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- Add validated mitre_attack frontmatter to all 754 skills (286 distinct techniques), verified against MITRE ATT&CK v19.1 via the official mitreattack-python library: 0 revoked, deprecated, or invalid IDs - Curate precise per-skill technique IDs for forensics, malware-analysis, threat-intel, and red-team skills (e.g. DCSync -> T1003.006, Kerberoasting -> T1558.003, Pass-the-Ticket -> T1550.003) - Reconcile v19.1 tactic restructuring: Defense Evasion split into Stealth (TA0005) and Defense Impairment (TA0112); revoked T1562.* family and T1070.001/.002 remapped to active equivalents (T1685.*) - Normalize word-split tags across 35 skills (remove filename-derived stopword tags, add semantic cybersecurity tags) - Add api-reference.md for 3 skills that were missing it - Update README ATT&CK section with accurate v19.1 tactic distribution
67 lines
2.2 KiB
Markdown
67 lines
2.2 KiB
Markdown
---
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name: implementing-container-network-policies-with-calico
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description: Enforce Kubernetes network segmentation using Calico CNI network policies
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and global network policies to control pod-to-pod traffic, restrict egress, and
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implement zero-trust microsegmentation.
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domain: cybersecurity
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subdomain: container-security
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tags:
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- container-security
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- kubernetes
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- calico
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- network-policy
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- microsegmentation
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- cni
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version: '1.0'
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author: mahipal
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license: Apache-2.0
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nist_csf:
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- PR.PS-01
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- PR.IR-01
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- ID.AM-08
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- DE.CM-01
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mitre_attack:
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- T1610
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- T1611
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- T1609
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- T1525
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---
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# Implementing Container Network Policies with Calico
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## Overview
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Calico provides Kubernetes-native and extended network policy enforcement through its CNI plugin. This skill covers creating and auditing Calico NetworkPolicy and GlobalNetworkPolicy resources to implement pod-to-pod traffic control, namespace isolation, egress restrictions, and DNS-based policy rules using calicoctl and the Kubernetes API.
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## When to Use
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- When deploying or configuring implementing container network policies with calico capabilities in your environment
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- When establishing security controls aligned to compliance requirements
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- When building or improving security architecture for this domain
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- When conducting security assessments that require this implementation
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## Prerequisites
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- Kubernetes cluster with Calico CNI installed
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- Python 3.9+ with `kubernetes` client library
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- calicoctl CLI tool installed and configured
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- kubectl access with RBAC permissions for network policy management
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## Steps
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### Step 1: Audit Existing Network Policies
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Use calicoctl and kubectl to inventory current network policies and identify unprotected namespaces.
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### Step 2: Implement Default-Deny Policies
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Create default-deny ingress and egress policies per namespace as a zero-trust baseline.
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### Step 3: Create Workload-Specific Allow Rules
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Define granular allow rules for legitimate pod-to-pod and pod-to-service communication.
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### Step 4: Validate Policy Enforcement
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Test connectivity between pods to verify policies are correctly enforced.
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## Expected Output
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JSON audit report listing all network policies, unprotected namespaces, policy rule counts, and connectivity test results.
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