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- Add mitre_f3 frontmatter block to 94 fraud-relevant skills (phishing, account takeover, banking malware, BEC, identity/KYC, payment/card fraud, money-mule/cash-out, ransomware extortion, DFIR, threat intel) - Map each skill to F3 v1.1 tactics + precise technique IDs, including the two F3-specific tactics ATT&CK lacks: Positioning (FA0001) and Monetization (FA0002) - All 123 F3 v1.1 technique IDs validated against the upstream STIX bundle (github.com/center-for-threat-informed-defense/fight-fraud-framework): 0 invalid IDs, 0 invalid tactics, 0 name mismatches, no placeholder IDs - mitre_f3 kept as a separate block from mitre_attack (F3 redefines several ATT&CK tactics for the fraud context) - Add docs/mitre-f3-mapping.md schema reference - Update README: F3 as the 6th framework, dedicated F3 section + badge
210 lines
8.6 KiB
Markdown
210 lines
8.6 KiB
Markdown
---
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name: building-ransomware-playbook-with-cisa-framework
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description: 'Builds a structured ransomware incident response playbook aligned with
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the CISA StopRansomware Guide and NIST Cybersecurity Framework. Covers preparation,
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detection, containment, eradication, recovery, and post-incident phases with actionable
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checklists. Activates for requests involving ransomware response planning, CISA
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compliance, incident response playbook creation, or ransomware preparedness assessment.
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'
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domain: cybersecurity
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subdomain: ransomware-defense
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tags:
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- ransomware
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- incident-response
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- CISA
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- playbook
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- compliance
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- NIST
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version: 1.0.0
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author: mahipal
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license: Apache-2.0
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nist_csf:
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- PR.DS-11
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- RS.MA-01
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- RC.RP-01
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- PR.IR-01
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mitre_attack:
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- T1486
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- T1490
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- T1489
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- T1078
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- T1021.002
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mitre_f3:
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version: '1.1'
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tactics:
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- initial-access
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- monetization
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techniques:
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- id: T1660
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name: Phishing
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tactic: initial-access
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source: attack
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- id: T1110
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name: Brute Force
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tactic: initial-access
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source: attack
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- id: F1018
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name: Convert to Cryptocurrency
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tactic: monetization
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source: f3
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- id: F1047
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name: Transfer of funds
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tactic: monetization
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source: f3
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---
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# Building Ransomware Playbook with CISA Framework
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## When to Use
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- An organization needs to create or update its ransomware incident response playbook following CISA guidelines
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- A security team is conducting a ransomware readiness assessment against the CISA StopRansomware framework
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- Compliance requires documenting ransomware response procedures aligned with NIST CSF and CISA recommendations
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- During tabletop exercises to validate that the organization's ransomware response steps match industry best practices
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- After a ransomware incident to update the playbook with lessons learned and close identified gaps
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**Do not use** as a substitute for legal counsel regarding ransom payment decisions, breach notification timelines, or regulatory obligations specific to your jurisdiction.
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## Prerequisites
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- Familiarity with the CISA StopRansomware Guide (cisa.gov/stopransomware/ransomware-guide)
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- NIST Cybersecurity Framework (CSF) understanding (Identify, Protect, Detect, Respond, Recover)
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- Inventory of critical assets, backup infrastructure, and communication channels
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- Defined roles and responsibilities for incident response team members
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- Python 3.8+ for playbook generation and compliance checking automation
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- Access to organization's asset inventory and backup configuration documentation
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## Workflow
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### Step 1: Preparation Phase (CISA Part 1 - Prevention)
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Establish ransomware-specific defenses before an incident:
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```
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CISA Preparation Checklist:
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━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━
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[ ] Maintain offline, encrypted backups tested for restoration
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[ ] Create and exercise a cyber incident response plan (IRP)
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[ ] Implement network segmentation between IT and OT networks
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[ ] Enable MFA on all remote access and privileged accounts
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[ ] Deploy endpoint detection and response (EDR) on all endpoints
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[ ] Disable or restrict RDP; require VPN for remote access
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[ ] Maintain a software/hardware asset inventory
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[ ] Apply patches within 48 hours for internet-facing systems
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[ ] Configure email filtering and disable macro execution by default
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[ ] Conduct regular phishing awareness training
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[ ] Implement application allowlisting (AppLocker/WDAC)
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[ ] Test backup restoration quarterly and document RTO/RPO
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```
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### Step 2: Detection and Analysis Phase
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Identify ransomware indicators and assess scope:
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```
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Detection Indicators:
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━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━
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- Mass file rename operations with new extensions (.locked, .encrypted)
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- Ransom notes appearing in directories (README.txt, DECRYPT.html)
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- Volume Shadow Copy deletion (vssadmin delete shadows)
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- Abnormal CPU usage from encryption processes
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- EDR/AV alerts for known ransomware signatures
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- Network connections to known C2 infrastructure
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- Unusual lateral movement via SMB or PsExec
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- Sysmon Event ID 11 (file creation) spikes
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Initial Analysis Steps (CISA):
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1. Take system images and memory captures of affected devices
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2. Identify patient zero and initial access vector
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3. Determine the ransomware family (ID Ransomware, ransom note analysis)
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4. Assess encryption scope: which systems, shares, and data are affected
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5. Check if data exfiltration occurred (double extortion indicator)
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```
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### Step 3: Containment Phase
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Stop the spread and preserve evidence:
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```
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Immediate Containment (First 1-4 hours):
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━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━
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1. Isolate affected systems from the network (disable NICs, VLAN quarantine)
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2. If unable to disconnect, power down affected systems
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3. Disable shared drives to prevent encryption spread
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4. Reset credentials for compromised accounts (especially admin/service accounts)
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5. Block known ransomware IOCs at firewall/proxy (C2 domains, IPs)
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6. Preserve forensic evidence (memory dumps, disk images, logs)
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7. Engage legal counsel and prepare breach notification if data exfiltrated
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Extended Containment:
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- Identify and patch the initial access vector (phishing, RDP, VPN vuln)
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- Audit all Active Directory accounts for persistence (scheduled tasks, services)
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- Check for backdoors or additional malware beyond the ransomware payload
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```
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### Step 4: Eradication and Recovery Phase
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Remove the threat and restore operations:
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```
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CISA Recovery Steps:
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━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━
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1. Rebuild affected systems from known-clean images (do NOT decrypt in place)
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2. Restore data from offline backups (verify backup integrity first)
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3. Reset ALL passwords including service accounts, krbtgt (twice, 12h apart)
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4. Scan restored systems with updated AV/EDR before reconnecting to network
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5. Re-enable services in priority order based on business criticality
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6. Monitor restored systems intensively for 72 hours for reinfection
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Recovery Priority Matrix:
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P1 (0-4h): Domain controllers, DNS, authentication infrastructure
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P2 (4-24h): Email, critical business applications, databases
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P3 (1-3d): File servers, departmental applications
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P4 (3-7d): Non-critical systems, development environments
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```
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### Step 5: Post-Incident Activity
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Document lessons learned and improve defenses:
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```
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Post-Incident Report Template:
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━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━
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1. Executive summary: What happened, impact, resolution
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2. Timeline: Detection to full recovery with timestamps
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3. Root cause analysis: Initial access vector and propagation path
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4. Scope: Number of systems, data volumes, business impact in hours/dollars
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5. Response effectiveness: What worked, what failed, what was missing
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6. Recommendations: Specific technical and procedural improvements
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7. Compliance actions: Notification timeline, regulatory obligations met
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8. Updated playbook: Revisions based on lessons learned
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```
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## Verification
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- Validate playbook completeness against CISA StopRansomware checklist items
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- Conduct tabletop exercise using the playbook with all stakeholders
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- Verify backup restoration procedures work within documented RTO targets
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- Test communication plans including out-of-band channels
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- Confirm legal and regulatory notification procedures are current
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- Review and update the playbook at least annually or after any incident
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## Key Concepts
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| Term | Definition |
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|------|------------|
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| **CISA StopRansomware Guide** | Joint CISA/MS-ISAC/NSA/FBI guide providing ransomware prevention best practices and response checklists |
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| **RTO/RPO** | Recovery Time Objective (max downtime) and Recovery Point Objective (max data loss); critical metrics for backup planning |
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| **Double Extortion** | Ransomware tactic where attackers both encrypt data and threaten to publish stolen data unless paid |
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| **Patient Zero** | The first system compromised in an incident; identifying it reveals the initial access vector |
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| **Tabletop Exercise** | Simulated incident scenario walked through by the response team to validate the playbook without live systems |
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## Tools & Systems
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- **CISA StopRansomware Guide**: Primary framework for ransomware response planning and prevention
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- **NIST CSF**: Cybersecurity Framework providing the Identify/Protect/Detect/Respond/Recover structure
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- **ID Ransomware**: Service for identifying ransomware families from encrypted files and ransom notes
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- **MITRE ATT&CK**: Technique framework for mapping ransomware TTPs to detection opportunities
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- **Velociraptor**: Endpoint visibility tool for rapid triage and forensic artifact collection during incidents
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