1,185 @@
+#!/usr/bin/env python3
+"""OAuth token theft detection agent.
+
+Analyzes sign-in logs for impossible travel, new device sign-ins,
+token replay from unusual IPs, and anomalous scope requests.
+"""
+
+import argparse
+import json
+import math
+import sys
+import datetime
+import collections
+
+try:
+    import requests
+    HAS_REQUESTS = True
+except ImportError:
+    HAS_REQUESTS = False
+
+
+EARTH_RADIUS_KM = 6371
+
+
+def haversine(lat1, lon1, lat2, lon2):
+    """Calculate great-circle distance between two points in km."""
+    lat1, lon1, lat2, lon2 = map(math.radians, [lat1, lon1, lat2, lon2])
+    dlat = lat2 - lat1
+    dlon = lon2 - lon1
+    a = math.sin(dlat / 2) ** 2 + math.cos(lat1) * math.cos(lat2) * math.sin(dlon / 2) ** 2
+    return 2 * EARTH_RADIUS_KM * math.asin(math.sqrt(a))
+
+
+def detect_impossible_travel(sign_ins, max_speed_kmh=900):
+    """Detect impossible travel based on geo and time between logins."""
+    alerts = []
+    by_user = collections.defaultdict(list)
+    for event in sign_ins:
+        by_user[event.get("user", "")].append(event)
+
+    for user, events in by_user.items():
+        sorted_events = sorted(events, key=lambda e: e.get("timestamp", ""))
+        for i in range(1, len(sorted_events)):
+            prev, curr = sorted_events[i - 1], sorted_events[i]
+            if not all(k in prev for k in ("lat", "lon")) or not all(k in curr for k in ("lat", "lon")):
+                continue
+            dist = haversine(prev["lat"], prev["lon"], curr["lat"], curr["lon"])
+            try:
+                t1 = datetime.datetime.fromisoformat(prev["timestamp"].replace("Z", "+00:00"))
+                t2 = datetime.datetime.fromisoformat(curr["timestamp"].replace("Z", "+00:00"))
+                hours = max((t2 - t1).total_seconds() / 3600, 0.001)
+            except (ValueError, KeyError):
+                continue
+            speed = dist / hours
+            if speed > max_speed_kmh and dist > 100:
+                alerts.append({
+                    "type": "impossible_travel",
+                    "user": user,
+                    "from_ip": prev.get("ip", ""),
+                    "to_ip": curr.get("ip", ""),
+                    "distance_km": round(dist, 1),
+                    "time_hours": round(hours, 2),
+                    "speed_kmh": round(speed, 1),
+                    "severity": "HIGH",
+                })
+    return alerts
+
+
+def detect_token_replay(sign_ins):
+    """Detect token replay from multiple IPs in short timeframe."""
+    alerts = []
+    by_user = collections.defaultdict(list)
+    for event in sign_ins:
+        by_user[event.get("user", "")].append(event)
+
+    for user, events in by_user.items():
+        sorted_events = sorted(events, key=lambda e: e.get("timestamp", ""))
+        window = []
+        for event in sorted_events:
+            try:
+                ts = datetime.datetime.fromisoformat(event["timestamp"].replace("Z", "+00:00"))
+            except (ValueError, KeyError):
+                continue
+            window = [e for e in window
+                      if (ts - datetime.datetime.fromisoformat(
+                          e["timestamp"].replace("Z", "+00:00"))).total_seconds() < 300]
+            window.append(event)
+            unique_ips = set(e.get("ip") for e in window if e.get("ip"))
+            if len(unique_ips) >= 3:
+                alerts.append({
+                    "type": "token_replay",
+                    "user": user,
+                    "ips": list(unique_ips),
+                    "window_seconds": 300,
+                    "severity": "CRITICAL",
+                })
+    return alerts
+
+
+def detect_new_device(sign_ins, known_devices=None):
+    """Detect sign-ins from previously unseen devices."""
+    known = set(known_devices or [])
+    alerts = []
+    for event in sign_ins:
+        device_id = event.get("device_id", event.get("user_agent", ""))
+        if device_id and device_id not in known:
+            alerts.append({
+                "type": "new_device",
+                "user": event.get("user", ""),
+                "device": device_id,
+                "ip": event.get("ip", ""),
+                "timestamp": event.get("timestamp", ""),
+                "severity": "MEDIUM",
+            })
+            known.add(device_id)
+    return alerts
+
+
+def detect_suspicious_scopes(sign_ins):
+    """Detect OAuth requests with overly broad or sensitive scopes."""
+    sensitive_scopes = {
+        "Mail.ReadWrite", "Mail.Send", "Files.ReadWrite.All",
+        "Directory.ReadWrite.All", "User.ReadWrite.All",
+        "Application.ReadWrite.All", "RoleManagement.ReadWrite.Directory",
+    }
+    alerts = []
+    for event in sign_ins:
+        scopes = set(event.get("scopes", []))
+        dangerous = scopes & sensitive_scopes
+        if len(dangerous) >= 2:
+            alerts.append({
+                "type": "suspicious_scopes",
+                "user": event.get("user", ""),
+                "scopes": list(dangerous),
+                "app": event.get("app_name", ""),
+                "severity": "HIGH",
+            })
+    return alerts
+
+
+def main():
+    parser = argparse.ArgumentParser(description="OAuth token theft detection agent")
+    parser.add_argument("--log-file", help="JSON file with sign-in events")
+    parser.add_argument("--max-speed", type=int, default=900, help="Max travel speed km/h (default: 900)")
+    parser.add_argument("--output", "-o", help="Output JSON report path")
+    args = parser.parse_args()
+
+    print("[*] OAuth Token Theft Detection Agent")
+    report = {"timestamp": datetime.datetime.utcnow().isoformat() + "Z", "alerts": []}
+
+    if args.log_file:
+        with open(args.log_file) as f:
+            sign_ins = json.load(f)
+    else:
+        sign_ins = [
+            {"user": "alice@corp.com", "ip": "203.0.113.10", "lat": 40.7128, "lon": -74.0060,
+             "timestamp": "2025-06-15T10:00:00Z", "device_id": "device-A"},
+            {"user": "alice@corp.com", "ip": "198.51.100.50", "lat": 51.5074, "lon": -0.1278,
+             "timestamp": "2025-06-15T10:30:00Z", "device_id": "device-B"},
+            {"user": "bob@corp.com", "ip": "10.0.0.1", "lat": 37.7749, "lon": -122.4194,
+             "timestamp": "2025-06-15T09:00:00Z", "device_id": "device-C",
+             "scopes": ["Mail.ReadWrite", "Mail.Send", "Files.ReadWrite.All"]},
+        ]
+        print("[DEMO] Using sample sign-in events")
+
+    report["alerts"].extend(detect_impossible_travel(sign_ins, args.max_speed))
+    report["alerts"].extend(detect_token_replay(sign_ins))
+    report["alerts"].extend(detect_new_device(sign_ins))
+    report["alerts"].extend(detect_suspicious_scopes(sign_ins))
+
+    by_type = collections.Counter(a["type"] for a in report["alerts"])
+    print(f"[*] Total alerts: {len(report['alerts'])}")
+    for alert_type, count in by_type.items():
+        print(f"    {alert_type}: {count}")
+    for a in report["alerts"]:
+        print(f"  [{a['severity']}] {a['type']}: {a.get('user', '')} - {a.get('distance_km', a.get('ips', a.get('device', '')))}")
+
+    if args.output:
+        with open(args.output, "w") as f:
+            json.dump(report, f, indent=2)
+    print(json.dumps({"total_alerts": len(report["alerts"]), "by_type": dict(by_type)}, indent=2))
+
+
+if __name__ == "__main__":
+    main()
@@ -0,0 +1,21 @@
+MIT License
+
+Copyright (c) 2025 Mahipal
+
+Permission is hereby granted, free of charge, to any person obtaining a copy
+of this software and associated documentation files (the "Software"), to deal
+in the Software without restriction, including without limitation the rights
+to use, copy, modify, merge, publish, distribute, sublicense, and/or sell
+copies of the Software, and to permit persons to whom the Software is
+furnished to do so, subject to the following conditions:
+
+The above copyright notice and this permission notice shall be included in all
+copies or substantial portions of the Software.
+
+THE SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED "AS IS", WITHOUT WARRANTY OF ANY KIND, EXPRESS OR
+IMPLIED, INCLUDING BUT NOT LIMITED TO THE WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY,
+FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE AND NONINFRINGEMENT. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE
+AUTHORS OR COPYRIGHT HOLDERS BE LIABLE FOR ANY CLAIM, DAMAGES OR OTHER
+LIABILITY, WHETHER IN AN ACTION OF CONTRACT, TORT OR OTHERWISE, ARISING FROM,
+OUT OF OR IN CONNECTION WITH THE SOFTWARE OR THE USE OR OTHER DEALINGS IN THE
+SOFTWARE.
@@ -0,0 +1,19 @@
+---
+name: hunting-for-defense-evasion-via-timestomping
+description: >
+  Detect NTFS timestamp manipulation (MITRE T1070.006) by comparing
+  $STANDARD_INFORMATION vs $FILE_NAME timestamps in the MFT. Uses
+  analyzeMFT and Python to identify files with anomalous temporal
+  patterns indicating anti-forensic timestomping activity.
+domain: cybersecurity
+subdomain: threat-hunting
+tags: [timestomping, ntfs-forensics, mft-analysis, defense-evasion]
+version: "1.0"
+author: mahipal
+license: Apache-2.0
+---
+
+# Hunting for Defense Evasion via Timestomping
+
+Detect timestamp manipulation by analyzing NTFS MFT entries for
+discrepancies between $STANDARD_INFORMATION and $FILE_NAME attributes.
@@ -0,0 +1,67 @@
+# API Reference: Hunting for Timestomping (T1070.006)
+
+## NTFS Timestamp Attributes
+| Attribute | Modifiable By | Updated On |
+|-----------|--------------|------------|
+| $STANDARD_INFORMATION | User-level APIs (SetFileTime) | Create, modify, access, MFT change |
+| $FILE_NAME | Windows kernel only | File create, rename, move |
+
+## Detection Logic
+| Indicator | Description |
+|-----------|------------|
+| SI < FN Created | $SI creation before $FN creation (most reliable) |
+| Zero nanoseconds | .0000000 in timestamp (tool artifacts) |
+| Future timestamp | Date beyond current time |
+| Pre-OS timestamp | $SI before OS install but $FN after |
+| Round seconds | No fractional seconds (unusual for NTFS) |
+
+## analyzeMFT (Python)
+```bash
+pip install analyzemft
+
+# Parse MFT to CSV
+analyzeMFT.py -f /path/to/$MFT -o mft_output.csv
+
+# With body file output (for timeline)
+analyzeMFT.py -f $MFT -o mft.csv -b body.txt
+```
+
+## MFTECmd (Eric Zimmerman)
+```bash
+# Parse MFT to CSV
+MFTECmd.exe -f C:\evidence\$MFT --csv C:\output\
+
+# With $J (USN Journal)
+MFTECmd.exe -f $MFT --csv output\ --json output\
+```
+
+### CSV Columns
+| Column | Description |
+|--------|------------|
+| Record Number | MFT entry number |
+| Filename | File name |
+| SI Created/Modified/Accessed | $STANDARD_INFORMATION timestamps |
+| FN Created/Modified/Accessed | $FILE_NAME timestamps |
+| In Use | Active record flag |
+
+## USN Journal Analysis
+```bash
+# Parse USN Journal for corroboration
+MFTECmd.exe -f $J --csv output\
+
+# fsutil on live system
+fsutil usn readjournal C: csv > usn_journal.csv
+```
+
+## Timestomping Tools (for detection awareness)
+| Tool | Method |
+|------|--------|
+| timestomp (Metasploit) | SetFileTime API |
+| PowerShell Set-ItemProperty | .NET DateTime |
+| NirSoft BulkFileChanger | Batch timestamp edit |
+| $STANDARD_INFORMATION patch | Direct MFT edit |
+
+## MITRE ATT&CK
+- **T1070.006** - Indicator Removal: Timestomp
+- **Tactic**: Defense Evasion
+- **Platforms**: Windows
@@ -0,0 +1,206 @@
+#!/usr/bin/env python3
+"""Timestomping detection agent for NTFS MFT analysis.
+
+Detects MITRE T1070.006 (Timestomping) by comparing $STANDARD_INFORMATION
+and $FILE_NAME timestamps in NTFS Master File Table entries. Identifies
+anomalous nanosecond patterns and temporal inconsistencies.
+"""
+
+import argparse
+import csv
+import json
+import os
+import re
+import sys
+import datetime
+
+
+TIMESTOMP_INDICATORS = {
+    "zero_nanoseconds": "Nanosecond field is exactly 0000000 (common in timestomping tools)",
+    "si_before_fn": "$STANDARD_INFORMATION created before $FILE_NAME created",
+    "future_timestamp": "Timestamp is in the future",
+    "pre_os_timestamp": "Timestamp predates the operating system install",
+    "round_seconds": "Timestamp has perfectly round seconds (no fractional component)",
+}
+
+
+def parse_mft_csv(csv_path):
+    """Parse analyzeMFT CSV output for timestamp analysis."""
+    entries = []
+    try:
+        with open(csv_path, "r", encoding="utf-8", errors="replace") as f:
+            reader = csv.DictReader(f)
+            for row in reader:
+                entry = {
+                    "record_number": row.get("Record Number", ""),
+                    "filename": row.get("Filename", row.get("Good", "")),
+                    "si_created": row.get("SI Created", row.get("STD_INFO Creation date", "")),
+                    "si_modified": row.get("SI Modified", row.get("STD_INFO Modification date", "")),
+                    "si_accessed": row.get("SI Accessed", row.get("STD_INFO Access date", "")),
+                    "si_entry_modified": row.get("SI Entry Modified", row.get("STD_INFO Entry date", "")),
+                    "fn_created": row.get("FN Created", row.get("FN Creation date", "")),
+                    "fn_modified": row.get("FN Modified", row.get("FN Modification date", "")),
+                    "fn_accessed": row.get("FN Accessed", row.get("FN Access date", "")),
+                    "fn_entry_modified": row.get("FN Entry Modified", row.get("FN Entry date", "")),
+                    "in_use": row.get("Active", row.get("In Use", "")).lower() in ("true", "1", "yes"),
+                }
+                if entry["filename"]:
+                    entries.append(entry)
+    except FileNotFoundError:
+        return {"error": f"File not found: {csv_path}"}
+    return entries
+
+
+def parse_timestamp(ts_str):
+    """Parse various timestamp formats to datetime."""
+    if not ts_str or ts_str in ("", "NoFNDate", "N/A"):
+        return None
+    formats = [
+        "%Y-%m-%d %H:%M:%S.%f",
+        "%Y-%m-%d %H:%M:%S",
+        "%m/%d/%Y %H:%M:%S",
+        "%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S.%f",
+        "%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S",
+    ]
+    for fmt in formats:
+        try:
+            return datetime.datetime.strptime(ts_str.strip(), fmt)
+        except ValueError:
+            continue
+    return None
+
+
+def detect_timestomping(entries, os_install_date=None):
+    """Analyze MFT entries for timestomping indicators."""
+    if os_install_date is None:
+        os_install_date = datetime.datetime(2020, 1, 1)
+    now = datetime.datetime.now()
+    findings = []
+
+    for entry in entries:
+        if isinstance(entry, dict) and "error" in entry:
+            continue
+        reasons = []
+        si_created = parse_timestamp(entry.get("si_created", ""))
+        fn_created = parse_timestamp(entry.get("fn_created", ""))
+
+        # Check zero nanoseconds
+        si_str = entry.get("si_created", "")
+        if ".0000000" in si_str or (si_str and re.search(r"\.\d{6}0$", si_str)):
+            reasons.append("zero_nanoseconds")
+
+        # Check SI before FN (most reliable indicator)
+        if si_created and fn_created:
+            if si_created < fn_created - datetime.timedelta(seconds=2):
+                reasons.append("si_before_fn")
+
+        # Check future timestamps
+        if si_created and si_created > now + datetime.timedelta(days=1):
+            reasons.append("future_timestamp")
+
+        # Check pre-OS timestamps
+        if si_created and si_created < os_install_date:
+            if fn_created and fn_created >= os_install_date:
+                reasons.append("pre_os_timestamp")
+
+        # Check perfectly round timestamps
+        if si_created and si_created.microsecond == 0:
+            si_mod = parse_timestamp(entry.get("si_modified", ""))
+            if si_mod and si_mod.microsecond == 0:
+                reasons.append("round_seconds")
+
+        if reasons:
+            findings.append({
+                "filename": entry.get("filename", ""),
+                "record_number": entry.get("record_number", ""),
+                "si_created": entry.get("si_created", ""),
+                "fn_created": entry.get("fn_created", ""),
+                "indicators": reasons,
+                "descriptions": [TIMESTOMP_INDICATORS.get(r, r) for r in reasons],
+                "confidence": "HIGH" if "si_before_fn" in reasons else "MEDIUM",
+                "mitre": "T1070.006",
+            })
+
+    return findings
+
+
+def generate_report(entries, findings):
+    """Generate timestomping analysis report."""
+    return {
+        "timestamp": datetime.datetime.utcnow().isoformat() + "Z",
+        "total_mft_entries": len(entries) if isinstance(entries, list) else 0,
+        "total_findings": len(findings),
+        "high_confidence": sum(1 for f in findings if f.get("confidence") == "HIGH"),
+        "medium_confidence": sum(1 for f in findings if f.get("confidence") == "MEDIUM"),
+        "indicator_counts": dict(collections.Counter(
+            ind for f in findings for ind in f.get("indicators", [])
+        )) if findings else {},
+        "mitre_technique": "T1070.006 - Indicator Removal: Timestomp",
+    }
+
+
+# Need collections for generate_report
+import collections
+
+
+def main():
+    parser = argparse.ArgumentParser(
+        description="NTFS timestomping detection via MFT analysis (MITRE T1070.006)"
+    )
+    parser.add_argument("mft_csv", nargs="?", help="Path to analyzeMFT CSV output")
+    parser.add_argument("--os-install", help="OS install date (YYYY-MM-DD) for baseline")
+    parser.add_argument("--high-only", action="store_true", help="Show only HIGH confidence findings")
+    parser.add_argument("--output", "-o", help="Output JSON report path")
+    args = parser.parse_args()
+
+    print("[*] Timestomping Detection Agent (MITRE T1070.006)")
+    print("[*] Compares $STANDARD_INFORMATION vs $FILE_NAME timestamps")
+
+    if not args.mft_csv:
+        print("\n[DEMO] Usage:")
+        print("  1. Extract MFT: ftkimager /path/to/image mft_output")
+        print("  2. Parse MFT: analyzeMFT.py -f $MFT -o mft.csv")
+        print("  3. Detect: python agent.py mft.csv [--os-install 2022-01-15]")
+        print("\n  Indicators detected:")
+        for name, desc in TIMESTOMP_INDICATORS.items():
+            print(f"    - {name}: {desc}")
+        print(json.dumps({"demo": True, "indicators": len(TIMESTOMP_INDICATORS)}, indent=2))
+        sys.exit(0)
+
+    os_date = None
+    if args.os_install:
+        try:
+            os_date = datetime.datetime.strptime(args.os_install, "%Y-%m-%d")
+        except ValueError:
+            print(f"[!] Invalid date format: {args.os_install}")
+
+    entries = parse_mft_csv(args.mft_csv)
+    if isinstance(entries, dict) and "error" in entries:
+        print(f"[!] {entries['error']}")
+        sys.exit(1)
+
+    findings = detect_timestomping(entries, os_date)
+    if args.high_only:
+        findings = [f for f in findings if f.get("confidence") == "HIGH"]
+
+    report = generate_report(entries, findings)
+    print(f"[*] MFT entries analyzed: {report['total_mft_entries']}")
+    print(f"[*] Timestomping findings: {report['total_findings']}")
+    print(f"    HIGH confidence: {report['high_confidence']}")
+    print(f"    MEDIUM confidence: {report['medium_confidence']}")
+
+    for f in findings[:20]:
+        print(f"  [{f['confidence']}] {f['filename']}")
+        for desc in f["descriptions"]:
+            print(f"    - {desc}")
+
+    if args.output:
+        full_report = {"summary": report, "findings": findings}
+        with open(args.output, "w") as f:
+            json.dump(full_report, f, indent=2)
+
+    print(json.dumps(report, indent=2))
+
+
+if __name__ == "__main__":
+    main()
@@ -0,0 +1,21 @@
+MIT License
+
+Copyright (c) 2025 Mahipal
+
+Permission is hereby granted, free of charge, to any person obtaining a copy
+of this software and associated documentation files (the "Software"), to deal
+in the Software without restriction, including without limitation the rights
+to use, copy, modify, merge, publish, distribute, sublicense, and/or sell
+copies of the Software, and to permit persons to whom the Software is
+furnished to do so, subject to the following conditions:
+
+The above copyright notice and this permission notice shall be included in all
+copies or substantial portions of the Software.
+
+THE SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED "AS IS", WITHOUT WARRANTY OF ANY KIND, EXPRESS OR
+IMPLIED, INCLUDING BUT NOT LIMITED TO THE WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY,
+FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE AND NONINFRINGEMENT. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE
+AUTHORS OR COPYRIGHT HOLDERS BE LIABLE FOR ANY CLAIM, DAMAGES OR OTHER
+LIABILITY, WHETHER IN AN ACTION OF CONTRACT, TORT OR OTHERWISE, ARISING FROM,
+OUT OF OR IN CONNECTION WITH THE SOFTWARE OR THE USE OR OTHER DEALINGS IN THE
+SOFTWARE.
@@ -0,0 +1,18 @@
+---
+name: implementing-security-information-sharing-with-stix2
+description: >
+  Create, validate, and share STIX 2.1 threat intelligence objects using
+  the stix2 Python library. Covers indicators, malware, campaigns,
+  relationships, bundles, and TAXII 2.1 publishing.
+domain: cybersecurity
+subdomain: threat-intelligence
+tags: [stix, taxii, threat-sharing, intelligence-exchange]
+version: "1.0"
+author: mahipal
+license: Apache-2.0
+---
+
+# Implementing Security Information Sharing with STIX 2.1
+
+Build and share structured threat intelligence using STIX 2.1 objects
+with the stix2 Python library and TAXII 2.1 transport protocol.
@@ -0,0 +1,77 @@
+# API Reference: Security Information Sharing with STIX 2.1
+
+## stix2 Python Library
+```bash
+pip install stix2 taxii2-client
+```
+
+### Create Objects
+```python
+from stix2 import Indicator, Malware, Relationship, Bundle, Identity
+
+identity = Identity(name="My SOC", identity_class="organization")
+
+indicator = Indicator(
+    name="Malicious IP",
+    pattern="[ipv4-addr:value = '198.51.100.42']",
+    pattern_type="stix",
+    valid_from="2025-01-01T00:00:00Z",
+    created_by_ref=identity.id,
+)
+
+malware = Malware(name="EvilRAT", malware_types=["trojan"], is_family=True)
+
+rel = Relationship(source_ref=indicator.id, target_ref=malware.id,
+                   relationship_type="indicates")
+
+bundle = Bundle(objects=[identity, indicator, malware, rel])
+print(bundle.serialize(pretty=True))
+```
+
+### Validate and Parse
+```python
+import stix2
+
+parsed = stix2.parse(json_string, allow_custom=True)
+print(parsed.type, len(parsed.objects))
+```
+
+## STIX 2.1 Object Types
+| Type | Description |
+|------|------------|
+| indicator | IOC with STIX pattern |
+| malware | Malware family/sample |
+| campaign | Named threat campaign |
+| threat-actor | Threat group |
+| attack-pattern | TTP (ATT&CK technique) |
+| relationship | Link between objects |
+| sighting | Observation of indicator |
+| identity | Organization/individual |
+
+## TAXII 2.1 Publishing
+```python
+from taxii2client.v21 import Collection
+
+collection = Collection(
+    "https://taxii.server.com/taxii2/collections/abc-123/",
+    user="api_user", password="api_pass"
+)
+collection.add_objects(bundle.serialize())
+```
+
+## TLP Marking Definitions
+| TLP | stix2 Constant |
+|-----|---------------|
+| TLP:CLEAR | stix2.TLP_WHITE |
+| TLP:GREEN | stix2.TLP_GREEN |
+| TLP:AMBER | stix2.TLP_AMBER |
+| TLP:RED | stix2.TLP_RED |
+
+## STIX Pattern Examples
+| Type | Pattern |
+|------|---------|
+| IPv4 | `[ipv4-addr:value = '1.2.3.4']` |
+| Domain | `[domain-name:value = 'evil.com']` |
+| SHA-256 | `[file:hashes.'SHA-256' = 'abc...']` |
+| URL | `[url:value = 'https://evil.com/mal']` |
+| Email | `[email-addr:value = 'bad@evil.com']` |
@@ -0,0 +1,202 @@
+#!/usr/bin/env python3
+"""STIX 2.1 threat intelligence sharing agent.
+
+Creates, validates, and exports STIX 2.1 objects including indicators,
+malware, campaigns, and relationships using the stix2 Python library.
+"""
+
+import argparse
+import json
+import sys
+import datetime
+import uuid
+
+try:
+    import stix2
+    from stix2 import Indicator, Malware, Campaign, Relationship, Bundle
+    from stix2 import ThreatActor, Identity, Sighting, AttackPattern
+    HAS_STIX2 = True
+except ImportError:
+    HAS_STIX2 = False
+
+try:
+    from taxii2client.v21 import Collection, Server
+    HAS_TAXII = True
+except ImportError:
+    HAS_TAXII = False
+
+
+IDENTITY = None
+if HAS_STIX2:
+    IDENTITY = Identity(
+        id="identity--f165a29e-a997-5f8a-a63b-4b72b9f2f963",
+        name="Security Operations Center",
+        identity_class="organization",
+    )
+
+
+def create_indicator(value, indicator_type="ipv4-addr", confidence=80, tlp="TLP:AMBER"):
+    """Create a STIX 2.1 Indicator object."""
+    if not HAS_STIX2:
+        return {"error": "stix2 not installed. pip install stix2"}
+    pattern_map = {
+        "ipv4-addr": f"[ipv4-addr:value = '{value}']",
+        "domain-name": f"[domain-name:value = '{value}']",
+        "url": f"[url:value = '{value}']",
+        "file-sha256": f"[file:hashes.'SHA-256' = '{value}']",
+        "file-md5": f"[file:hashes.MD5 = '{value}']",
+        "email-addr": f"[email-addr:value = '{value}']",
+    }
+    pattern = pattern_map.get(indicator_type, f"[ipv4-addr:value = '{value}']")
+    marking = stix2.TLP_AMBER if tlp == "TLP:AMBER" else stix2.TLP_GREEN
+    return Indicator(
+        name=f"Malicious {indicator_type}: {value}",
+        pattern=pattern,
+        pattern_type="stix",
+        valid_from=datetime.datetime.now(datetime.timezone.utc),
+        confidence=confidence,
+        created_by_ref=IDENTITY.id,
+        object_marking_refs=[marking],
+    )
+
+
+def create_malware(name, malware_types=None, is_family=True, description=""):
+    """Create a STIX 2.1 Malware object."""
+    if not HAS_STIX2:
+        return {"error": "stix2 not installed"}
+    return Malware(
+        name=name,
+        malware_types=malware_types or ["ransomware"],
+        is_family=is_family,
+        description=description or f"Malware family: {name}",
+        created_by_ref=IDENTITY.id,
+    )
+
+
+def create_campaign(name, description="", first_seen=None):
+    """Create a STIX 2.1 Campaign object."""
+    if not HAS_STIX2:
+        return {"error": "stix2 not installed"}
+    kwargs = {"name": name, "description": description or f"Campaign: {name}",
+              "created_by_ref": IDENTITY.id}
+    if first_seen:
+        kwargs["first_seen"] = first_seen
+    return Campaign(**kwargs)
+
+
+def create_relationship(source, target, relationship_type="indicates"):
+    """Create a STIX 2.1 Relationship."""
+    if not HAS_STIX2:
+        return {"error": "stix2 not installed"}
+    return Relationship(
+        source_ref=source.id if hasattr(source, "id") else source,
+        target_ref=target.id if hasattr(target, "id") else target,
+        relationship_type=relationship_type,
+        created_by_ref=IDENTITY.id,
+    )
+
+
+def build_threat_report(indicators, malware_obj=None, campaign_obj=None):
+    """Build a STIX 2.1 Bundle with all objects and relationships."""
+    if not HAS_STIX2:
+        return {"error": "stix2 not installed"}
+    objects = [IDENTITY] + list(indicators)
+    relationships = []
+
+    if malware_obj:
+        objects.append(malware_obj)
+        for ind in indicators:
+            rel = create_relationship(ind, malware_obj, "indicates")
+            relationships.append(rel)
+
+    if campaign_obj:
+        objects.append(campaign_obj)
+        if malware_obj:
+            rel = create_relationship(campaign_obj, malware_obj, "uses")
+            relationships.append(rel)
+
+    objects.extend(relationships)
+    bundle = Bundle(objects=objects)
+    return bundle
+
+
+def publish_to_taxii(bundle, collection_url, username=None, password=None):
+    """Publish STIX bundle to TAXII 2.1 collection."""
+    if not HAS_TAXII:
+        return {"error": "taxii2-client not installed. pip install taxii2-client"}
+    try:
+        collection = Collection(collection_url, user=username, password=password)
+        collection.add_objects(bundle.serialize())
+        return {"status": "published", "collection": collection_url,
+                "object_count": len(bundle.objects)}
+    except Exception as e:
+        return {"error": str(e)}
+
+
+def validate_bundle(bundle_json):
+    """Validate a STIX 2.1 bundle."""
+    if not HAS_STIX2:
+        return {"error": "stix2 not installed"}
+    try:
+        parsed = stix2.parse(bundle_json, allow_custom=True)
+        return {"valid": True, "type": parsed.type,
+                "object_count": len(parsed.objects) if hasattr(parsed, "objects") else 1}
+    except Exception as e:
+        return {"valid": False, "error": str(e)}
+
+
+def main():
+    parser = argparse.ArgumentParser(description="STIX 2.1 threat intelligence sharing agent")
+    parser.add_argument("--create-indicator", help="Create indicator from value (e.g. 198.51.100.42)")
+    parser.add_argument("--type", default="ipv4-addr", help="Indicator type (default: ipv4-addr)")
+    parser.add_argument("--malware", help="Create malware object with this name")
+    parser.add_argument("--campaign", help="Create campaign object with this name")
+    parser.add_argument("--validate", help="Validate a STIX JSON file")
+    parser.add_argument("--output", "-o", help="Output STIX bundle JSON path")
+    args = parser.parse_args()
+
+    print("[*] STIX 2.1 Threat Intelligence Sharing Agent")
+    print(f"    stix2 available: {HAS_STIX2}")
+    print(f"    taxii2-client available: {HAS_TAXII}")
+
+    if args.validate:
+        with open(args.validate) as f:
+            result = validate_bundle(f.read())
+        print(json.dumps(result, indent=2))
+        sys.exit(0)
+
+    if not HAS_STIX2:
+        print("[!] Install stix2: pip install stix2")
+        sys.exit(1)
+
+    indicators = []
+    if args.create_indicator:
+        ind = create_indicator(args.create_indicator, args.type)
+        indicators.append(ind)
+        print(f"[+] Created indicator: {ind.name}")
+    else:
+        demo_iocs = [("198.51.100.42", "ipv4-addr"), ("evil.example.com", "domain-name"),
+                     ("a" * 64, "file-sha256")]
+        for val, itype in demo_iocs:
+            indicators.append(create_indicator(val, itype))
+        print(f"[DEMO] Created {len(indicators)} sample indicators")
+
+    malware_obj = create_malware(args.malware) if args.malware else create_malware("DemoRAT", ["trojan"])
+    campaign_obj = create_campaign(args.campaign) if args.campaign else None
+    bundle = build_threat_report(indicators, malware_obj, campaign_obj)
+
+    print(f"\n[*] Bundle: {bundle.id}")
+    print(f"    Objects: {len(bundle.objects)}")
+    for obj in bundle.objects:
+        print(f"    - {obj.type}: {getattr(obj, 'name', getattr(obj, 'id', ''))}")
+
+    if args.output:
+        with open(args.output, "w") as f:
+            f.write(bundle.serialize(pretty=True))
+        print(f"[*] Bundle saved to {args.output}")
+
+    print(json.dumps({"objects": len(bundle.objects), "stix_version": "2.1"}, indent=2))
+
+
+if __name__ == "__main__":
+    main()
@@ -0,0 +1,21 @@
+MIT License
+
+Copyright (c) 2025 Mahipal
+
+Permission is hereby granted, free of charge, to any person obtaining a copy
+of this software and associated documentation files (the "Software"), to deal
+in the Software without restriction, including without limitation the rights
+to use, copy, modify, merge, publish, distribute, sublicense, and/or sell
+copies of the Software, and to permit persons to whom the Software is
+furnished to do so, subject to the following conditions:
+
+The above copyright notice and this permission notice shall be included in all
+copies or substantial portions of the Software.
+
+THE SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED "AS IS", WITHOUT WARRANTY OF ANY KIND, EXPRESS OR
+IMPLIED, INCLUDING BUT NOT LIMITED TO THE WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY,
+FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE AND NONINFRINGEMENT. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE
+AUTHORS OR COPYRIGHT HOLDERS BE LIABLE FOR ANY CLAIM, DAMAGES OR OTHER
+LIABILITY, WHETHER IN AN ACTION OF CONTRACT, TORT OR OTHERWISE, ARISING FROM,
+OUT OF OR IN CONNECTION WITH THE SOFTWARE OR THE USE OR OTHER DEALINGS IN THE
+SOFTWARE.
@@ -0,0 +1,21 @@
+---
+name: performing-binary-exploitation-analysis
+description: >
+  Analyze binary exploitation techniques including buffer overflows and
+  ROP chains using pwntools Python library. Covers checksec analysis,
+  gadget discovery with ROPgadget, and exploit development for CTF and
+  authorized security assessments.
+domain: cybersecurity
+subdomain: offensive-security
+tags: [binary-exploitation, pwntools, rop-chains, buffer-overflow]
+version: "1.0"
+author: mahipal
+license: Apache-2.0
+---
+
+# Performing Binary Exploitation Analysis
+
+# For authorized security testing and CTF challenges only
+
+Analyze ELF binaries for exploitation vectors using checksec, ROPgadget,
+and pwntools for buffer overflow and ROP chain development.
@@ -0,0 +1,74 @@
+# API Reference: Binary Exploitation Analysis
+
+## pwntools (Python)
+```bash
+pip install pwntools
+```
+
+### ELF Analysis
+```python
+from pwn import ELF, ROP, context
+
+elf = ELF('./vulnerable_binary')
+print(elf.checksec())         # Security mitigations
+print(hex(elf.sym['main']))   # Symbol address
+print(hex(elf.plt['system'])) # PLT entry
+print(hex(elf.got['puts']))   # GOT entry
+
+# ROP gadget discovery
+rop = ROP(elf)
+pop_rdi = rop.find_gadget(['pop rdi', 'ret'])[0]
+ret = rop.find_gadget(['ret'])[0]
+```
+
+### Exploit Template
+```python
+from pwn import *
+
+context.binary = elf = ELF('./vuln')
+p = process('./vuln')  # or remote('host', port)
+payload = flat(b'A' * offset, pop_rdi, next(elf.search(b'/bin/sh')), elf.plt['system'])
+p.sendline(payload)
+p.interactive()
+```
+
+## checksec CLI
+```bash
+checksec --file ./binary
+checksec --file ./binary --output json
+```
+
+### Output Fields
+| Field | Values | Impact |
+|-------|--------|--------|
+| NX | Enabled/Disabled | No shellcode on stack |
+| PIE | Enabled/Disabled | Randomized addresses |
+| Canary | Found/Not found | Stack smash detection |
+| RELRO | Full/Partial/None | GOT write protection |
+
+## ROPgadget CLI
+```bash
+# Find all gadgets
+ROPgadget --binary ./vuln
+
+# Search specific gadget
+ROPgadget --binary ./vuln --only "pop|ret"
+
+# Generate ROP chain
+ROPgadget --binary ./vuln --ropchain
+```
+
+## Dangerous Functions
+| Function | Risk |
+|----------|------|
+| gets() | Unbounded stdin read |
+| strcpy() | No length check |
+| sprintf() | No length check |
+| scanf() | Possible overflow |
+
+## MITRE ATT&CK
+| Technique | Description |
+|-----------|------------|
+| T1203 | Exploitation for Client Execution |
+| T1068 | Exploitation for Privilege Escalation |
+| T1211 | Exploitation for Defense Evasion |
@@ -0,0 +1,202 @@
+#!/usr/bin/env python3
+"""Binary exploitation analysis agent.
+
+# For authorized security testing and CTF challenges only
+
+Analyzes ELF binaries for security mitigations, discovers ROP gadgets,
+and assists exploit development using pwntools and checksec.
+"""
+
+import argparse
+import json
+import os
+import struct
+import subprocess
+import sys
+import datetime
+
+try:
+    from pwn import ELF, ROP, context
+    HAS_PWNTOOLS = True
+except ImportError:
+    HAS_PWNTOOLS = False
+
+
+def run_checksec(binary_path):
+    """Analyze binary security mitigations using checksec."""
+    if HAS_PWNTOOLS:
+        try:
+            elf = ELF(binary_path, checksec=False)
+            return {
+                "arch": elf.arch,
+                "bits": elf.bits,
+                "endian": elf.endian,
+                "nx": elf.nx,
+                "pie": elf.pie,
+                "canary": elf.canary,
+                "relro": "Full" if elf.relro == "Full" else ("Partial" if elf.relro else "None"),
+                "stripped": not elf.sym,
+                "static": elf.statically_linked,
+            }
+        except Exception as e:
+            return {"error": str(e)}
+    try:
+        result = subprocess.run(["checksec", "--file", binary_path, "--output", "json"],
+                                capture_output=True, text=True, timeout=10)
+        if result.stdout:
+            return json.loads(result.stdout)
+    except (FileNotFoundError, subprocess.TimeoutExpired, json.JSONDecodeError):
+        pass
+    return {"error": "Neither pwntools nor checksec available"}
+
+
+def find_rop_gadgets(binary_path, max_gadgets=20):
+    """Find ROP gadgets using pwntools or ROPgadget."""
+    if HAS_PWNTOOLS:
+        try:
+            elf = ELF(binary_path, checksec=False)
+            rop = ROP(elf)
+            gadgets = []
+            for gadget in rop.gadgets.values():
+                if len(gadgets) >= max_gadgets:
+                    break
+                gadgets.append({
+                    "address": hex(gadget.address),
+                    "insns": "; ".join(gadget.insns),
+                })
+            return gadgets
+        except Exception as e:
+            return [{"error": str(e)}]
+    try:
+        result = subprocess.run(
+            ["ROPgadget", "--binary", binary_path, "--count", str(max_gadgets)],
+            capture_output=True, text=True, timeout=30
+        )
+        gadgets = []
+        for line in result.stdout.splitlines():
+            if " : " in line:
+                parts = line.split(" : ", 1)
+                gadgets.append({"address": parts[0].strip(), "insns": parts[1].strip()})
+        return gadgets[:max_gadgets]
+    except (FileNotFoundError, subprocess.TimeoutExpired):
+        return [{"error": "Neither pwntools ROP nor ROPgadget available"}]
+
+
+def find_useful_functions(binary_path):
+    """Find useful functions for exploitation (system, exec, write, etc.)."""
+    if not HAS_PWNTOOLS:
+        return {"error": "pwntools not available"}
+    try:
+        elf = ELF(binary_path, checksec=False)
+        interesting = ["system", "execve", "exec", "popen", "gets", "strcpy",
+                       "sprintf", "read", "write", "puts", "printf", "mprotect"]
+        found = {}
+        for func in interesting:
+            addr = elf.sym.get(func) or elf.plt.get(func)
+            if addr:
+                found[func] = hex(addr)
+        got_entries = {}
+        for name in ["system", "printf", "puts", "__libc_start_main"]:
+            if name in elf.got:
+                got_entries[name] = hex(elf.got[name])
+        return {"functions": found, "got_entries": got_entries}
+    except Exception as e:
+        return {"error": str(e)}
+
+
+def find_vulnerable_functions(binary_path):
+    """Identify potentially vulnerable functions in the binary."""
+    dangerous = {"gets": "Unbounded read - guaranteed buffer overflow",
+                 "strcpy": "No length check - possible overflow",
+                 "strcat": "No length check - possible overflow",
+                 "sprintf": "No length check - possible overflow",
+                 "scanf": "Possible format string / overflow",
+                 "vsprintf": "No length check - possible overflow"}
+    if not HAS_PWNTOOLS:
+        return {"error": "pwntools not available"}
+    try:
+        elf = ELF(binary_path, checksec=False)
+        found = []
+        for func, reason in dangerous.items():
+            if func in elf.plt or func in elf.sym:
+                found.append({"function": func, "reason": reason,
+                              "address": hex(elf.plt.get(func, elf.sym.get(func, 0)))})
+        return found
+    except Exception as e:
+        return [{"error": str(e)}]
+
+
+def analyze_binary(binary_path):
+    """Full binary exploitation analysis."""
+    report = {
+        "binary": binary_path,
+        "timestamp": datetime.datetime.utcnow().isoformat() + "Z",
+        "checksec": run_checksec(binary_path),
+        "dangerous_functions": find_vulnerable_functions(binary_path),
+        "useful_functions": find_useful_functions(binary_path),
+        "rop_gadgets": find_rop_gadgets(binary_path, max_gadgets=15),
+    }
+    mitigations = report["checksec"]
+    if isinstance(mitigations, dict) and "error" not in mitigations:
+        report["exploit_difficulty"] = "HARD" if all([
+            mitigations.get("nx"), mitigations.get("pie"),
+            mitigations.get("canary"), mitigations.get("relro") == "Full"
+        ]) else "MEDIUM" if mitigations.get("nx") else "EASY"
+    return report
+
+
+def main():
+    parser = argparse.ArgumentParser(
+        description="Binary exploitation analysis agent (authorized testing only)"
+    )
+    parser.add_argument("binary", nargs="?", help="Path to ELF binary")
+    parser.add_argument("--checksec-only", action="store_true", help="Only run checksec")
+    parser.add_argument("--gadgets", type=int, default=15, help="Max ROP gadgets to find")
+    parser.add_argument("--output", "-o", help="Output JSON report path")
+    args = parser.parse_args()
+
+    print("[*] Binary Exploitation Analysis Agent")
+    print("[*] For authorized security testing and CTF challenges only")
+    print(f"    pwntools available: {HAS_PWNTOOLS}")
+
+    if not args.binary:
+        print("\nUsage: python agent.py /path/to/binary [--checksec-only] [--gadgets 20]")
+        print("  Analyzes: mitigations, dangerous functions, ROP gadgets, GOT entries")
+        print(json.dumps({"demo": True, "pwntools": HAS_PWNTOOLS}, indent=2))
+        sys.exit(0)
+
+    if args.checksec_only:
+        result = run_checksec(args.binary)
+        print(json.dumps(result, indent=2))
+        sys.exit(0)
+
+    report = analyze_binary(args.binary)
+    checksec = report.get("checksec", {})
+    if isinstance(checksec, dict) and "error" not in checksec:
+        print(f"\n[*] Architecture: {checksec.get('arch')} ({checksec.get('bits')}-bit)")
+        print(f"    NX: {checksec.get('nx')} | PIE: {checksec.get('pie')} | "
+              f"Canary: {checksec.get('canary')} | RELRO: {checksec.get('relro')}")
+        print(f"    Exploit difficulty: {report.get('exploit_difficulty', '?')}")
+
+    dangerous = report.get("dangerous_functions", [])
+    if isinstance(dangerous, list) and dangerous:
+        print(f"\n[!] Dangerous functions found: {len(dangerous)}")
+        for d in dangerous:
+            if "error" not in d:
+                print(f"    {d['function']} @ {d['address']}: {d['reason']}")
+
+    gadgets = report.get("rop_gadgets", [])
+    if gadgets and "error" not in gadgets[0]:
+        print(f"\n[*] ROP gadgets found: {len(gadgets)}")
+        for g in gadgets[:5]:
+            print(f"    {g['address']}: {g['insns']}")
+
+    if args.output:
+        with open(args.output, "w") as f:
+            json.dump(report, f, indent=2)
+    print(json.dumps({"difficulty": report.get("exploit_difficulty", "unknown"),
+                       "gadgets": len(gadgets)}, indent=2))
+
+
+if __name__ == "__main__":
+    main()